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ABSTRACT 
Computer security incident response is a critical capability in light of the growing 
threat of malware infecting endpoint systems today. Ransomware is one type of malware that 
is causing increasing harm to organizations. Ransomware infects an endpoint system by 
encrypting files until a ransom is paid. Ransomware can have a negative impact on an 
organization’s daily functions if critical business files are encrypted and are not backed up 
properly. 
Many tools exist that claim to detect and respond to malware. Organizations and small 
businesses are often short-staffed and lack the technical expertise to properly configure 
security tools. One such endpoint detection tool is Sysmon, which logs critical events to the 
Windows event log. Sysmon is free to download on the Internet. The details contained in 
Sysmon events can be extremely helpful during an incident response. The author of Sysmon 
states that the Sysmon configuration needs be iteratively assessed to determine which Sysmon 
events are most effective. Unfortunately, an organization may not have the time, knowledge, 
or infrastructure to properly configure and analyze Sysmon events. If configured incorrectly, 
the organization may have a false sense of security or lack the logs necessary to respond 
quickly and accurately during a malware incident. 
This research seeks to answer the question “What methodology can an organization 
follow to determine which Sysmon events should be analyzed to identify ransomware in a 
Windows environment?” The answer to this question helps organizations make informed 
decisions regarding how to configure Sysmon and analyze Sysmon logs. This study uses 
design science research methods to create three artifacts: a method, an instantiation, and a 
tool. The artifacts are used to analyze Sysmon logs against a ransomware dataset consisting of 
publicly available samples from three ransomware families that were major threats in 2017 
according to Symantec. The artifacts are built using software that is free to download on the 
Internet. Step-by-step instructions, source code, and configuration files are provided so that 
other researchers can replicate and expand on the results. The end goal provides concrete 
results that organizations can apply directly to their environment to begin leveraging the 
benefits of Sysmon and understand the analytics needed to identify suspicious activity during 
an incident response. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Background of the Problem 
This research focuses on computer security incident response and provides rigorous 
results that help organizations make informed decisions about the tools and techniques used to 
identify suspicious activity on computer systems during an incident response. The Verizon 
“2017 Data Breach Investigations Report” defines an incident as “a security event that 
compromises the integrity, confidentiality or availability of an information asset”. Computer 
incident response, which is the act of responding to an incident, is an increasingly critical skill 
for all Information Technology (IT) professionals. In 2004, the National Institute of Science 
and Technology (NIST) stated that a computer security incident response capability is 
“necessary for rapidly detecting incidents, minimizing loss and destruction, mitigating the 
weaknesses that were exploited, and restoring IT services.” (Grance, Kent & Kim, 2004). A 
recent CSO Online article predicted that the growing impact of cybercrime has made every IT 
position a cybersecurity position (Morgan, 2018). 
Logging important data from computers and networks is essential to facilitate incident 
response efforts. In 2006, NIST recommended that “organizations be proactive in collecting 
useful data” to aid incident response effectiveness (Kent, Chevalier, Grance & Dang, 2006). 
Specific recommendations included auditing operating system behavior and implementing 
centralized logging so that data is available during forensic events. One month later, NIST 
published recommended guidelines for how to manage computer security logs, including how 
to generate, transmit, store, analyze, and dispose of computer security log data (Kent & 
Souppaya, 2006). In the years since this NIST guidance was published, computer security 
incidents have increased dramatically. An information security survey conducted by PwC 
concluded that the number of reported security incidents averaged 117,339 attacks per day in 
2014 and the growth rate of detected incidents has increased 66% each year since 2009 (PwC, 
2015). In this rapidly growing environment of security incidents and cybercrime, 
organizations must be even more prepared to respond to computer security incidents. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Organizations must be prepared to respond to computer security incidents. Many tools 
and techniques exist to provide insight into what events took place on a system during an 
incident response. The Sysinternals Suite provides a bundle of tools to gain insight into 
Microsoft Windows systems (Russinovich & Garnier, 2016). Sysmon is a tool in the 
Sysinternals Suite that logs specific system activity to the Windows event log to help record 
and identify malicious or anomalous activity (Russinovich & Garnier, 2017). The Symon 
author Mark Russinovich has given numerous talks showing how he used Sysmon to identify 
malware running on a Windows system (Russinovich, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017). Sysmon 
provides logging only; the tool does not analyze events. Sysmon documentation states that 
Sysmon should be used with a Security Information & Event Management (SIEM) system to 
provide event correlation for analysis (Russinovich & Garnier, 2017). 
The Sysmon tool is useful for logging Windows system activity, but there is little 
guidance concerning which Sysmon events are most likely to indicate suspicious activity. 
Russinovich has stated that creating a good configuration file is an iterative process consisting 
of a cycle that involves editing the configuration, deploying it, and assessing it (Russinovich, 
2017a). Unfortunately, many organizations do not have the knowledge or the infrastructure to 
perform detailed testing of security tools such as Sysmon. In addition, when faced with so 
many Sysmon configuration options, many organizations do not have the time or the expertise 
to configure the tool effectively or analyze the results properly. 
Objectives of the Research 
This research strives to answer the question “What methodology can an organization 
follow to determine which Sysmon events should be analyzed to identify ransomware in a 
Windows environment?” The objective of this research is to develop a practical and relevant 
method that organizations can utilize to analyze Sysmon events in their Windows 
environments to aid incident response procedures. The purpose of this research is to prove the 
effectiveness and value of Sysmon event logging by creating a comprehensive 
implementation of the method and demonstrating how to analyze Sysmon events. The 
implementation will be used to study which Sysmon events are triggered most frequently by a 
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publicly available ransomware dataset to provide guidance regarding which Sysmon events 
are most useful in detecting ransomware. 
Summary 
This research study explores how to analyze Sysmon logs to identify ransomware and 
improve incident response procedures. This paper presents the resulting research in a manner 
that can be applied and implemented by other organizations and researchers. Chapter 1 
provides an introduction to the problem statement and describes the importance and relevance 
of the research question. Chapter 2 explores prior work regarding related software, analytic 
approaches, and datasets. A gap in existing literature is identified regarding analyzing Sysmon 
events with ransomware. The gap will be addressed by this research. Chapter 3 explains the 
design science research methodology that is followed to answer the research question. Three 
artifacts developed by the research are introduced and requirements for the artifacts are 
defined. Chapter 4 contains the results of the conducting the iterative research. 
Implementation details are provided regarding the developed artifacts and results are 
evaluated to demonstrate the effectiveness of profiling ransomware using Sysmon events. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the unique contributions provided by this research, including 
limitations, recommendations, and future work. References and Appendices are provided to 
augment the results and provide further details to organizations seeking to replicate the results 
obtained by this research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) is a category of computer security tools that 
detect and respond to suspicious activity observed on hosts, as opposed to activity observed 
on network segments (Chuvakin, 2013). EDR solutions are popular because endpoint devices 
are often the target of exploitation (Reis, 2016). More than 30 EDR vendors existed in 2015 
and EDR marketplace was expected to double in 2016 (Higgins, 2015). Although EDR tools 
are robust, they cannot stop every attack. Users might have a false sense of security if they do 
not fully understand an EDR tool’s capabilities and limitations. In addition, while EDR tools 
provide detailed incident response information, the technical details may only be understood 
by the most experienced security professionals (Chuvakin, 2016). Smaller companies and less 
experienced security teams may not be able to leverage the capabilities and data insight that 
EDR tools provide. Sysinternals Sysmon is a tool that performs endpoint detection only, not 
response. This literature review explores previous research and open source contributions 
regarding the endpoint detection tool Sysmon. Specifically, existing literature is examined to 
determine how Sysmon has been used to identify ransomware during an incident response. 
Sysmon Capabilities 
Sysmon is an endpoint detection tool that logs specific Microsoft Windows system 
events to the Windows event log (Russinovich & Garnier, 2017). Sysmon was written by 
Mark Russinovich and Thomas Garnier (Perez, 2014). Sysmon was originally released in 
2014, and the tool is frequently updated. Sysmon version 6.20 was released on November 22, 
2017 (Russinovich & Garnier, 2017). Sysmon provides documentation online and from the 
command line tool. An additional resource developed by Michael Haag provides numerous 
references to online sources with Sysmon details, including configuration, deployment, and 
analysis examples (Haag, 2017a). Sysmon only operates on Microsoft Windows systems. 
Microsoft Windows is the most popular desktop operating system worldwide, consisting of 
82.68% of the market share as of December 2017 (StatCounter, 2017). Therefore, studying 
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Microsoft Windows desktop endpoints is extremely relevant and useful to a large majority of 
organizations. 
Each Sysmon event records various types of system activity information in descriptive 
fields to help an incident responder understand what happened during an event. Sysmon 
version 6.20 is capable of logging 21 event types, which are enumerated in Appendix A. 
Sysmon logging can be filtered by providing an Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
configuration file to specify which events to include and which events to filter out. The full 
Sysmon schema can be accessed from the command line to understand the type of details that 
are recorded by Sysmon (Russinovich & Garnier, 2017). SwiftOnSecurity (2017) provides a 
Sysmon configuration file that provides a good starting point for deploying Sysmon. The 
configuration is very well documented and provides great insight into various Sysmon 
filtering options. The SwiftOnSecurity configuration file is licensed with a Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 license, which allows others to “privatize, fork, edit, teach, publish, 
or deploy for commercial use - with attribution in the text” (SwiftOnSecurity, 2017). 
This research builds upon the SwiftOnSecurity Sysmon configuration file because the 
configuration is thorough and robust and the license allows such usage. Creating a Sysmon 
configuration file from scratch would be duplicating efforts that the community has already 
completed. In addition, the SwiftOnSecurity configuration file is still an actively developed 
project, so updates provided by SwiftOnSecurity can be leveraged by this study. The 
SwiftOnSecurity configuration file specifies which Sysmon events to log, but there is no 
existing mechanism to verify that the desired Sysmon events are being logged as expected. A 
review of existing literature did not identify a tool available to trigger all the Sysmon events 
and confirm that the configuration file is working as expected. 
Sysmon During Incident Response 
Several existing efforts have leveraged Sysmon during incident response. In 2016, 
Mark Russinovich presented “Tracking Hackers on Your Network with Sysinternals Sysmon” 
at the RSA Conference, a highly-respected computer security conference (Russinovich, 2016). 
In the presentation, Russinovich discussed how he used Sysmon to detect malware running as 
a scheduled task, as well as malware escaping from restricted environments. In 2017, 
Russinovich presented “How to Go from Responding to Hunting with Sysinternals Sysmon” 
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and demonstrated how to use Sysmon to hunt a phishing email and identify credential stealing 
(Russinovich, 2017a). Others, such as Jerome Quentin, have said that Sysmon is a good tool 
for threat hunting and incident response (Quentin, 2017). Lenny Zeltser of SANS, a popular 
cybersecurity training organization, pointed out that Sysmon is helpful for “system 
administrators, incident responders and forensic investigators” because it records interesting 
events for log collection (Zeltser, 2014). These efforts demonstrate that Sysmon is an 
appropriate tool to use during incident response, which gives credence to this study. 
Analyzing Sysmon Results 
Sysmon provides logging only; the tool does not analyze events or respond to alerts. 
Sysmon documentation explicitly states that “Sysmon does not provide analysis of the events 
it generates, nor does it attempt to protect or hide itself from attackers” (Russinovich & 
Garnier, 2017). Sysmon documentation recommends using a Security Information & Event 
Management (SIEM) system to provide event correlation (Russinovich & Garnier, 2017). 
One popular SIEM system is Splunk. There are discussions online about using Splunk 
to analyze Sysmon logs (ncis0x007, 2016; Haag, 2017b; Hall, 2016; Hayes, 2016; Splunk, 
2017; Crypsisgroup, 2016), but Splunk is an expensive corporate tool and may not be a 
feasible solution for individuals or small businesses due to high costs (Dreyfuss, 2015). 
Another popular SIEM is LogRhythm (LogRhythm, 2018). LogRhythm released a webcast to 
demonstrate how to use LogRhythm to collect and investigate Sysmon logs (Reynolds & 
Smith, 2017). LogRhythm may also be priced out of the reach of many organizations, with the 
LogRhythm appliance solution starting at $35,000 (Stephenson, 2017). 
Unlike Splunk and LogRhythm, which are commercial data analysis tools, the Elastic 
Stack is an open source collection of tools to perform data analysis. The Elastic Stack, 
formerly referred to as the ELK stack, consists primarily of the open source software products 
Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Kibana (Langlois, 2016). Elasticsearch provides an open source, 
high-speed, near real-time, distributed search engine. (Banon, 2010). Elasticsearch is currently 
the most popular search engine (solid IT gmbh, 2018). Logstash performs data collection and 
parsing (Elastic, n.d.). Kibana is a visual front-end for Elasticsearch (Langlois, 2016). 
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The Elastic Stack is a promising tool to use during the analysis portion of this study. 
In 2017, Elastic announced that the Elastic Stack had been downloaded over 100 million 
times (Elastic, 2017). Elastic products are rising in popularity to monitor and analyze security 
logs (adm, 2015). There is a precedence for using Elastic to examine security event logs. 
Mozilla uses Elastic to analyze their security logs (Bryner, 2015). The CyberSponse Security 
Operations Platform has integrated Elastic into their platform (CyberSponse, 2015). Informal 
tutorials are available online that discuss using Sysmon logs and Elastic products during 
incident response (Bandos, 2016; Churchill, 2015; Lewis, 2015), but no rigorous academic 
studies exist to explore using the two tools together. 
In addition, many of the online discussions do not provide access to all of the 
configuration files used to create the Elastic environment. This makes it difficult to replicate 
and implement similar results. Some of the studies that do provide source code only provide 
basic implementations. For example, two web articles have published Logstash pipelines to 
support the parsing of Sysmon events (Andy, 2017; Delgado, 2017). However, the pipelines 
are simplistic. They provide a good starting point for organizations getting started with 
Sysmon, but they do not implement data enrichment and customized parsing to suit the needs 
of detailed incident response analytics. There is a need for robust, open source guidance to 
help organizations implement their own Elastic environment to analyze Sysmon logs. 
Ransomware 
Ransomware is affecting users and businesses worldwide. Ransomware is a type of 
malware that restricts access to an infected system until the ransom is paid (US-CERT, 2016). 
Crypto-ransomware uses an algorithm to encrypt files on an infected machine to prevent 
access to the files until payment is received (F-Secure, 2018). Encrypted files are usually 
renamed with a new file extension (Dubey, 2016). Since the attacker’s goal is to be paid a 
ransom, the user is typically notified via a text document or webpage that files have been 
encrypted. The notification document contains instructions on how to pay the ransom to 
recover and decrypt the files (Trend Micro, n.d.). Although there are different types of 
ransomware besides crypto-ransomware (Steinberg, 2018), this research will use the 
simplified term ransomware to refer to crypto-ransomware. 
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The threat of ransomware has increased over the past few years. The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) stated that law enforcement observed an increase in ransomware 
attacks against organizations during 2015 (FBI, 2016). Check Point reported that ransomware 
attacks consisted of 10.5% of all worldwide malware attacks in the second half of 2016 
(Check Point, 2017a, 2017b). Studies show that ransomware is a growing threat to 
organizations (Schulze, 2017; O’Brien, 2017). Sometimes paying the ransom is an 
organization’s only option, due to lack of backups and ransomware detection tools (Palmer, 
2017). 
Due to the increasing threat and impact of ransomware, this research explores the 
usefulness of analyzing Sysmon events to identify ransomware. Splunk posted an article in 
2016 on how to use Splunk to find ransomware in Sysmon logs by searching for a large 
number of files being created in a short time (Hayes, 2016). Hayes only demonstrated the 
analytic using one ransomware sample, and the name of the ransomware sample was not 
mentioned. This article provides good ideas for Sysmon analytics, but it does not provide a 
repeatable environment that organizations can implement on their own. As previously 
mentioned, Splunk is not a feasible solution for all organizations due to cost. There is a need 
to expand the analytics presented by Hayes into an open source solution, with detailed 
guidance and advanced customization to profile multiple ransomware samples. 
LogRhythm posted an online article on analyzing WannaCry ransomware activity in 
Sysmon logs using the LogRhythm software (Costis, 2016). The article only focused on two 
Sysmon events, instead of all possible Sysmon events. In addition, details about the 
WannaCry sample used were not disclosed. As previously mentioned, LogRhythm may be too 
expensive for some organizations. Once again, existing efforts have discussed using Sysmon 
to investigate ransomware, but an open source, repeatable solution is not available. There is a 
need to expand existing analytics into a robust solution that leverages all Sysmon event logs 
and that an organization can implement fully to perform their own analytics. 
Elastic posted a blog entry on how to detect WannaCry ransomware using Sysmon 
with an Elastic Stack (McDiarmid, 2017). McDiarmid looked specifically for activity related 
to WannaCry downloading, executing, spreading, and terminating. McDiarmid investigated 
only one WannaCry sample executable, and he focused specifically on searching for 
signatures that WannaCry is known to exhibit. There is a need to expand Sysmon analysis 
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over multiple ransomware families to compare how different samples behave. In addition, a 
generic approach is needed to profile ransomware behavior, instead of looking for specific, 
known behaviors. The results need to be presented in a repeatable manner that organizations 
can leverage in their own environments.  
The articles discussed above confirm that the community is interested in using 
Sysmon events during incident response, indicating that this topic is relevant and timely. 
Existing work has been performed with Elastic and Sysmon, but gaps have been identified to 
promote further understanding of how Sysmon logs can be used to investigate ransomware. 
Summary 
This research explored previous research conducted using the endpoint detection tool 
Sysmon. Sysmon documentation states that Sysmon does not provide analysis of events, and 
that any analysis must be done in another tool. Some researchers have used Splunk and 
LogRhythm to analyze Symon events, but commercial tools are expensive and not viable for 
many organizations. Elastic Stack is an open source solution that provides storage and 
searching of distributed data. A gap was identified in existing literature regarding the analysis 
of Sysmon events to identify ransomware in a generic, repeatable manner. Solutions to fill 
this gap need to provide configuration files and ransomware samples so that results can be 
repeated and enhanced by the incident response community. The remainder of this paper 
describes a research study that was conducted to fill the identified research gap and answer 
the question “What methodology can an organization follow to determine which Sysmon 
events should be analyzed to identify ransomware in a Windows environment?” Details 
regarding the methods followed to construct this research study are found in Chapter 3. 
Results and design documents created by the study are found in Chapter 4. A summary of 
contributions provided by this research to address the identified research question, including 
limitations, recommendations, and future work, is found in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The literature review identified a gap in the availability of detailed guidance for 
organizations desiring to analyze Sysmon events to identify ransomware. This gap led to the 
development of the research question “What methodology can an organization follow to 
determine which Sysmon events should be analyzed to identify ransomware in a Windows 
environment?” Selecting an appropriate research methodology provides guidance and 
techniques to answer the research question (Kumar, 2014). Due to the nature of the research 
question, a design science research methodology was selected to provide a framework for this 
study. This chapter describes why a design science methodology was selected to address the 
research question. Advantages and shortcomings of using design science methods to conduct 
this study are discussed. The research model and artifact requirements that directed the 
execution of the study are described in detail. Validation that the research conducted by this 
study conformed to design science principles is also presented. Chapter 4 contains the results 
that were obtained by performing the study. Chapter 5 contains a detailed summary of 
contributions produced as an outcome of this research. 
Research Methodology Justification 
Three research methodologies were originally considered for this study: quantitative, 
qualitative, and design science. 
Quantitative research methods are typically used to measure relationships between two 
variables to explain an observation (USC, 2018). Quantitative research commonly explores 
observable facts and typically results in numerical outcomes and objective outcomes. 
Quantitative research was not appropriate for this study because the research goal was not to 
measure the performance of Sysmon, but rather to develop useful tools and techniques to 
produce a deeper understanding of how to leverage Sysmon events to identify ransomware. 
Thus, quantitative methods were not appropriate to develop tools to analyze Sysmon events. 
However, once tools and techniques are fully developed, quantitative methods would be very 
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appropriate in future research to compare and study the efficiency of the resulting tools and 
techniques to identify the solution that has the best performance or maximizes resource 
utilization. 
Qualitative research methods are commonly used to study behaviors and subjective 
research questions that require inductive reasoning (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Qualitative 
studies typically employ questionnaires and interviews to collect relevant data to answer a 
qualitative research question. Qualitative research was not appropriate for this study because 
the research goal was not to understand behavior related to Sysmon or study why users do or 
do not prefer using Sysmon. The goals of this study were to develop tangible procedures that 
could be used by organizations desiring to use Sysmon to detect ransomware. Thus, 
qualitative methods were not appropriate to address this research problem. However, once a 
solution is developed by design science, qualitative methods would be quite appropriate in 
future research to study human-computer interaction of the resulting tools and to understand 
what an organization finds most beneficial when using the outcomes of this study. 
A design science research methodology was selected to conduct this study. Design 
science research seeks to create useful artifacts that solve an unknown problem or improve an 
existing solution (Hevner et al., 2004). Sysmon and Elastic products are existing, freely 
available tools. However, the literature review identified a gap in guidance on analyzing 
Sysmon events to identify ransomware using Elastic. This study will improve upon existing 
ideas that have been implemented in other tools, as well as add new capabilities to use 
Sysmon logging to investigate and profile ransomware. 
Design science produces new knowledge relevant to the community (Vaishnavi & 
Kuechler, 2004). This study produced new knowledge in the form of a comprehensive 
environment to analyze Sysmon events that will be useful to the computer security incident 
response community. The environment can be implemented by organizations seeking to 
address the identified research question “What methodology can an organization follow to 
determine which Sysmon events should be analyzed to identify ransomware in a Windows 
environment?” 
The primary driver behind selecting design science research methods was to iteratively 
develop a solution that organizations could apply directly and immediately to leverage 
Sysmon in Microsoft Windows environments. Hevner, et al. (2004) state that the ultimate 
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evaluation for research is the question “What are the new and interesting contributions?” By 
following design science methods, this study ensured utility of the research contributions 
because development was performed in a cyclical manner enabling rapid improvements and 
adjustments. Design science methods led directly to the development of artifacts that can be 
leveraged by organizations to identify ransomware using Sysmon log analysis. 
Research Model 
This section describes the research steps that were planned and executed using a 
design science research methodology to answer the research question “What methodology can 
an organization follow to determine which Sysmon events should be analyzed to identify 
ransomware in a Windows environment?” Design science methods allowed for iterative 
research, which enabled the development of research artifacts by implementing incremental 
improvements throughout the research study to properly address the research question.  
The following steps were conducted to implement this research. The results obtained 
after conducting the research steps below are found in Chapter 4. 
1. Compile a corpus of ransomware to use during testing. 
2. Develop a method to analyze Sysmon events. 
3. Develop a virtual environment to apply the method. 
4. Develop a tool to trigger all Sysmon events and verify that the virtual environment 
logs Sysmon events as expected. 
5. Execute ransomware samples in the virtual environment and analyze results. 
6. Develop dashboards, alerts, and queries to aid in automating Sysmon analysis. 
7. Repeated Steps 2-6 iteratively as needed to profile ransomware and answer the 
research question “What methodology can an organization follow to determine which 
Sysmon events should be analyzed to identify ransomware in a Windows 
environment?” 
8. Make results, configuration files, and code available for usage by the community to 
implement and enhance through future work.  
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Artifacts of Design Science 
Artifacts are the primary contribution created by design science research (March & 
Storey, 2008). A design science research artifact is a useful product developed as part of the 
research process to help answer the research question. This study used a design science 
research methodology to create innovative and useful artifacts that can be leveraged by the 
cyber security community during an incident response. The purpose of the artifacts developed 
by this research was to help organizations utilize Sysmon for event logging and ransomware 
detection. The artifacts can be used to make educated decisions about which Sysmon events to 
enable and to guide the analysis of Sysmon events to determine what occurred on an infected 
system during an incident response. 
This research identified three artifacts that were needed to explore the research 
question: a method, an instantiation, and a tool. This section documents the requirements of 
the three artifacts developed by this study. Accurate requirements help ensure that the 
resulting artifacts are useful and applicable to the research domain. Details regarding the 
resulting development of the artifacts are found in Chapter 4. 
A Method. A method is needed to help organizations leverage Sysmon during 
incident response in Windows environments. In design science, a method is “a set of steps (an 
algorithm or guideline) used to perform a task” (March & Smith, 1995). The method created 
by this research will document the key steps needed to deploy and analyze Sysmon logging to 
investigate ransomware. The Sysmon tool is freely available, but there is little guidance on 
how to fine-tune the configuration files and analyze the results. The method will serve as a 
guideline to organizations who wish to use Sysmon but do not know where to start. The only 
requirement is that the method must provide guidance to answer the research question, “What 
methodology can an organization follow to determine which Sysmon events should be 
analyzed to identify ransomware in a Windows environment?” The method will be generic so 
that it can be applied to various types of ransomware. 
An Instantiation. The most critical artifact needed for this research is an instantiation 
that implements the method designed above. In design science, an instantiation is “the 
realization of an artifact in its environment” (March & Smith, 1995). Instantiations can 
operationalize a method and can help articulate a method further (March & Smith, 1995). In 
this research, the method guided the development of the instantiation, and the instantiation 
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helped formalize the steps in the method. The instantiation will be used to analyze which 
Sysmon events are triggered most frequently by ransomware. The instantiation will prove that 
the method can be implemented and used by organizations seeking to leverage Sysmon to 
identify ransomware. The instantiation is a tangible example of how to apply the method to 
answer the research question. The requirements for the instantiation artifact are introduced in 
Table 1. Hardware specifications are included as a requirement to demonstrate the relevance 
of the solution to an average user due to the use of low cost and commodity hardware and 
software. The completed instantiation can be implemented by anyone desiring to setup an 
infrastructure and begin exploring Sysmon data. 
Table 1. Requirements for Instantiation Artifact 
Number Requirement 
1. Must be implemented in a virtual environment consisting of at least 2 systems: 
a) Microsoft Windows 7 Service Pack 1 endpoint system to generate 
Sysmon events 
b) Correlation Server to collect Sysmon events 
 
2. Must operate on the following hardware: 
System:          Dell Inspiron 7559 
CPU:              Intel Core i7-6700HQ @ 2.60GHz 
RAM:            16 GB 
Hard Drive:  1TB Solid State Drive 
 
3. Must implement open source and/or freely available downloadable software 
whenever possible. 
 
4. Must document software versions implemented in final solution so that others 
may repeat the results. 
 
 
A Tool. A third artifact is needed to verify Sysmon logging. A tool will be created to 
trigger every Sysmon event. This tool is technically considered a design science instantiation, 
but this research refers to the artifact as a tool to distinguish it from the instantiation artifact 
described above. This tool will be used to ensure that the test environment is properly 
configured by verifying the logging of all Sysmon events. No capability of this nature was 
identified while reviewing existing literature. The requirements used to develop the trigger 
tool artifact are introduced in Table 2. 
15 
Table 2. Requirements for Trigger Tool Artifact 
Number Requirement 
1. Must run on Microsoft Windows 7 Service Pack 1 operating system. 
 
2. Must be run with administrative privileges. 
 
3. Must be written in an interpreted language so users can easily confirm that the 
tool contains no malicious behavior. 
 
4. Must trigger all 21 of the Sysmon events. Does not need to trigger the Sysmon 
error event (event ID 255). 
 
5. Must execute fully without requiring a reboot. 
 
6. Must limit external dependencies as much as possible. If dependencies on other 
software or libraries cannot be avoided, those dependencies must be fully 
documented.  
 
 
Advantages and Shortcomings of Design Science Research 
Every research methodology has advantages and shortcomings. Design science is 
advantageous in this research scenario because it provides utility to organizations desiring to 
use Sysmon effectively to identify ransomware. Utility is the main advantage of design 
science research. The output of this research is three artifacts designed to help organizations 
and system administrators leverage Sysmon during an incident response. The resulting 
artifacts are useful to organizations, even though an organization may not fully understand 
every aspect of Sysmon. Another benefit to design science is the iterative approach that 
allows the researcher to evaluate if progress is being made toward the research goal. If the 
research is not leading to an artifact that is useful to the problem statement, the research can 
be adjusted and modified to ensure that research results are useful. Continuous iterations that 
are constantly critiqued against the research question enable the development of useful 
artifacts that are immediately relevant to the incident response community. 
In this research scenario, design science has a few shortcomings when compared to 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Design science results in the creation of artifacts, 
but not in an understanding of how or why Sysmon or ransomware performs in a certain 
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manner. This research study provides guidance to organizations regarding Sysmon analysis, 
but it does not provide in-depth understanding of how Sysmon works or how ransomware 
triggers specific Sysmon events. Another shortcoming is that design science results can be 
perishable because the cybersecurity domain changes so quickly. Resulting artifacts could 
become obsolete before they are effectively implemented in an organization (Hevner et al., 
2004). Throughout the duration of this research, both the Sysmon and the Elastic Stack 
software versions were regularly updated. Fortunately, backwards compatibility was 
maintained, and the updated software did not break any functionality during this research. 
However, newer versions of Sysmon and Elastic have already been released prior to the 
publication of this research. Another drawback to design science is that artifacts are 
customized to a specific environment (Hevner et al., 2004). This research is customized to 
Sysmon version 6.20 running on Windows 7 using a specific ransomware dataset. Results 
may not be applicable to other environments, including other operating systems, software 
versions, or malware samples. These shortcomings are reduced during this research by 
producing a repeatable method that can be applied to other tools and datasets. Overall, the 
advantages of design science far exceeded the shortcomings when applied to this research 
question. 
Validation of Design Science Research 
To validate that the resulting research followed design science principles, the research 
goals and outcomes are dissected below into the five steps of the Vaishnavi and Kuechler 
(2004) design science research process. 
Awareness of Problem. This research identified that endpoint detection logging is 
critical for effective incident response. The Sysmon tool was identified as a tool used to log 
critical Microsoft Windows events, but there were no existing academic studies to measure 
the effectiveness of Sysmon at recording malicious activity. Because there was no rigorous 
guidance on how to configure Sysmon, users could not ensure that they were monitoring their 
Windows systems in the most effective manner to log potential ransomware activity. This left 
users without confidence in their Sysmon implementations and incident response readiness. 
Suggestion. This research suggested and explored a solution to the identified research 
question through the creation of three design science artifacts. The research investigates the 
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effectiveness of Sysmon at logging malicious activity and provides empirical evidence 
regarding which Sysmon events are triggered most frequently by ransomware. 
Development. This research developed three useful design science artifacts: a method, 
an instantiation, and a tool. The method documented a process to follow to identify 
ransomware using Sysmon logging. The instantiation implemented the method to allow 
tangible research on the effectiveness of Sysmon logging against the selected ransomware 
dataset. The trigger tool verified Sysmon logging in the instantiation. All of the artifacts could 
be further modified to test other endpoint detection tools or other malware samples. 
Evaluation. The artifacts were evaluated to determine the effectiveness of the Sysmon 
configuration. The method was tested by implementing an instantiation to verify that the 
method was sound. Results were analyzed to determine which Sysmon events were triggered 
most frequently by the ransomware dataset. Regardless of the outcome of the tests, the 
artifacts deliver utility to the incident response community by providing insight into how 
Sysmon performs against the selected ransomware dataset. By providing tangible results, this 
research contributed to the body of knowledge by enabling organizations evaluate the 
usefulness of Sysmon logging in Microsoft Windows environments. 
Conclusion. This research provided conclusions regarding the results of the research, 
including conclusions regarding the effectiveness of using Sysmon to identify ransomware. 
The usefulness of the developed artifacts was articulated and provided the community with a 
greater understanding of Sysmon logging. Source code and configuration files were made 
available for the community to download and reuse in their own environments to replicate this 
research. Future work is documented so that other researchers may continue to expand the 
field. 
 
If there is any remaining doubt that this research followed sound design science 
principles, the seven design science guidelines offered by Hevner et al. (2004) are evaluated 
in the following sections. 
Design as an Artifact. The research resulted in the design of a method, an 
instantiation, and a tool. The creation of the artifacts was the primary focus of the research to 
answer the identified research question “What methodology can an organization follow to 
determine which Sysmon events should be analyzed to identify ransomware in a Windows 
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environment?” All of the artifacts worked together to allow an organization to evaluate the 
effectiveness of Sysmon at logging ransomware activity. 
Problem Relevance. The research addressed a relevant and important business 
problem: the lack of guidance regarding how to use Sysmon to analyze malicious events, 
leaving organizations on their own to configure, deploy, and assess the effectiveness of 
Sysmon event logging, an especially difficult task for small organizations without dedicated 
computer security personnel. The use of a current ransomware dataset added to the relevance 
of this research. 
Design Evaluation. The three developed artifacts helped evaluate the research results. 
The method artifact was used to define how to leverage Sysmon events during incident 
response. The instantiation artifact was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the method at 
identifying ransomware. The trigger tool artifact confirmed that Sysmon logging was 
behaving as expected in the instantiation. The Sysmon events were analyzed with 
observational methods and experimental methods. Histograms were generated to make 
conclusions regarding which Sysmon events are triggered most frequently by the selected 
ransomware dataset. 
Research Contributions. This research provided valuable contributions to the 
incident response community and organizations desiring to use Sysmon logging to identify 
ransomware. The developed artifacts were well-documented for others to understand, use, and 
enhance for their own needs. The method provided guidance on the steps to take during 
Sysmon log analysis. The instantiation provided a realistic environment to implement. The 
tool allowed verification and validation of a Sysmon implementation. Source code and 
configuration files were made available for others to reuse and modify for their own 
environment. More details regarding the contributions of this research can be found in 
Chapter 5. 
Research Rigor. A rigorous experimental evaluation of the instantiation was 
presented to profile ransomware. Data analysis of Sysmon logging was performed using 
statistical analysis through Elastic Stack dashboards and queries. 
Design as a Search Process. The research process sought to find the best way to 
leverage Sysmon events during incident response to identify ransomware. The artifacts were 
developed using an iterative approach. Satisficing was used to identify a satisfactory solution 
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to the research question without needing to answer every question about how and why 
Sysmon performed a certain way (March & Storey, 2008). 
Communication of Research. The results were presented as a formal dissertation. 
The resulting artifacts were made available to the community, including code and 
configuration files that can be found in the Appendices. The content of this research was 
appropriately technical so that other researchers may replicate the study. The results were 
presented in an actionable manner so that organizations without deep technical knowledge can 
apply the results within their own environment and get started using Sysmon to identify 
ransomware. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The goal of this research was to provide academically sound results to help 
organizations leverage Sysmon logging during incident response. The specific research 
question studied was “What methodology can an organization follow to determine which 
Sysmon events should be analyzed to identify ransomware in a Windows environment?” A 
review of existing literature indicated a lack of rigorous research studies involving the 
analysis of Sysmon events to identify ransomware. A design science research study was 
conducted to answer the research question and to develop unique and useful artifacts as a 
result of the research. This chapter discusses the details of the results obtained from carrying 
out the design science research study proposed in Chapter 3. An overview of research 
contributions, limitations, and future work are found in Chapter 5. 
Ransomware Dataset 
As discussed in Chapter 2, studies show that ransomware is a growing threat to 
organizations (Schulze, 2017; O’Brien, 2017). To achieve relevant and repeatable research 
results, a ransomware dataset was needed in this research to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
the developed artifacts at profiling ransomware in Sysmon logs. The use of modern, relevant, 
freely-accessible ransomware samples was the most important consideration in selecting the 
dataset. 
Sample size was considered when compiling the ransomware dataset. This study was 
based on design science methods, not quantitative or qualitative methods. Therefore, the 
dataset served as a proof of concept to exhibit the usefulness of the research results. This 
research did not rely on statistical methods to measure relationships or derive numerical 
truths. The sample size of the ransomware dataset used in this design science research study 
was not as critical as it would have been in a statistical study. The purpose of the dataset was 
to prove the effectiveness of the developed artifacts. This research study deemed the content 
of the dataset to be more important than the size of the dataset. A dataset consisting of a few 
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high-ranking ransomware threats would provide more valuable results in this study than a 
dataset consisting of a thousand out-of-date or unfamiliar ransomware samples. 
For the purpose of this study, three samples were considered sufficient to represent a 
ransomware family. One sample was deemed insufficient to represent an entire ransomware 
family. Two samples would not provide a means to determine which results are more accurate 
if discrepancies are found. Three samples were deemed to provide a reasonable comparison to 
prove the concepts developed by this design science research study. Malware samples change 
frequently to avoid detection, which can make it challenging to obtain current malware 
samples. Therefore, requiring more than three samples could prove difficult to find enough 
samples of a given ransomware family. 
Design science research excels at providing relevant results. The first step in selecting 
the ransomware dataset was to identify ransomware families to study. To ensure that the 
results of this study were relevant to organizations today, relevant ransomware samples were 
required. In July 2017, Symantec published a “Ransomware 2017” report which identified six 
major ransomware threats seen in 2017 (O’Brien, 2017). The six ransomware threats 
identified by Symantec were Cerber, Jaff, Sage, GlobeImposter, Locky, and Mamba. The 
samples selected for the dataset used in this research were limited to those six ransomware 
families due to their significance in 2017. All six of these ransomware families are considered 
crypto-ransomware (Abrams, 2017; Ducklin, 2016; Hasherezade, 2016; MalwareBytes, 2017; 
MalwareBytes, n.d.; Trend Micro, 2017). Details regarding crypto-ransomware behavior is 
found in Chapter 2. 
The second step was to identify specific samples within the six major ransomware 
threats identified by Symantec in 2017. Only publicly available ransomware samples were 
used in this study to ensure that others could repeat, verify, and expand the results of this 
research. VirusTotal provided three months of student access to VirusTotal Intelligence 
during the early stages of this research (VirusTotal, 2018a), but that service was not used to 
collect samples for this study because the service is not freely available to everyone. Several 
online malware repositories exist that provide free access to malware samples for researchers 
(Zeltser, 2018). Hybrid Analysis is a web-based malware analysis service that allows users to 
upload samples for free and obtain an analysis report (Hybrid Analysis, 2018). If the user 
marked the uploaded sample as public, then other Hybrid Analysis users could download the 
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sample from the Hybrid Analysis website. The Hybrid Analysis website provides a robust 
searching capability to identify malware samples based on specific criteria such as file type 
and hashtag. All of the malware samples used in this research were downloaded from the 
Hybrid Analysis website due to the search features offered by the website and due to the fact 
that samples could be downloaded for free from the website (Hybrid Analysis, 2018). Using 
only one source for the ransomware samples allowed other researchers to obtain the samples 
more easily without having to register for multiple accounts on multiples repositories. 
The third step was to select current ransomware samples to ensure that the samples 
used in this research were representative of ransomware that an organization might likely 
encounter today. In order to ensure the ransomware samples were current, only samples dated 
between July 2017 and December 2017 on the Hybrid Analysis website were considered for 
the dataset. In addition, only samples that were clearly and only tagged as one of the 
Symantec-identified ransomware families was considered to ensure that the labeling of the 
samples was accurate. Some samples in Hybrid Analysis were tagged with multiple 
ransomware families, which created ambiguity as to how to properly label the ransomware. 
Such samples were discarded and not used in this study. 
The fourth and final step in selecting the ransomware dataset was to confirm that the 
samples executed properly on a Microsoft Windows 7 Service Pack 1 system without any 
additional software. Therefore, only Portable Executable (PE) files were considered because 
PE files are the native executable format used by Windows (Microsoft, n.d.). This 
requirement ensured that all samples in the dataset would be compatible with the artifacts 
developed by this study. Proper execution was defined as files getting encrypted, file 
extensions being renamed, and notification provided to the user regarding how to pay the 
ransom to decrypt the files. Some samples downloaded from Hybrid Analysis did not execute 
properly on the test endpoint system. Such samples were discarded and not used in this 
research because they did not simulate a ransomware infection. 
The Hybrid Analysis website was searched for ransomware samples based on the 
restrictions identified in the steps above. No Sage ransomware samples were available on the 
Hybrid Analysis website that met the criteria. Only one Mamba ransomware sample and one 
Jaff ransomware sample was available on the Hybrid Analysis website that met the criteria. 
Although sample size is not critical in this study, one sample was not sufficient to represent an 
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entire ransomware family. Therefore, Sage, Mamba, and Jaff ransomware families were not 
considered for this study. Only GlobeImposter, Cerber, and Locky ransomware families were 
selected for the dataset compiled by this research study due to availability of acceptable 
samples on the Hybrid Analysis website. Three samples each of GlobeImposter, Cerber, and 
Locky ransomware were selected from the Hybrid Analysis webpage that met the criteria 
above. For the purposes of this design science research study, where the samples are used to 
prove the conceptual ideas developed in this study, not to prove statistical truths, three 
ransomware samples were deemed sufficient to represent a ransomware family. 
The use of recent and prevalent ransomware samples made this research applicable 
and relevant to organizations. In summary, a dataset consisting of three samples each from 
three prevalent ransomware families was compiled for this study. GlobeImposter, Cerber, and 
Locky ransomware families were selected because they were among the list of six major 
ransomware threats identified in the Symantec 2017 ransomware report (O’Brien, 2017) and 
public samples were available to download from the Hybrid Analysis website (Hybrid 
Analysis, 2018). Different ransomware families were used so that this research could 
investigate if all ransomware families triggered the same Sysmon events or if different 
ransomware families interacted with Sysmon in a different way. 
Overall, nine samples were selected to form the ransomware dataset. Details regarding 
the dataset samples are provided to assist other researchers in understanding the behavior of 
the samples without having the execute the samples in their own environment. In addition, the 
samples are uniquely identified so that other can download the samples and replicate these 
results in their own environment if desired. A cryptographic hash of each sample is provided 
to uniquely identify each sample. A cryptographic hash is computed by a cryptographic hash 
function, which takes an arbitrary number of bytes as input (in this case, the bytes that 
comprise a ransomware sample) and output a unique fixed length hash value (Gilbert & 
Handschuh, 2003). In this study, the Secure Hash Algorithm called “SHA-256” was used to 
generate 256-bit hashes of the ransomware samples (Dang, 2015). Cryptographic hashes are 
commonly used to uniquely identify files in digital forensics (Roussev, 2009). SHA-256 
hashes are available when viewing samples on the Hybrid Analysis website. 
Three GlobeImposter ransomware samples were selected for the dataset. The SHA-
256 hash of each sample, the reference citation, and the label this research used to refer to 
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each sample are introduced in Table 3. All three samples were executed in the research 
environment to confirm that the ransomware was functional. The GlobeImposter samples 
used file extensions “.crypt”, “.STN”, and “.coded” to encrypt files. The samples 
created the notification files “how_to_back_files.html” and 
“0_HELP_DECRYPT_FILE.html” to instruct the user on how to pay the ransom and 
decrypt the files. 
Table 3. GlobeImposter Ransomware Samples 
Label SHA-256 Hash 
G1 7d49a2a9d788fc8dbaa6331c8b740f689e20600ff7e8d3692b1a9c6d37a37bd6 
(Hybrid Analysis, 2017g) 
G2 edf67ba035e52cd903017a24271544caba57dace039be51b1e867fdfd5252744 
(Hybrid Analysis, 2017b) 
G3 b2282de3df95c6a9d0151ad61d2ab4e99400ca3104ce9003a0b13290260a7a55 
(Hybrid Analysis, 2017c) 
 
Three Cerber ransomware samples were selected for the dataset. The SHA-256 hash of 
the sample, the reference citation, and the label this research used to refer to each sample are 
introduced in Table 4. The Cerber samples used file extensions “.cerber3” and “.8899” 
to encrypt files. The samples created notification files “@__README__@.txt”, 
“@__README__@.html”, “_R_E_A_D__T_H_I_S_######.txt”, and 
“_R_E_A_D__T_H_I_S_######.txt” to instruct the user on how to pay the ransom and 
restore their files, where ###### in the file name was a random string. 
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Table 4. Cerber Ransomware Samples 
Label SHA-256 Hash 
C1 6563059c4e556e2bc1589b9711a328c4499baed3b0a14b533a467ce65ee37af6 
(Hybrid Analysis, 2017i) 
C2 403577074344d4832649881daf8885fed4d9afc3e7a4b02247ceb9b51d858794 
(Hybrid Analysis, 2017h) 
C3 e67834d1e8b38ec5864cfa101b140aeaba8f1900a6e269e6a94c90fcbfe56678 
(Hybrid Analysis, 2017a) 
 
Three Locky samples were selected for the dataset. The SHA-256 hash of the sample, 
the reference citation, and the label this research used to refer to each sample are introduced in 
Table 5. All three Locky samples used the file extension “.asasin” to encrypt files. All the 
samples created notification files “asasin.html” and “asasin.bmp” to instruct the user 
on how to pay the ransom and restore their files. 
Table 5. Locky Ransomware Samples 
Label SHA-256 Hash 
L1 c35f705df9e475305c0984b05991d444450809c35dd1d96106bb8e7128b9082f 
(Hybrid-Analysis, 2017l) 
L2 294f55a28930c8afed9b95d2af108a6916eeb2c79967e91f4dde48026bab15ce  
(Hybrid-Analysis, 2017e) 
L3 4c054127056fb400acbab7825aa2754942121e6c49b0f82ae20e65422abdee4f 
(Hybrid-Analysis, 2017d) 
 
An interesting feature of ransomware is that it needs to inform the user that the system 
is infected so that the user will know to pay the ransom. Other types of malware may want to 
run silently so that users do not know the malware is present. This is not the case with 
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ransomware. While executing the malware, the key effects of the ransomware samples were 
observed and documented. The observed effects were discussed in the paragraphs above. The 
file extensions used by each ransomware sample and the notification files created by each 
sample are introduced in Table 6. This information is useful because it helps incident 
responders identify infected systems in their environment and identify which ransomware 
family caused the incident. Screenshots of the notification files created by the samples to 
demand ransom payment are found in Appendix R. It is important for incident responders to 
be familiar with how ransomware behaves and what it looks like so that they can act promptly 
when an incident occurs. The rest of this study used the compiled ransomware dataset to 
demonstrate the usefulness of the developed artifacts at effectively identifying and analyzing 
ransomware. 
 
Table 6. Observed Effects of Ransomware Samples 
Label File Extension Notification Files Created 
G1 .crypt how_to_back_files.html 
G2 .STN 0_HELP_DECRYPT_FILE.html 
G3 .coded how_to_back_files.html 
C1 .cerber3 @__README__@.txt 
@__README__@.html 
C2 .cerber3 @__README__@.txt 
@__README__@.html 
C3 .8899 _R_E_A_D__T_H_I_S_######.txt 
_R_E_A_D__T_H_I_S_######.hta 
(where ###### is random) 
L1 .asasin asasin.html 
asasin.bmp 
L2 .asasin asasin.html 
asasin.bmp 
L3 .asasin asasin.html 
asasin.bmp 
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Artifact 1: A Method to Analyze Sysmon Event Logging 
This research iteratively created a method that organizations can follow to analyze 
Sysmon events in Windows environments to identify ransomware. The literature review 
identified a gap in guidance regarding how to analyze Sysmon events. This method was 
created to be a guideline for organizations needing to analyze Sysmon events. The method 
was developed iteratively based on the research study designed in Chapter 3. The method was 
constructed specifically for this research to identify and document the steps needed to analyze 
Sysmon logs. The resulting method is introduced in Table 7 and summarized in the 
paragraphs below. 
The method is an overview of steps an organization can take to analyze Sysmon 
events. The method was used to guide the development of the instantiation and trigger tool 
artifacts discussed later. The instantiation and trigger tool artifacts also helped improve the 
method and gave credence to the worthiness of the method. Although the method is straight-
forward, it took time to develop and iteratively improve the steps of the method to ensure the 
results were valuable to organizations and the incident response community. The method was 
developed according to the design and requirements set forth in Chapter 4. 
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Table 7. Detailed Method for Utilizing Sysmon Event Logging 
Step Description 
1. Update Sysmon configuration to collect events of interest on the endpoint 
 
2. Collect Sysmon events into a centralized Security Information & Event 
Management (SIEM) server. Concrete example: instantiation artifact. 
 
3. Verify Sysmon logging on the endpoint. Concrete example: trigger tool artifact. 
 
4. Execute ransomware samples on the endpoint, to simulate an incident. 
 
5. Analyze the Sysmon events to identify suspicious activity: 
 
a. Alert automatically if known suspicious activity is seen. 
1. Look for malicious VirusTotal hashes. 
2. Look for files created with file extensions commonly used by ransomware. 
3. Look for processes that changed file creation times. 
4. Look for large number of files created in a short amount of time. 
 
b. Review dashboards for suspicious activity: 
1. Inspect malicious VirusTotal hashes. 
2. Look for network connections to suspicious countries. 
3. Review word cloud to see the most common Sysmon event triggered during 
a given timeframe. 
4. Identify the start time and end time of any suspicious activity. 
 
c. Query other Sysmon events that occurred around the same timeframe of any 
suspicious events identified to investigate. 
 
d. Create a histogram of Sysmon events triggered by the ransomware samples 
based on the timeframe of start and end times of the ransomware process. 
 
6. Automate the identification of the suspicious activity identified in Step 5 by 
creating new queries, dashboards, and alerts. 
 
7. Repeat this cyclical method to improve the Sysmon configuration and to implement 
additional analytics in order to identify suspicious activity more quickly and 
effectively to answer the research question. 
 
 
The first step in the method was to install and configure Sysmon on the endpoint 
system. Next, a correlation server was setup to receive and consolidate the Sysmon logs for 
analysis. The implementation was verified to confirm that Sysmon was logging the desired 
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events. Ransomware samples were then executed in the test environment to simulate an 
incident. After each sample was executed, Sysmon events were analyzed to identify 
suspicious activity. The analytic techniques were iteratively developed as the entire research 
study was conducted. Suspicious activity was identified through alerting, dashboards, and 
queries based on observed behavior and Sysmon events triggered by the ransomware dataset.  
Automated alerting drew attention to events suspected to indicate the presence of ransomware 
without requiring manual intervention. Data was enriched with metadata from VirusTotal to 
identify potentially malicious processes that were executed (Hayes, 2016). Since ransomware 
encrypts user files, the number of files created was analyzed to identify a large number of files 
created in a short amount of time. Ransomware typically rewrites the file extension, so file 
extensions of files created were analyzed to look for known ransomware extensions 
(MalwareBytes, n.d.). Malware has been known to change the timestamp of a file to help the 
new file blend in with other files on the system (Knutson, 2016). This procedure is known as 
“timestomping”. Sysmon event ID 2 indicates that a process changed a file creation time. 
These events were analyzed to automate the identification of timestomping. By automatically 
looking for multiple indicators, ransomware is less likely to evade detection and more likely 
to be identified quickly during an incident response. 
Dashboards were reviewed to manually look for anomalous activity. Network 
connections were visualized on a map to pinpoint connections to suspicious or unexpected 
countries. Malware may initiate network connections in order to download additional 
capabilities, so any network connections to unexpected countries needs to be investigated. 
Word clouds were reviewed to determine the most common Sysmon events triggered. By 
understanding how normal activity looks on a system, anomalous activity stood out and drew 
attention to additional logs that should be investigated. These analytic dashboards helped 
create a timeframe of suspicious activity on a host. The start time and end time of any 
suspicious activity was determined and used to focus analysis efforts. Once a time window 
was created, other Sysmon events that occurred during that timeframe were queried to look 
for additional abnormal activity. A histogram of the Sysmon events triggered by the 
ransomware sample was created based on the start and end time of the abnormal activity. This 
provided a profile of the ransomware sample based on Sysmon events. The ransomware 
profile helped provide details regarding what actions the ransomware sample took on the 
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infected system. This knowledge helps an incident responder identify the source of the 
infection in order to clean it up, as well as identify infections on other systems. 
As mentioned previously, the method artifact was developed using an iterative 
approach as described in Chapter 3. Once suspicious activity was identified, a process was 
determined to automate the finding of that activity in the future. Additional alerts, dashboards, 
and queries were created to improve future analysis efforts. This cycle was repeated over each 
ransomware sample to improve the Sysmon configuration and to implement additional 
analytics to identify suspicious activity more quickly and more effectively. Trial and error 
helped determine which analytic techniques were useful in identifying ransomware. The 
resulting method provides valuable guidance to organizations desiring to analyze Sysmon 
events to identify ransomware. This method fills a gap in the community by providing precise 
steps to follow to analyze Sysmon logs during incident response and to profile ransomware 
based on the Sysmon events it triggers. 
Artifact 2: An Instantiation of the Method 
This research created a comprehensive instantiation of the method described above. 
The instantiation is a tangible example of how to apply the method in an actual environment. 
As March & Smith state in their often-cited design science paper, the instantiation serves as a 
“realization” of the method (1995). The instantiation was developed iteratively according to 
design science principles and the requirements introduced in Table 1. This section describes 
the how the instantiation was constructed and articulates the unique contributions developed 
within the instantiation. Implementation details are provided so that other researchers can 
implement the instantiation in their own environment to replicate or expand on the results 
obtained by this study. An architecture diagram of the implemented environment is introduced 
in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Architecture Diagram for Instantiation Artifact 
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The instantiation was developed on a laptop computer with virtualization software so 
that the results would be applicable to many organizations regardless of budget. The virtual 
environment consisted of a Windows endpoint system because Sysmon only runs on 
Windows operating systems. The endpoint system was configured with a Windows 7 Service 
Pack 1 operating system. The correlation server ran on a CentOS 7 operating system. An 
Elastic Stack served as the foundation for the log analysis platform. An Elastic Stack provides 
a generic data analysis platform. This research created a unique solution by leveraging the 
Elastic Stack to analyze Sysmon logs to identify ransomware. 
The architecture can be understood by discussing the process flow that occurs from the 
time an action takes place on the endpoint system to the time it is visualized on the correlation 
server. Within the Windows 7 endpoint system, an executable performs an action on the 
operating system. The action is stored by the Sysmon service according to the Sysmon 
configuration file created by this research. On Windows 7, the Sysmon event details are 
stored in the Windows event log under Application and Services 
Logs/Microsoft/Windows/Sysmon/Operational (Russinovich & Garnier, 2017). 
The event log entries are periodically shipped across the network to the correlation server by 
the Winlogbeat service according to the configuration file defined in this research. The 
Logstash service on the correlation server receives the Sysmon events and parses the event. 
This research created a custom Logstash pipeline to enhance the data. Logstash enriches the 
data according to the custom pipeline and sends the results to Elasticsearch for storage. The 
Elasticsearch service stores and indexes the data so that it can be queried and retrieved. The 
Elasticsearch plugin X-Pack Watcher monitors the data. Four Watcher alerts were developed 
in this research to issue email alerts when specific suspicious activity is identified in the data. 
Kibana provides a visualization front-end to display the underlying data from Elasticsearch. 
This research created custom dashboards and specialized queries to enable focused analysis of 
the data. The entire architecture is provided to help organizations configure their own 
environments without having to start from scratch learning how all the components work 
together. 
Open-source and freely available software was used to implement the instantiation 
whenever possible. This ensured that the solution is not out of reach for organizations due to 
budget reasons. The unique contributions of this research were made possible by configuring 
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the open-source solution in such a way that unique analysis could be performed and 
documented. This study did not implement additional functionality into the open-source 
software, but rather leveraged open-source software to create a custom instantiation where 
analysis could take place and be documented for the incident response community to consume 
and scrutinize. 
This research used VMware Workstation for the virtualization software. Although 
VMware Workstation is not free, other virtualization products exist that are free, such as 
VirtualBox (Oracle, 2018), which could replace VMware if cost was an issue. The endpoint 
system was running Sysmon v6.20 for logging, Winlogbeat v5.6.5 for shipping the logs to the 
server, and Python v3.6.3 to implement the trigger tool. The ransomware samples from the 
selected dataset were installed on the endpoint as well. The correlation server was a CentOS 7 
virtual machine. It was running Logstash, Elasticsearch, Kibana, and the X-Pack plugin, all 
version 5.6.5. The Java version 8 was also used on the server because it is required by the 
Elastic Stack software. All the software used in the instantiation artifact is introduced in Table 
8. These details are provided to facilitate others desiring to apply this research artifact within 
their own environments. 
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Table 8. Software Installed in the Instantiation Artifact 
Base System: 
Microsoft Windows 10.0.16299 
VMware Workstation 12.5.9 
Virtual Machine #1 (Endpoint System): 
Microsoft Windows 7 Service Pack 1 
Sysmon 6.20 
Winlogbeat 5.6.5 
Python 3.6.3 
Ransomware samples from selected dataset 
Virtual Machine #2 (Correlation Server): 
CentOS 7 
Logstash 5.6.5 
Elasticsearch 5.6.5 
Kibana 5.6.5 
X-Pack 5.6.5 
Java JDK 8 
 
Sysmon 
Sysmon documentation is very robust and provides details about various configuration 
options, but it does not provide guidance regarding which Sysmon events to monitor or how 
to analyze Sysmon events (Russinovich & Garnier, 2017). By default, Sysmon does not log 
every type of event so that it does not impact system performance when installed. Instead, the 
use of an Extensive Markup Language (XML) file is recommended to specify which events to 
include and which events to exclude. SwiftOnSecurity provides an extremely robust and well-
documented configuration file that suits the needs of many organizations as discussed in 
Chapter 2 (2017). 
SwiftOnSecurity advertises their configuration file as being a great starting point for 
understanding what events are possible for Sysmon to log (2017). SwiftOnSecurity is very 
clear that their configuration file will not capture every single event that malware could 
perform, but they state that it captures the most likely events that will be executed. The 
configuration settings are deliberately chosen to reduce performance impact while logging 
appropriate events (SwiftOnSecurity, 2017). Other security professionals also recommend the 
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SwiftOnSecurity configuration (Koopmann 2017, Russinovich 2017). For these reasons, the 
SwiftOnSecurity Sysmon configuration file was selected as a good fit for this research study. 
The SwiftOnSecurity configuration file is covered by a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
license, which allows use to “privatize, fork, edit, teach, publish, or deploy for commercial 
use - with attribution in the text” (SwiftOnSecurity, 2017). Starting with the SwiftOnSecurity 
configuration file, this research iteratively modified the SwiftOnSecurity Sysmon 
configuration file to meet the needs of this research study. 
Sysmon installation details are provided to guide others in how to implement Sysmon 
on their systems. Sysmon was installed in the instantiation using the command line introduced 
in Figure 2. The Sysmon configuration file was iteratively updated as this study was 
conducted. The final version of the Symon configuration file utilizes the recommendations 
from SwiftOnSecurity and also enables logging of the trigger tool artifact created later to 
confirm that all Sysmon events could be logged. The final version of the file is found in 
Appendix B. The Sysmon installation was verified by looking for the Sysmon service in the 
list of running services and by observing the Sysmon events in the event log Application 
and Services Logs/Microsoft/Windows/Sysmon/Operational (Russinovich & Garnier, 
2017). 
 
 
 
 
The Elastic Stack 
The Elastic Stack is an open source data analysis framework that was used to analyze 
the data in this study. The purpose of the Elastic Stack is to analyze data. Therefore, the usage 
of Elastic Stack for data analysis was not unique. However, fine-tuning the configuration of 
the Elastic Stack to enrich Sysmon logs and profile ransomware was a unique contribution of 
this research study. All of the configuration details used to create the Elastic Stack deployed 
in the instantiation are discussed below so that other researchers may replicate this study. 
Sysmon.exe -i c:\Users\user1\Desktop\code\sysmonconfig-modified.xml 
Figure 2. Command to Install Sysmon 
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The Elastic Stack, formerly referred to as the ELK stack, consisted of Beats, Logstash, 
Elasticsearch, and Kibana (Langlois, 2016). All of these services resided on the same 
correlation server virtual machine, but the implementation could be expanded to multiple 
servers to address additional resource and storage needs. An online tutorial, along with Elastic 
documentation, was useful in configuring a generic Elastic Stack on the CentOS 7 server 
(Arul, 2017; Elastic, 2018). Once a generic Elastic Stack was working, the services were 
customized to suit the needs of this research study. 
Winlogbeat was used to ship Sysmon logs from the endpoint to the correlation server 
using a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) network connection over port 5044. Winlogbeat 
ran as a service installed on the endpoint system. Winlogbeat was installed using the 
PowerShell script install-service-winlogbeat.ps1, which is included in the 
Winlogbeat installation file. Winlogbeat uses a configuration file to specify which logs should 
be shipped to which locations. The Winlogbeat configuration file used in this study is found 
in Appendix E. Finally, Winlogbeat was started with the PowerShell command “Start-
Service winlogbeat”. The Winlogbeat service was verified to be running by checking 
the list of running services in Windows. 
Logstash was used to parse and enrich the Sysmon logs what were received from 
Winlogbeat and send the results to Elasticsearch for storage. The implemented instantiation 
required Logstash listen on TCP port 5044 to receive the data from Winlogbeat on the 
endpoint system. The Logstash configuration file used in this study to configure the Logstash 
service is found in Appendix J. A custom developed Logstash pipeline defined how the 
Sysmon logs were parsed. The custom pipeline enriched the Sysmon data with additional 
metadata from VirusTotal and from custom Logstash dictionary files. 
The Logstash pipeline was a key component of this research. It was iteratively 
developed as additional functionality was needed. The final pipeline configuration used in this 
research is found in Appendix F and is discussed below. Every Logstash pipeline contains an 
input section to define where the logs are coming from, a filter section to process, change, and 
enrich the logs as needed, and an output section to define where the logs will be sent. This 
study provides a detailed and unique filter section for the Logstash pipeline to perform data 
enrichment and custom functionality needed for the analysis developed in the method artifact. 
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The Logstash pipeline developed by this study implemented several tasks to enrich the 
Sysmon log data. The full pipeline in Appendix F includes detailed comments to document 
the functionality of the pipeline. The pipeline extracted SHA-256 hashes from the Sysmon 
events so that hashes could be queried individually and to identify specific processes. The 
pipeline performed Internet Protocol (IP) address geolocation on network connections. This 
enabled incident responders to identify the country of origin of a network connection in order 
to detect anomalous or unexpected network connections. The pipeline extracted file 
extensions from file names so that file extensions could be queried directly and common 
ransomware extensions could be flagged. The pipeline matched events relating to the start of a 
process and the termination of the process to determine the longevity of the process. Knowing 
when a process started and ended helped provide a timeframe to focus analytic efforts. The 
pipeline translated Sysmon event ID numbers into a textual description to enable quick 
understanding of Sysmon events while analyzing logs. The pipeline implemented a whitelist 
to track known good processes, and queried VirusTotal whenever an unknown process was 
executed. A public VirusTotal Application Programming Interface (API) key was used to look 
up unknown executables and determine if a process was malicious (VirusTotal, 2018b). The 
VirusTotal results were stored with the logs so they could be used during analytic tasks to 
help analysts determine if a process was malicious and if so, to determine what type of 
malware was executed. 
One capability that made the Logstash pipeline created in this study unique was the 
creation of three custom dictionary files to enrich the Sysmon data. The first custom 
dictionary mapped Sysmon event ID numbers to a textual description of each event. This 
allowed for easier analysis when viewing Symon entries in Kibana. The Sysmon event 
dictionary file is found in Appendix G. The second custom dictionary identified commonly 
used ransomware extensions to tag suspicious Sysmon events if they contained a suspicious 
file extension. The file extensions were obtained from a MalwareBytes article (n.d.) that 
enumerated several ransomware extensions, along with observed file extensions discovered 
during this study. The ransomware extension dictionary file is found in Appendix H. The third 
custom dictionary provided a whitelist of known good file hashes and file paths. This 
dictionary was used to reduce the number of VirusTotal lookups executed by the system. By 
whitelisting known executables, only unknown executables were looked up in VirusTotal. 
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This saved time and network bandwidth. The application whitelist dictionary file is found in 
Appendix I. After all of the Sysmon events were processed and enriched through the Logstash 
pipeline, the results were then sent to Elasticsearch according to the output section of the 
pipeline. 
Elasticsearch was used for storing and indexing the results received from Logstash. 
The Elasticsearch configuration was very basic and did not require any unique customizations 
to meet the needs of this research study. Elasticsearch listened on TCP port 9200. The 
Elasticsearch configuration file used in this study is found in Appendix K. Elasticsearch only 
ran on one node in this study, but it could be expanded to work as a cluster with a master node 
and slave nodes to improve performance and speed. In a production environment, the data 
transferred between Logstash and Elasticsearch should be encrypted to maintain privacy. 
A X-Pack plugin called Watcher was used to provide automated alerting in the 
instantiation. Watcher was automatically enabled once the X-Pack package from Elastic was 
installed with Elasticsearch and Kibana (Elastic, 2018). A trial license was used in this 
research. Watcher alerts have multiple alerting capabilities, but only email alerting was used 
in this research. Four unique Watcher alerts were created during this research to implement 
automated alerting and identify suspicious behavior more quickly. Watcher alerts are 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Kibana was used as a web-based front-end to analyze and visualize results. Kibana 
listened for web connections on TCP port 5061. The Kibana configuration file used in this 
study is found in Appendix L. Kibana created an index of fields based on the data found in 
Elasticsearch. This index specifies exactly what data fields are available to query against, in 
addition to the data type. The final instantiation used in this research study contained 716 
fields in the index. The index can be found in Appendix M. Kibana was a critical tool used to 
understand the Sysmon data and provide visualizations that were useful during incident 
response. This research created custom dashboards and custom queries to enable deep 
analysis of the Sysmon events. Dashboards and queries are discussed in more detail in later 
sections. 
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Alerts 
Alerting was implemented using Watcher, which is a component of the Elastic X-Pack 
installation. This research used a trial license for X-Pack. Watcher alerts were configured to 
provide automated alerting when suspicious activity was identified in the Sysmon logs. Four 
Watcher alerts were created in this study. The first Watcher alert looked for processes marked 
as malicious by VirusTotal. The alert ran every minute, and if any malicious processes were 
found during that minute, an email alert was sent. The email contains the SHA-256 hash of 
the process, along with the data that triggered the alert and the dashboard summary so that 
analysts can quickly identify where the malicious process was executed. This alert depended 
on the VirusTotal data enrichment provided by the Logstash pipeline. The malicious process 
watcher configuration code is found in Appendix N. An example of the email alert triggered 
when ransomware sample G1 was executed on the endpoint system is introduced in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. Email Alert for Process Labeled Malicious by VirusTotal (Sample G1) 
 
The second Watcher alert looked for commonly used ransomware file extensions in 
the Sysmon logs. The alert ran every minute, and if any suspicious extensions were found, an 
email alert was sent. The email contained a list of the malicious extension and file path, along 
with attachments containing the data that triggered the alert and the dashboard summary to 
help analysts quickly identify the suspicious activity. The malicious process Watcher 
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configuration code is found in Appendix O. An example of the email alert triggered when 
ransomware sample L1 was executed on the endpoint system is introduced in Figure 4. The 
figure has been truncated for brevity to show both the beginning and ending of the email alert. 
The email alert shows that this sample generated 146 Sysmon events with the file extension 
“.asasin” within 1 minute. 
 
 
Figure 4. Email Alert for Malicious File Extensions (Sample L1) 
 
The third Watcher alert looked for instances when a process changed a file creation 
time. Malware sometimes changes the file creation time of files it creates or modifies in order 
to make the files blend into the filesystem so that the user does not know the files were 
modified. The alert runs every minute and looks for Sysmon event ID 2, which indicated that 
a file’s creation time was changed by a process. If any of those Sysmon events occurred, an 
email alert is sent. The email alert listed the time of the event, the file name that was affected, 
and the process name that changed the file creation time. Attachments were also included 
containing the data that triggered the alert and a dashboard summary so that an analyst could 
quickly identify the activity. The malicious process watcher configuration code is found in 
Appendix P. An excerpt of the email alert triggered when ransomware sample L1 was 
executed on the endpoint system is introduced in Figure 5. The figure has been truncated for 
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brevity to show both the beginning and ending of the email alert. The email alert shows that 
this sample changed the creation time of 151 files in one minute. 
 
 
Figure 5. Email Alert for Creation Time Changed on a File (Sample L1) 
 
The fourth Watcher alert looked for too many files created on the system in a short 
timeframe. The alert ran every minute and looked for Sysmon event ID 11, which indicated a 
file was created. The watcher alerted if more than 240 files were created in a minute. The 
email alert contained a list of files created, along with attachments containing the data that 
triggered the alert and a dashboard summary to help incident responder identify the suspicious 
activity quickly. The malicious process watcher configuration code is found in Appendix Q. 
An excerpt of the email alert sent by this watcher when ransomware sample G5 was executed 
on the endpoint system is introduced in Figure 6. The figure has been truncated for brevity to 
show both the beginning and ending of the email alert. The email alert shows that this sample 
created 243 new files in one minute. 
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Figure 6. Email Alert for Too Many Files Created (Sample G5) 
 
Dashboards 
Kibana dashboards were created to quickly visualize important data. The dashboards 
were designed to contain charts, graphs, maps, word clouds, and metrics to present the 
Sysmon logs in a meaningful way. The dashboards could be filtered based on time and data 
requirements to enhance the information conveyed by the dashboard. Several dashboards 
were created during this research to iteratively drive the development of the resulting artifacts 
and enhance analysis of Sysmon logs. These dashboards contribute to the overall goal of this 
research to provide guidance on how improve Sysmon analysis. 
A custom dashboard was created to view processes labeled malicious by VirusTotal. 
Any potentially malicious processes should be investigated, and this dashboard was critical in 
pinpointing which processes are suspicious. This dashboard provided a quick starting place 
for analysis by providing a timeframe for when suspicious activity occurred. This dashboard 
was also attached to the related Watcher email alerts discussed in the previous section. The 
dashboard after running Cerber sample C1 on the endpoint system is introduced in Figure 7. 
In this scenario, 46 VirusTotal scan engines reported the process as malicious. VirusTotal 
results typically contain results from approximately 60 virus scanning engines. 46 VirusTotal 
hits are a strong indicator that the process is malicious. 
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Figure 7. Dashboard for Viewing Processes Labeled Malicious by VirusTotal (Sample C1) 
A custom dashboard was designed to visualize network connections. The network 
connections were pinpointed on a map based on the number of connections to each location. 
A chart was displayed underneath the map to summarize how many connections occurred to 
each country. This dashboard was dependent on Logstash enriching Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses with geolocation data using the geoip Logstash filter as configured in the 
Logstash pipeline created by this research. The dashboard results after running Cerber 
ransomware sample C1 on the endpoint system is introduced in Figure 8. In this scenario, 
ransomware sample C1 created network connections to Montenegro and Russia. If an analyst 
sees unexpected network connections to suspicious countries, then they should continue the 
analysis process by exploring the network connection, including the process that initiated the 
connection and any other activity that occurred during the suspicious timeframe. 
 
Figure 8. Dashboard for Viewing Network Connections (Sample C1) 
A custom dashboard was created to view the frequency of Sysmon events using a 
word cloud. This provides a quick understanding of the Sysmon events that occurred most 
often during a given timeframe. The dashboard results after running Cerber ransomware 
sample C1 on the endpoint system is introduced in Figure 9. The results indicate that 
ransomware sample C1 primarily initiates network connections, but the other actions 
performed by the ransomware sample are also displayed, such as creating files and processes. 
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Figure 9. Dashboard for Viewing Sysmon Events Word Cloud (Sample C1) 
Another dashboard was created to display a histogram of Sysmon events triggered 
during a given timeframe. This provides more details than the word cloud dashboard created 
above because it includes numerical data regarding how many Sysmon events of each type 
were triggered. This dashboard was useful for profiling the ransomware samples, a process 
that is discussed on page 54. The histogram dashboard after running sample C1 on the 
endpoint system is introduced in Figure 10. A total of 565 Sysmon events were triggered by 
this sample, consisting of six unique Sysmon event types. The network connection event was 
triggered most often, for a total of 512 network events. These details augment the 
understanding that was gained by the network connection and word cloud dashboards 
discussed previously as it now provides numerical data to provide context on how the 
ransomware sample behaved. 
 
Figure 10. Dashboard for Viewing Sysmon Events Histogram (Sample C1) 
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A ransomware file extension dashboard was created to view known ransomware file 
extensions. This dashboard was also attached to the related Watcher alert discussed above. 
The file extensions were obtained from a MalwareBytes article (n.d.) that enumerated several 
ransomware extensions, along with observed file extensions discovered during this study. 
During the ransomware profiling phase of this research, this dashboard helped determine that 
not all ransomware triggers the file creation Sysmon events. This observation is discussed in 
more detail in the Ransomware Profiling section below. The dashboard after executing 
ransomware sample L1 on the endpoint system is introduced in Figure 11. The dashboard 
shows that the ransomware sample used the file extension “.asasin” 201 times in the 
Sysmon logs.  
 
Figure 11. Dashboard for Viewing Ransomware File Extensions (Sample L1) 
A custom dashboard was created to visualize the Sysmon events triggered when a 
process modified the creation time of a file. This dashboard was also attached to the related 
Watcher email alert, as discussed in the previous section. This dashboard showed the time of 
the event, the process name that changed the creation time, and the filename of the file that 
was changed. The dashboard after executing ransomware sample L1 on the endpoint system is 
introduced in Figure 12. The figure was truncated at the bottom for brevity. It demonstrates 
that the ransomware sample L1 changed the file time of 150 files, most of them ending with 
the file extension “.asasin”. This was likely done to mask the time of the infection. 
 
Figure 12. Dashboard for Viewing Changes to File Creation Time (Sample L1) 
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Since ransomware creates newly encrypted files, monitoring file creation activity is 
useful in detecting ransomware. A custom dashboard was created to investigate files created 
on a system. This dashboard was also attached to the related Watcher email alert, as discussed 
in the previous section. File creations were logged by Sysmon event ID 11. The dashboard 
after executing ransomware sample L1 on the endpoint system is introduced in Figure 13. The 
figure is truncated at the bottom for brevity. The dashboard demonstrates that while the L1 
sample was executing, 53 files were created. 52 of those files were created by the parent 
process itself. One file was created by svchost.exe, which was a process started by the 
ransomware process. Most of the created files ended with the file extension “.asasin”. A 
keen observer will notice that the L1 sample notification files ended in “.html” and 
“.bmp”, but those file extensions were not found in any file creation events in Sysmon logs. 
The Sysmon file creation event (event ID 11) was not triggered when sample L1 created the 
notification files. Because this research study does not investigate why Sysmon performs a 
certain way, this study cannot determine why the creation of those two files did not trigger 
Sysmon events. 
 
Figure 13. Dashboard for Viewing Created Files (Sample L1) 
Queries 
Kibana queries were used to search through the data to gain greater understanding of 
the data and look for specific events. Querying data is a critical skill during incident response, 
and it was essential throughout this research. Queries were filtered based on time and content 
as needed. Queries were saved so that useful searches could be repeated easily. The use of 
saved queries was an integral part in conducting the iterative analysis required to answer the 
research question.  
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One of the queries created by this research focused on process creation and 
termination events. By viewing processes as they were created and terminated, the behavior of 
the samples could be observed. Some samples launched other processes to complete the 
ransomware tasks. The query result introduced in Figure 14 shows the process creation and 
termination Sysmon events that were triggered by ransomware sample L1. The L1 sample 
launched four additional processes. One of the processes launched was Internet Explorer, 
which was used to display the notification file “asasin.html” to inform the user that a 
ransom payment was required to decrypt the files. By reviewing the processes created by a 
ransomware sample, an incident responder can determine what additional actions the 
ransomware executed on the infected system. 
 
 
Figure 14. Query to Analyze Process Creation and Termination Events (Sample L1) 
A query was created to search for file creations, which was relevant to ransomware 
because ransomware creates new encrypted files in order to demand a ransom payment. The 
query highlighted the timestamp, the created filename, and the process name that created the 
file. The results of this query after executing ransomware sample C1 on the endpoint system 
are introduced in Figure 15. Only three file creation events were triggered by sample C1. All 
of those were related to the notification files created by the ransomware. This query identified 
one additional file created by the ransomware that was not observed manually when the 
sample was first executed during the dataset selection process discussed on page 20. The 
newly discovered file was “@__README__@.url”. Another item of interest was the fact 
that none of the encrypted files with file extension “.cerber3” were listed in this query. 
The ransomware must have created the encrypted files in a manner that was not logged by the 
Sysmon file creation event, but the reason Sysmon did not trigger this activity could not be 
confirmed by this design science study.  
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Figure 15. Query to Analyze File Creations (Sample C1) 
A query was created to search for common ransomware file extensions. The query 
displayed the timestamp, the file extension, and the filename. The results of this query after 
executing sample L1 are introduced in Figure 16. The creation of encrypted “.asasin” files 
by sample L1 triggered the Sysmon file creation event and was captured in the query results.  
 
Figure 16. Query to Analyze Ransomware File Extensions (Sample L1)  
The results of this query after executing sample C1 are introduced in Figure 17. The 
creation of encrypted “.cerber3” files by sample C1 did not trigger the Sysmon file 
creation event and were not captured in the data. This matches what was discovered when 
reviewing the results of the query discussed in the previous paragraph. 
 
Figure 17. Query to Analyze Ransomware File Extensions (Sample C1) 
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The queries discussed above demonstrate the usefulness of the created instantiation 
artifact in analyzing Sysmon event to investigate ransomware incidents. The created queries 
provide a guided starting point for organizations that wish to analyze their Sysmon logs and 
understand what Sysmon events are triggered by ransomware. 
Artifact 3: A Tool to Trigger All Sysmon Events 
This research developed a third unique artifact which was used to verify the 
instantiation artifact discussed above. The third artifact was a tool that triggered every 
Sysmon event in order to confirm that Sysmon logging was working as expected. Sysmon 
events are detailed in Appendix A for reference. Although technically the third artifact is also 
classified as a design science instantiation (March & Smith, 1995), this research refers to this 
artifact as a tool in order to distinguish it from the implementation instantiation described in 
the section “Artifact 2: An Instantiation of the Method”. The trigger tool artifact verified that 
Sysmon logging was working correctly and validated the accuracy of the instantiation artifact. 
Verifying that logging is working as expected is critical for incident response, otherwise data 
may not be available when it is needed most: during an incident. The literature review did not 
identify an existing tool to trigger all the Sysmon events and confirm that the configuration 
file is working as expected, so this tool provides new capabilities to the community.  
The tool artifact was developed on the endpoint system in the instantiation 
environment. The tool was written in Python version 3.6.3 using the IDLE Python GUI 
(Python, 2018a). Python was used because it is an interpreted language, so other researchers 
can verify exactly what the trigger tool is doing by reviewing the code before executing it. 
The tool performs actions that cause Sysmon events to trigger, but the tool itself is benign. 
Other researchers can confirm that the tool does not implement malicious behavior.  
The Python code for the trigger tool is provided in Appendix C. The trigger tool uses a 
manifest file that was written during this study to trigger three of the Sysmon events. The 
manifest file is provided in Appendix D. Many references were cited during the development 
of the Python script and the manifest file. References are documented as comments within the 
code in Appendix C and Appendix D. The trigger tool has external dependencies that are 
introduced in Table 9.  
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Table 9. External Dependencies for Trigger Tool Artifact 
Dependency Purpose 
Sysmon v6.20 Sysmon must be installed and running in order to log 
Sysmon events. 
 
Sysmon Configuration File 
 
sysmonconfig-
modified.xml 
Sysmon must be configured to include all the events.  
By default, not all Sysmon events are logged. 
The config file sysmonconfig-modified.xml is 
located in Appendix B. 
 
Python 3.6 The tool to trigger all Sysmon events is written in Python 
3.6. The script “trigger.py” is located in Appendix C. 
 
Process Monitor v3.40 
 
(Russinovich, 2017b) 
Installs a driver to trigger Sysmon Event ID 6. 
Save the files below into the same folder as Trigger Tool 
Python script trigger.py: 
./ProcessMonitor/procmon.exe 
./ProcessMonitor/procmon.chm 
./ProcessMonitor/eula.txt 
 
Microsoft PowerShell v2.0 PowerShell 2.0 is included by default in Microsoft 
Windows 7 (Barrato, 2009). 
 
Python v3.6 Built-in Modules The following Python modules are built-in Python 3.6: 
ctypes 
inspect 
os 
os.path 
shutil 
struct 
subprocess 
sys 
tempfile 
threading 
time 
winreg 
 
Manifest file 
 
trigger.mof 
Required to trigger Sysmon Events IDs 19, 20, and 21. 
File is located in Appendix D 
Save trigger.mof file into the same folder as the 
Trigger Tool Python script “trigger.py” 
. 
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The trigger tool needs to be executed with Administrative privileges. Barring any 
unexpected errors, the tool cleans up after itself by removing any files or registry entries that 
it creates. The trigger tool provides textual output to indicate its progress during execution. 
The output of the trigger tool is introduced in Figure 18. The keen observer will note that the 
events are not triggered in numerical order. During development, it was observed that the 
manner in which the tool triggers certain events affected other events. 
 
Specifically, event IDs 7 and 8 were required to be executed last. These events 
indicate that a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) or thread was created in another process, which 
is a task that malware commonly performs to infect a system. The trigger tool does not 
attempt to be successful at injecting another process; it only needs to trigger the Sysmon 
event. Therefore, when those two Sysmon events are triggered, the system is left in an 
unexpected state. Although the tool does not require a reboot during execution, it is 
VERIFY YOUR FILE LOCATIONS MATCH TO ENSURE TRIGGERS WORK: 
Sysmon Path:  C:\progra~1\Sysmon-v6.20\sysmon.exe 
Sysmon Config File:  C:\Users\user1\Desktop\code\sysmonconfig-
modified.xml 
Manifest File:  C:\Users\user1\Desktop\code\trigger.mof 
 
[ START ] 
EventID 9: Triggered 
EventID 1: Triggered 
EventID 2: Triggered 
EventID 3: Triggered 
EventID 4: Triggered 
EventID 5: Triggered 
EventID 6: Triggered 
EventID 10: Triggered 
EventID 11: Triggered 
EventID 12: Triggered 
EventID 13: Triggered 
EventID 14: Triggered 
EventID 15: Triggered 
EventID 16: Triggered 
EventID 18: Triggered 
EventID 17: Triggered 
EventID 21: Triggered 
EventID 19: Triggered 
EventID 20: Triggered 
EventID 7: Triggered 
EventID 8: Triggered 
[ DONE ] 
Figure 18. Output of the Tool Artifact 
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recommended to reboot the system after executing the trigger tool due to the issues noted with 
the process injection events. 
A dashboard was created to visualize all of the Sysmon events triggered by the tool. 
The dashboard was used to verify that every event was triggered at least once. The dashboard 
is introduced in Figure 19. The dashboard contained a histogram and a numerical table listing 
of the events triggered. After executing the trigger tool, a total of 85 Sysmon events were 
generated in the instantiation environment using the Sysmon configuration file specified in 
Appendix B. Many events were triggered multiple times. The process creation Sysmon event 
was triggered most frequently, due to the fact that the Python subprocess module was 
used frequently within the tool to spawn additional processes.  
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Figure 19. Dashboard of Sysmon Events Generated by the Tool Artifact 
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Ransomware Profiling 
This research focused on ransomware because of its increasing relevance as a threat to 
organizations as discussed in Chapter 2. All of the artifacts created above were developed in 
order to enable the profiling of ransomware based on the Sysmon events triggered by the 
ransomware. The ransomware dataset discussed on page 20 was used to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of this profiling technique. Each of the nine ransomware samples were executed 
within a virtual environment using snapshots to ensure that each sample was executed in the 
same manner. One ransomware sample was executed on the endpoint system, and the 
resulting Sysmon events were recorded in the Elastic Stack within the instantiation. After 
confirming that the ransomware executed as expected, the snapshot was reverted to its starting 
point and the next sample was executed. This cycle was repeated until all ransomware 
samples had been executed within the instantiation.  
After all nine ransomware samples were executed, analysis of the Sysmon events was 
performed using the instantiation created by this research. A custom dashboard was used to 
explore each of the Sysmon events triggered during the execution of the samples. The start 
time and end time for each sample was determined based on the Sysmon events for process 
creation (event ID 1) and process termination (event ID 5). This provided a timeframe for 
when each ransomware sample was active on the system. The dashboard focused on that 
timeframe and displayed a histogram of all the Sysmon events each ransomware sample 
triggered. This histogram was used to profile the sample and determine which Sysmon events 
each ransomware sample triggered most frequently. The detailed histograms for each sample 
are found in Appendix S. The histograms provide insight into the actions each ransomware 
sample executed on the infected system. Knowing what a piece of malware did on an infected 
system helps incident responders remove the infection and identify other infected systems. 
By analyzing the number of events triggered by the ransomware dataset, it was 
determined that only seven of the twenty-one Sysmon events were triggered by the 
ransomware samples. A list of the Sysmon events triggered by the ransomware dataset is 
introduced in Table 10.  
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Table 10. List of Sysmon Events Triggered by the Ransomware Dataset 
Sysmon 
Event 
Description # of 
Events  
Samples That Triggered Event 
3 TCP/UDP network connection 
 
2217 C1, C2, C3 
11 File created 
 
975 All 
2 File creation time was changed by a 
process 
523 C1, C2, L1, L2, L3 
1 Newly created process 
 
68 All 
5 Process terminated 
 
9 All 
13 Registry value was set 
 
6 G1, G2, G3, L1, L2, L3 
9 Process opened disk or volume for 
read access 
2 C1, C2 
4 Sysmon service started or stopped 
 
0 None 
6 Driver loaded 
 
0 None 
7 Module/DLL loaded into a process 
 
0 None 
8 Thread created in another process 
 
0 None 
10 Process opened another process 
 
0 None 
12 Registry object created or deleted 
 
0 None 
14 Registry key and/or value was 
renamed 
0 None 
15 File stream created 
 
0 None 
16 Sysmon configuration changed 
 
0 None 
17 Named pipe created 
 
0 None 
18 Named pipe connected 
 
0 None 
19 Windows Management 
Instrumentation (WMI) Event Filter 
registered 
0 None 
20 WMI Event Consumer registered 
 
0 None 
21 WMI Event Consumer bound to WMI 
Event Filter 
0 None 
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Sysmon event ID 3, which indicates an outbound network connection, was triggered 
the most number of times. However, only the Cerber ransomware samples triggered that 
event. None of the GlobeImposter or Locky samples initiated any network connections. 
Therefore, the Cerber samples utilized network capabilities, while GlobeImposter and Locky 
did not. 
According to the results gathered in Table 10, the second most frequent Sysmon event 
triggered by the dataset was event ID 11, which is triggered when a file is created. Since 
ransomware encrypts existing files and saves them with a new file extension, it makes sense 
that this Sysmon event would be triggered frequently by ransomware. 
The third most frequent Sysmon event triggered by the dataset was event ID 2, which 
is triggered when a process changes the creation time of a file. Malware sometimes changes 
file creation times to disguise the time the system was infected and to make altered files blend 
in with existing files on the system. All Locky samples triggered this event. Only two Cerber 
samples triggered this event. None of the GlobeImposter samples triggered this event. 
The fourth most frequent Sysmon event triggered by the dataset was event ID 1, which 
is triggered when a process is created. Malware will commonly launch additional processes to 
conduct the desired malicious behavior. Sometimes these will be scheduled tasks; other times 
it will be executing system utilities, such as ping, to check what capabilities are on the system. 
All of the ransomware samples triggered this event. On average, the event was triggered 7.5 
times by each sample in the dataset. This indicates that on average, the samples in the selected 
ransomware dataset launched approximately seven additional processes. 
The fifth most frequent Sysmon event triggered by the dataset was event ID 5, which 
is triggered when a process is terminated. All samples triggered this event one time. In all 
cases, this event was triggered when the ransomware process itself terminated. Sometimes 
malware will launch other processes and terminate the originating process as soon as the other 
processes are launched. However, that was not the case with any of the samples in the 
selected dataset. In all cases in this study, the ransomware samples in the dataset first 
executed the desired behavior of encrypting files for ransom and notifying the user and then 
terminated the parent process. 
The sixth most frequent Sysmon event triggered by the dataset was event ID 13, which 
is triggered when a registry value is set. All of the GlobeImposter and Locky samples 
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triggered this event exactly one time. None of the Cerber samples triggered this event. 
Sometimes malware uses registry values to store data or to indicate that the system has been 
infected.  
The seventh most frequent Sysmon event triggered by the dataset was event ID 9, 
which is triggered when a process opens a disk for read access. Only the Cerber samples C1 
and C2 triggered this event, and those samples triggered the event only one time. The other 
samples certainly read files on the filesystem in order to encrypt the files for ransom. The 
other samples may have used a different method to gain access to the filesystem in a manner 
that was not observable by Sysmon. 
According to the results generated by this study, the following conclusions could be 
made regarding the ransomware samples in the dataset. None of the remaining Sysmon events 
were triggered by any of the samples. None of the samples interacted with the Sysmon service 
to start, stop, or change the Sysmon service. None of the samples loaded a driver. None of the 
samples injected a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) or thread into another process or requested 
access to another running process. None of the samples created or deleted registry objects, 
and none of them renamed a registry key or value. None of the samples created a file stream. 
None of the samples created or connected to a named pipe. Finally, none of the ransomware 
samples in the selected dataset used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) filters or 
consumers.  
The results observed when profiling ransomware are understandable considering that 
the task of ransomware is to encrypt files and to notify the user to pay a ransom to get the files 
back. An interesting finding was that only the Cerber samples initiated outbound network 
connections. Another interesting finding was that none of the Cerber samples set a registry 
value. By profiling the ransomware in this manner, insight was gained into which Sysmon 
events are triggered most frequently by ransomware. This can aid organizations to help focus 
analysis efforts when investigating ransomware incidents in their environment. The insight 
also helps understand what actions each ransomware sample took on the infected system, 
which helps an incident responder remove the infection and identify other infected systems. 
The result presented in this chapter are summarized in Chapter 5, where the key contributions 
of this research study are conveyed as well.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research provides tangible results to organizations on how to use Sysmon to log 
Microsoft Windows events to investigate ransomware infections. This chapter discusses the 
unique contributions that this research study made to the incident response community. 
Recommendations are made to guide organizations desiring to use this research in their 
environment. Limitations of the research application are articulated. Finally, future research 
ideas are presented to encourage other researchers to further explore this research topic and 
expand on the ideas and results presented by this study. 
Contributions 
This research contributes knowledge that can be applied by organizations looking to 
effectively implement endpoint logging on Microsoft Windows systems using Sysmon. Three 
artifacts were created to explore the research question and to develop capabilities within the 
problem space: a method, an instantiation, and a tool. By following the method designed by 
this research, organizations can setup Sysmon and look for ransomware in Sysmon logs. The 
method provides guidance that an organization can follow to implement their Sysmon logging 
and analysis. Organizations that have resources available can follow the method to implement 
their own Sysmon testing infrastructure. Organizations that are not capable of designing their 
own infrastructure can leverage the results of the instantiation created during this research. 
The instantiation artifact provides a concrete example of an environment that can be created 
to analyze Sysmon logs from a central location using an Elastic Stack infrastructure. The 
Python tool artifact enables an organization to verify that their Sysmon deployment is logging 
events as expected and desired.  
This research contributes a Sysmon configuration file, based on SwiftOnSecurity’s 
configuration (2017), that can be used in conjunction with the trigger tool artifact to verify 
that Sysmon logging is working as expected. The Sysmon configuration file is available in 
Appendix B. This research provides the code for the Python tool that triggers all the Sysmon 
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events. The code is available in Appendix C and Appendix D. External dependencies for the 
tool are documented in Table 9. All Elastic Stack software configuration details are shared so 
that organizations can setup the instantiation in their own environment to replicate or expand 
on the results of this research. These configuration files are found in Appendix E, Appendix J, 
Appendix K, and Appendix L. 
A key contribution of this research is the Logstash pipeline that parses the Sysmon 
events received from Winlogbeat and stores them in Elasticsearch. The Logstash pipeline 
developed in this research enriches the data to provide additional context and information to 
enable further analytics. The Logstash pipeline is found in Appendix F. The Logstash 
dictionary files created in this study to augment parsed data and provide data enrichment of 
the Sysmon logs are found in Appendix G, Appendix H, and Appendix I. 
Another contribution is the development of email alerts that are triggered when certain 
activity is seen in the logs. These alerts were made functional through the Elastic X-Pack 
Watcher plugin. A trial license for X-Pack was used in this research. Four Watcher alerts were 
created. One alert is triggered whenever a process is seen that has been labeled as malicious 
by VirusTotal. Another alert is triggered whenever common ransomware file extensions are 
created on the system. A third alert is triggered whenever a process modifies the creation time 
of a file. The final alert is triggered whenever more than 240 files are created within a one-
minute threshold. These alerts bring attention to activity which may be suspicious, which 
helps incident responders identify malicious activity more quickly. The code for all of the 
Watcher alerts can be found in Appendix N, Appendix O, Appendix P, and Appendix Q. 
All of the development and artifacts created above were used to profile ransomware 
based on the Sysmon events triggered by the ransomware. The profiling provides empirical 
data regarding which Sysmon events are triggered most frequently by the ransomware dataset. 
This research provides insight into which Sysmon events are most useful when investigating 
ransomware. Details regarding the Sysmon events frequency can be found in Chapter 4. 
Seven Sysmon events were found to be triggered by the ransomware dataset. The events that 
captured network connections, file creations, file creation time changes, and newly created 
processes were triggered most frequently by the dataset. The dataset also triggered the events 
that indicate a process was terminated, a registry value was set, and a process opened a disk 
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for read access. The ransomware dataset provided proof that the artifacts developed in this 
study could be used to investigate ransomware with Sysmon logs. 
Limitations 
This research has limitations that must be understood in order to apply the results 
appropriately. The first limitation is that the research is based primarily on existing, freely 
downloadable software. No corporate or commercially available solutions were explored to 
address the research problem. If expensive commercial software products were selected, then 
many organizations may not be able to use the results due to the expense. Because 
commercial products were not explored, there may exist commercial solutions to answer the 
research question. If an organization has a large budget, they are encouraged to explore the 
capabilities of commercial solutions in addition to this solution to decide what best fits their 
needs.  
This research is not intended to replace antivirus products. Antivirus solutions are 
essential to preventing the execution of malware on an endpoint system. This research is 
intended to work alongside antivirus solutions to log activity and provide useful data during 
an incident response. 
This research is limited by the versions of the software available at the time the 
artifacts were developed. This research is based on Sysmon version 6.20 and Elastic version 
5.6.5. During the development of this study, Sysmon and Elastic were upgraded to newer 
versions. As of January 2018, Sysmon 7.01 and Elastic 6.1 were the current released versions. 
SwiftOnSecurity updated their Sysmon configuration file to support Sysmon version 7.01 on 
January 17, 2018. This research was built upon the July 13, 2017 version of the Sysmon 
configuration file provided by SwiftOnSecurity (2017). SwiftOnSecurity states that Sysmon 
7.01 contains important filtering bug fixes (2018), but it does not elaborate on what those 
bugs were. If any of the software versions used in this research have errors or underlying 
bugs, then this implementation will also contain those errors. This implementation does not 
seek to add any additional functionality into the Sysmon or Elastic software. This limitation 
did not affect the outcomes of this research because Sysmon and Elastic are already very 
robust, full functioning programs and no critical bugs were identified that affected the results 
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of this study. However, if additional functionality is desired in this research, one must ensure 
that Sysmon and Elastic products can support the desired functionality. 
This research was limited by restrictions placed on free user accounts by VirusTotal 
and Hybrid Analysis. These restrictions affect the application programming interface (API) 
capabilities that can be used to automate data retrieval to enrich data results. Specifically, 
VirusTotal restricted the API to 4 queries per minute (VirusTotal, 2018). The public 
VirusTotal API key must not be used in commercial products or services (VirusTotal, 2018). 
Hybrid Analysis limited the display of certain analysis results (2017m). This research study 
was able to work around those limitations without affecting results. However, the limitations 
should be heeded if applying this solution in non-research environment to ensure that services 
are being used according to license agreements. 
Ransomware can be delivered using a variety of infection vectors. This research did 
not explore the infection vector or manner in which ransomware gets executed. This research 
only analyzed the resulting ransomware infection, commonly called the ransomware payload 
(Cimpanu, 2017). 
This research is limited by the shortcomings of the design science methodology, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Although design science was the correct methodology to use to 
develop useful artifacts, this research cannot make conclusions regarding the performance or 
efficacy of Sysmon, Elastic, or any implemented tools. This was not a quantitative or 
qualitative study. Results relating to the selected ransomware dataset are provided as a proof 
of concept that the developed artifacts were useful in addressing the research question. 
Numerical results should be interpreted with the understanding that a small sample size was 
used. Additional quantitative and qualitative research could be performed on the results of this 
study to gain additional understanding of how and why Sysmon performs as it does if more 
concrete numerical results are desired.  
Recommendations 
In the process of implementing this research and developing artifacts, this research 
accentuated several recommendations useful to organizations regarding incident response. In 
light of the growing threat of malware and ransomware, it is critical that organizations get 
logging in place so that historical evidence exists when an incident occurs. Historical logging 
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provides great insight into what occurred on a system and can lead to quicker understanding 
of the incident and more complete recovery. Specifically, this research implements an Elastic 
Stack solution to leverage Sysmon logging and analysis. 
Organizations need to be able to detect malware as soon as possible. It is 
recommended that organizations implement cyber security defense in depth to provide a 
layered approach to protect against malware. Current antivirus products that are regularly 
patched are an organization’s first line of defense against known malware. However, malware 
changes frequently and antivirus products may miss new malware variants. Therefore, logging 
is essential to ensure that data exists to enable incident response after an incident occurs. 
Specifically, this research recommends implementing automation to detect and report 
suspicious activity without manual intervention. 
Organizations should also be looking at their logs manually so that abnormal activity 
stands out. Manual review of log data also serves to verify that logging is occurring as 
expected, so that data is available when an incident occurs. This research demonstrates how to 
use an Elastic Stack implementation to analyze Sysmon logs. The trigger tool artifact 
developed by this study can be used to verify Sysmon logging. Dashboards and queries 
provide an easy way to visualize logs and provide quicker understanding. This research 
recommends using Sysmon to log Microsoft Windows events and analyzing the logs with an 
Elastic Stack to stay proactive against malware threats. 
Future Research 
This research only touches the surface regarding capabilities that can be developed 
and explored when analyzing Sysmon logs. The Appendices contain source code and 
configuration files to help other researchers leverage the progress made by this study. 
Researchers are encouraged to implement their own instantiation to collect and analyze 
Sysmon logs to further enhance this research. This section presents several avenues in which 
this research could be extended. 
This research could be extended to study additional malware samples. Additional 
GlobeImposter, Cerber, and Locky samples could be downloaded and executed within the 
virtual environment to increase the sample size of the ransomware dataset. Samples from 
other ransomware families, such as Jaff, Sage, and Mamba could be identified and profiled 
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with this implementation. Other types of malware could be used to see what Sysmon events 
are triggered by malware that is not ransomware. 
Capabilities could be added to this research to improve analytics and automation. 
Additional dashboards could be created in Kibana to highlight key data. Additional queries 
could be identified to point out activity of interest to an incident responder. Additional 
Watcher alerts could be created to automatically alert when specific situations are identified in 
the data. Creating these capabilities and making them available to the incident response 
community would provide additional value by reducing the development time required to 
create new analytics from scratch. 
This research only analyzes the Sysmon events that are triggered by ransomware. It 
does not perform static or dynamic analysis on the ransomware samples to determine if the 
samples perform additional activities that Sysmon does not currently monitor. Future work 
could be performed to determine if there is additional suspicious system activity that Sysmon 
should detect in future versions to improve the effectiveness of Sysmon logging. The authors 
of Sysmon could be contacted to request additional capabilities be built into the tool. 
This research used VirusTotal and Hybrid Security public API keys to enrich the data 
logging with additional information about processes and malware. Many data sources exist to 
provide context to Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, domains, malware, and threats. Future 
work could expand the number of data sources and the type of data enriched in the logs 
through the Logstash pipeline.  
The trigger tool developed by this research could be improved to be more reliable and 
more efficient. Error handling was implemented, but additional testing should be performed to 
make the trigger tool script more robust. PowerShell is leveraged extensively within the 
Python script using the Python subprocess module. The trigger tool could be rewritten 
entirely in PowerShell instead of Python to improve efficiency. In addition, the trigger tool 
uses the Process Monitor software to trigger the driver installation Sysmon event. To reduce 
external dependencies and to reduce the footprint of the trigger tool, a custom driver could be 
implemented and loaded, instead of using the Process Monitor driver. Further work could also 
be performed to explore better ways to trigger Sysmon event IDs 7 and 8 so that a reboot is 
not required after execution of the tool artifact. 
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This research focused on a virtual environment consisting of one endpoint system and 
one server. Additional work could be performed to increase the scale of the implementation to 
include more endpoints and more servers. The Elastic Stack is frequently used on large 
clusters. Guidance on how this implementation performs a large networked environment 
would help expand use case scenarios where this solution could be deployed. 
Research could be performed to investigate how to integrate other open source tools, 
such as Suricata, Yara, and Snort, into the implementation configured by this research (Cisco, 
2018; Suricata, 2018; Yara, 2018). If malicious network connections are identified, perhaps 
Suricata could be updated to block the traffic. If executable files are identified on the system, 
perhaps Yara signatures could be run across the executables to look for malicious signatures. 
Perhaps Snort logs could be integrated into the system to provide additional network detection 
context. 
This research could also be updated to evaluate a different endpoint detection tool 
besides Sysmon. Many logging tools exist, and the Elastic Stack solution can ingest a variety 
of logs. Additional Windows event logs could be added to the implementation. Other logs, 
such as web traffic logs or antivirus logs, could be included in the solution to provide 
additional context regarding ongoing activity within an organization. 
Summary 
This research explored the question “What methodology can an organization follow to 
determine which Sysmon events should be analyzed to identify ransomware in a Windows 
environment?” A design science research study was conducted to develop three useful 
artifacts to answer the research question. A method was developed to articulate steps to take 
to use Sysmon logging to investigate ransomware infections. The developed method provides 
guidance to help organizations properly leverage Sysmon logs during incident response. An 
instantiation was implemented to provide a comprehensive environment to apply the method 
and demonstrate a proof of concept. The implemented instantiation provides a realistic 
example that organizations can implement to start analyzing Sysmon logs quickly. A tool was 
created to trigger all of the Sysmon events in order to verify that logging was behaving as 
expected in the instantiation. The tool enables organizations to confirm that Sysmon is 
logging as expected to ensure that data is available when needed during an incident response. 
65 
The results of this research showed that Sysmon logging provides useful historical 
knowledge when investigating a ransomware infection. Using the artifacts developed in this 
study, ransomware activity can be investigated more quickly during incident response. A 
dataset was compiled consisting of publicly available samples of three major ransomware 
threats, GlobeImposter, Cerber, and Locky. These ransomware families were identified by 
Symantec as major threats to organizations in 2017, making this research extremely relevant 
and applicable to organizations today. The nine dataset samples were executed on the 
endpoint system and analyzed using the instantiation artifact. The ransomware samples were 
profiled using the developed artifacts to determine which Sysmon events were triggered most 
frequently by the ransomware. By knowing what Sysmon events are logged by ransomware, 
an incident responder can inspect Sysmon logs more efficiently to determine what actions 
took place on infected systems.  
This study adds to the overall body of knowledge pertaining to incident response, 
particularly in the area of using Sysmon logs to investigate ransomware infections. The 
contributions of this research fill a gap identified in existing research regarding a lack of 
guidance in how to use Sysmon to investigate ransomware infections, as well as lack of a tool 
to verify Sysmon logging. The artifacts developed by this study fill those gaps and provide 
detailed source code and configuration files to enable organizations to implement, verify, and 
enhance the research results. Organizations can use the results of this research to improve 
their ability to analyze Sysmon logs. Researchers are encouraged to build upon the research 
created in this study to further explore and expand the use of Sysmon logging during incident 
response. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: SYSMON VERSION 6.20 EVENTS 
EVENT ID EVENT DESCRIPTION (Russinovich & Garnier, 2017) 
1 Newly created process 
2 File creation time was changed by a process 
3 TCP/UDP network connection 
4 Sysmon service started or stopped 
5 Process terminated 
6 Driver loaded 
7 Module/DLL loaded into a process 
8 Thread created in another process 
9 Process opened disk or volume for read access 
10 Process opened another process 
11 File created 
12 Registry object created or deleted 
13 Registry value was set 
14 Registry key and/or value was renamed 
15 File stream created 
16 Sysmon configuration changed 
17 Named pipe created 
18 Named pipe connected 
19 Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Event Filter registered 
20 WMI Event Consumer registered 
21 WMI Event Consumer bound to WMI Event Filter 
255 Sysmon Error 
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APPENDIX B: SYSMON CONFIGURATION 
(SYSMONCONFIG-MODIFIED.XML) 
The Symon configuration file used in this research was based on the ‘sysmonconfig-
export.xml’ configuration file from SwiftOnSecurity (2017). The configuration file was 
updated to capture trigger events, as well as improve ransomware detection. The 
configuration file used in this research can be found online at 
https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. The configuration is included 
below, with line numbers displayed for reference. 
 
1   <!-- 
2     sysmon-config | A sysmon configuration focused on default high-
quality event tracing and easy customization by the community 
3     Master version: 52 | Date: 2017-07-13 
4     Master author: @SwiftOnSecurity, other contributors also credited 
in-line or on Git. 
5     Master project: https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config 
6     Master license: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 | You may 
privatize, fork, edit, teach, publish, or deploy for commercial use - with 
attribution in the text. 
7    
8     Fork version: <N/A> 
9     Fork author: Stefani Hobratsch 
10    Fork project: A Holistic Methodology for Profiling Ransomware 
through Endpoint Detection 
11    Fork license: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 | You may 
privatize, fork, edit, teach, publish, or deploy for commercial use - with 
attribution in the text. 
12    
13    REQUIRED: Sysmon version 6.00 or higher (due to changes in registry 
syntax) 
14   https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb545021.aspx 
15   Note that 6.03 has important fixes for filtering 
16   
17    NOTE: Do not let the imposing size and complexity of this 
configuration scare you off building your own or customizing it. 
18   This configuration is based around known high-quality event tracing, 
and thus looks extremely complicated. 
19   Sysmon configurations only have to be a few lines, but significant 
effort has been invested in front-loading as 
20   much filtering as possible onto the client. This is to make analysis 
of intrusions possible by hand, and try to 
21   surface anomalous activity as quickly as possible to any technician 
armed only with Event Viewer. 
22   
23    NOTE: Sysmon is not hardened against a determined attacker with admin 
rights. Also, this configuration offers an attacker, willing 
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24   to study it closely, several ways to evade some of the alerting. If 
you are in a high-threat environment and have significant  
25   security staff, you should consider a much broader log-all approach. 
However, in the vast majority of cases, an attacker 
26   will bumble along through multiple behavioral traps which this 
configuration monitors, especially in the first minutes. 
27   
28    NOTE: "Image" is a technical term for a compiled binary file like an 
EXE or DLL. Also, it can match just the filename, or entire path. 
29    "ProcessGuid" is randomly generated, assigned, and tracked by 
Sysmon to assist in tracing individual process launches. 
30    "LoginGuid" is randomly generated, assigned, and tracked by 
Sysmon to assist in tracing individual user sessions. 
31  --> 
32  <!-- TESTING (changed version number) --> 
33  <Sysmon schemaversion="3.40"> 
34   <HashAlgorithms>md5,sha256</HashAlgorithms> 
35   <EventFiltering> 
36   
37   <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 1 : PROCESS CREATION--> 
38    <!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessID, Image, CommandLine, 
CurrentDirectory, User, LogonGuid, LogonId, TerminalSessionId, 
IntegrityLevel, Hashes, ParentProcessGuid, ParentProcessId, ParentImage, 
ParentCommandLine--> 
39    <ProcessCreate onmatch="exclude"> 
40    <!--COMMENT: All process launched will be included, except 
for what matches a rule below. It's best to be as specific as possible, to 
41      avoid user-mode executables imitating other process 
names to avoid logging, or if malware drops files in an existing directory. 
42      Ultimately, you must weigh CPU time checking many 
detailed rules, against the risk of malware exploiting the blindness 
created.--> 
43     <!--SECTION: Microsoft Windows--> 
44     <CommandLine condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid</CommandLine> <!--
Microsoft:Windows--> 
45     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SearchIndexer.exe 
/Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Search Indexer--> 
46     <Image condition="end 
with">C:\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows:Customer Experience Improvement--> 
47     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\MusNotification.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Update popups--> 
48     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\MusNotificationUx.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Update popups--> 
49     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\audiodg.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Launched constantly--> 
50     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Command line interface host process--> 
51     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\powercfg.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Power 
configuration management--> 
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52     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiApSrv.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: WMI performance adpater host process--> 
53     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\wermgr.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry--> 
54     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\wermgr.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry--> 
55     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\sppsvc.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Software Protection Service--> 
56     <IntegrityLevel 
condition="is">AppContainer</IntegrityLevel> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Don't 
care about sandboxed processes--> 
57     <ParentCommandLine condition="begin 
with">%%SystemRoot%%\system32\csrss.exe 
ObjectDirectory=\Windows</ParentCommandLine> <!--
Microsoft:Windows:CommandShell: Triggered when programs use the command 
shell, but without attribution--> 
58     <ParentImage 
condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SearchIndexer.exe</ParentImage> <!--
Microsoft:Windows:Search: Launches many uninteresting sub-processes--> 
59     <!--SECTION: Microsoft:Windows:Defender--> 
60     <Image condition="begin with">C:\Program Files\Windows 
Defender</Image> <!--Microsoft:Windows:Defender in Win10--> 
61     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\MpSigStub.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Microsoft Malware Protection Signature Update Stub--> 
62     <Image condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\Install\AM_Base</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Defender: Full signature updates--> 
63     <Image condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\Install\AM_Delta</Image> <!-
-Microsoft:Defender: Delta signature updates--> 
64     <Image condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\Install\AM_Engine</Image> 
<!--Microsoft:Defender: Engine updates--> 
65     <!--SECTION: Microsoft:Windows:svchost--> 
66     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k appmodel</CommandLine> 
<!--Microsoft:Windows 10--> 
67     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k dcomLaunch</CommandLine> 
<!--Microsoft:Windows dervices--> 
68     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k defragsvc</CommandLine> 
<!--Microsoft:Windows defrag--> 
69     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k imgsvc</CommandLine> <!--
Microsoft:The Windows Image Acquisition Service--> 
70     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k 
localServiceAndNoImpersonation</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Network 
services--> 
71     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k 
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localServiceNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Network 
services--> 
72     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k 
localSystemNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Network 
services--> 
73     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs</CommandLine> <!-
-Microsoft:Windows: Network services--> 
74     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k 
networkServiceNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Windows: 
Network services--> 
75     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k rPCSS</CommandLine> <!--
Microsoft:Windows Services--> 
76     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k swprv</CommandLine> <!--
Microsoft:Software Shadow Copy Provider--> 
77     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k 
unistackSvcGroup</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Windows 10--> 
78     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k utcsvc</CommandLine> <!--
Microsoft:Windows Services--> 
79     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k 
wbioSvcGroup</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Windows Services--> 
80     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k wsappx</CommandLine> <!--
Microsoft:Windows 10--> 
81     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k 
networkService</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Network services--> 
82     <CommandLine 
condition="is">C:\windows\System32\svchost.exe -k werSvcGroup</CommandLine> 
<!--Microsoft:Windows: ErrorReporting--> 
83     <ParentCommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k 
netsvcs</ParentCommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Network services: Spawns 
Consent.exe--> 
84     <ParentCommandLine 
condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k 
LocalSystemNetworkRestricted</ParentCommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Windows: 
Network services--> 
85     <!--SECTION: Microsoft:dotNet--> 
86     <CommandLine condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\ngen.exe</CommandLine> 
<!--Microsoft:DotNet--> 
87     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe
</Image> <!--Microsoft:DotNet--> 
88     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</
Image> <!--Microsoft:DotNet--> 
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89     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework64\v3.0\WPF\PresentationFo
ntCache.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Font cache service--> 
90     <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework64\v3.0\WPF\PresentationFo
ntCache.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Font cache service--> 
91     <ParentCommandLine 
condition="contains">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ngenta
sk.exe</ParentCommandLine> 
92     <ParentImage 
condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe
</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet--> 
93     <ParentImage 
condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe
</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet--> 
94     <ParentImage 
condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</
ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet--> 
95     <ParentImage 
condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe</
ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet--> 
96     <ParentImage 
condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe</
ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet: Spawns thousands of ngen.exe processes--
> 
97     <!--SECTION: Microsoft:Office--> 
98     <Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft 
Office\Office16\MSOSYNC.EXE</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background 
process--> 
99     <Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common 
Files\Microsoft Shared\OfficeSoftwareProtectionPlatform\OSPPSVC.EXE</Image> 
<!--Microsoft:Office: Background process--> 
100    <!--SECTION: Microsoft:Office:Click2Run--> 
101    <Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common 
Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Office: Background process--> 
102    <ParentImage condition="end with">C:\Program Files\Common 
Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe</ParentImage> <!--
Microsoft:Office: Background process--> 
103    <ParentImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common 
Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe</ParentImage> <!--
Microsoft:Office: Background process--> 
104    <!--SECTION: Google--> 
105    <CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=</CommandLine> <!--
Google:Chrome: massive command-line arguments--> 
106    <CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program 
Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=</CommandLine> <!--
Google:Chrome: massive command-line arguments--> 
107    <Image condition="begin with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Google\Update\</Image> <!--Google:Chrome: Updater--> 
108    <ParentImage condition="begin with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Google\Update\</ParentImage> <!--Google:Chrome: Updater--> 
109    <!--SECTION: Firefox--> 
110    <CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program 
Files\Mozilla Firefox\plugin-container.exe" --channel</CommandLine> <!-- 
Mozilla:Firefox: Large command-line arguments | Credit @Darkbat91 --> 
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111    <CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Mozilla Firefox\plugin-container.exe" --channel</CommandLine> <!-- 
Mozilla:Firefox: Large command-line arguments | Credit @Darkbat91 --> 
112    <!--SECTION: Adobe--> 
113    <CommandLine condition="contains">AcroRd32.exe" /CR 
</CommandLine> <!--Adobe:AcrobatReader: Uninteresting sandbox subprocess--> 
114    <CommandLine condition="contains">AcroRd32.exe" --
channel=</CommandLine> <!--Adobe:AcrobatReader: Uninteresting sandbox 
subprocess--> 
115    <Image condition="end with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\AcroCEF\AcroCEF.exe</Image> <!--
Adobe:Acrobat: Sandbox subprocess, still evaluating security exposure--> 
116    <ParentImage condition="end with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Common Files\Adobe\AdobeGCClient\AGSService.exe</ParentImage> 
117    <Image condition="end with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroCEF\RdrCEF.exe</Image> <!--
Adobe:AcrobatReader: Sandbox subprocess, still evaluating security 
exposure--> 
118    <Image condition="end with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\LogTransport2.exe</Image> 
119    <!--SECTION: Adobe:Flash--> 
120    <Image condition="end 
with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Macromed\Flash\FlashPlayerUpdateService.exe</Imag
e> <!--Adobe:Flash: Properly hardened updater, not a risk--> 
121    <!--SECTION: Adobe:Updater--> 
122    <Image condition="end with">C:\Program Files (x86)\Common 
Files\Adobe\ARM\1.0\AdobeARM.exe</Image> <!--Adobe:Updater: Properly 
hardened updater, not a risk--> 
123    <ParentImage condition="end with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Common Files\Adobe\ARM\1.0\AdobeARM.exe</ParentImage> <!--
Adobe:Updater: Properly hardened updater, not a risk--> 
124    <Image condition="end with">C:\Program Files (x86)\Common 
Files\Adobe\ARM\1.0\armsvc.exe</Image> <!--Adobe:Updater: Properly hardened 
updater, not a risk--> 
125    <!--SECTION: Adobe:Supporting processes--> 
126    <Image condition="end with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\AdobeCollabSync.exe</Image> 
127    <Image condition="end with">C:\Program Files (x86)\Common 
Files\Adobe\Adobe Desktop Common\HEX\Adobe CEF Helper.exe</Image> 
128    <Image condition="end with">C:\Program Files (x86)\Common 
Files\Adobe\AdobeGCClient\AdobeGCClient.exe</Image> <!--Adobe:Creative 
Cloud--> 
129    <Image condition="end with">C:\Program Files (x86)\Common 
Files\Adobe\OOBE\PDApp\P6\adobe_licutil.exe</Image> <!--Adobe:License 
utility--> 
130    <Image condition="end with">C:\Program Files (x86)\Common 
Files\Adobe\OOBE\PDApp\P7\adobe_licutil.exe</Image> <!--Adobe:License 
utility--> 
131    <ParentImage condition="end with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Common Files\Adobe\OOBE\PDApp\P7\adobe_licutil.exe</ParentImage> <!--
Adobe:License utility--> 
132    <Image condition="end with">C:\Program Files (x86)\Common 
Files\Adobe\OOBE\PDApp\UWA\updaterstartuputility.exe</Image> 
133    <ParentImage condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Common 
Files\Adobe\OOBE\PDApp\UWA\updaterstartuputility.exe</ParentImage> 
134    <!--SECTION: Adobe:Creative Cloud--> 
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135    <Image condition="end with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Adobe\Adobe Creative Cloud\ACC\Creative Cloud.exe</Image> 
136    <ParentImage condition="end with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Adobe\Adobe Creative Cloud\ACC\Creative Cloud.exe</ParentImage> 
137    <ParentImage condition="end with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Adobe\Adobe Creative Cloud\CCXProcess\CCXProcess.exe</ParentImage> 
138    <ParentImage condition="end with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Adobe\Adobe Creative Cloud\CoreSync\CoreSync.exe</ParentImage> 
139    <!--SECTION: Drivers--> 
140    <CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program 
Files\DellTPad\ApMsgFwd.exe" -s{</CommandLine> 
141    <Image condition="begin with">C:\Program Files\NVIDIA 
Corporation\</Image> <!--Nvidia:Driver: routine actions--> 
142    <Image condition="begin with">C:\Program 
Files\Realtek\</Image> <!--Realtek:Driver: routine actions--> 
143    <ParentImage condition="end with">C:\Program 
Files\DellTPad\HidMonitorSvc.exe</ParentImage> 
144    <ParentImage condition="end with">C:\Program 
Files\Realtek\Audio\HDA\RtkAudioService64.exe</ParentImage> <!--
Realtek:Driver: routine actions--> 
145    <!--SECTION: Dropbox--> 
146    <Image condition="end with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe</Image> <!--Dropbox:Updater: Lots of 
command-line arguments--> 
147    <ParentImage condition="end with">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Dropbox\Update\DropboxUpdate.exe</ParentImage> 
148    <!--SECTION: Dell--> 
149    <ParentImage condition="image">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Dell\CommandUpdate\InvColPC.exe</ParentImage> <!--Dell:CommandUpdate: 
Detection process--> 
150   </ProcessCreate> 
151  
152  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 2 : FILE CREATION TIME RETROACTIVELY CHANGED IN 
THE FILESYSTEM--> 
153   <!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, 
TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime, PreviousCreationUtcTime--> 
154    <FileCreateTime onmatch="include"> 
155    <Image condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Look 
for timestomping processes in user area-->  
156    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">trigger.txt</TargetFilename> <!--Look for Trigger --> 
157   </FileCreateTime> 
158   <FileCreateTime onmatch="exclude"> 
159    <Image condition="image">OneDrive.exe</Image> <!--
OneDrive constantly changes file times--> 
160    <Image condition="contains">setup</Image> <!--Ignore 
setups--> 
161   </FileCreateTime> 
162  
163  
164  
165  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 3 : NETWORK CONNECTION INITIATED--> 
166   <!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, User, 
Protocol, Initiated, SourceIsIpv6, SourceIp, SourceHostname, SourcePort, 
SourcePortName, DestinationIsIpV6, DestinationIP, DestinationHostname, 
DestinationPort, DestinationPortName--> 
167   <NetworkConnect onmatch="include"> 
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168   <!--COMMENT: Takes a very conservative approach to network 
logging, limit to extremely high-signal events.--> 
169   <!--TECHNICAL: For the DestinationHostname, Sysmon uses the 
GetNameInfo API, which may not always have the information or may be a CDN. 
Using that field is best-effort only.--> 
170   <!--TECHNICAL: These exe's do not initiate their 
connections, and cannot be included: BITSADMIN--> 
171    <Image condition="end with">trigger.exe</Image>  <!--Look 
for Trigger --> 
172    <!--Suspicious sources--> 
173    <Image condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Tools 
downloaded by users can use other processes for networking, but this is a 
very valuable indicator.--> 
174    <Image condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData</Image> <!--
Normally, network communications should be sourced from "Program Files" not 
from ProgramData, something to look at--> 
175    <Image condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Temp</Image> <!-
-Suspicious anything would communicate from the system-level temp 
directory--> 
176    <!--Suspicious Windows tools--> 
177    <Image condition="image">at.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Remote task scheduling | Credit @ion-storm --> 
178    <Image condition="image">certutil.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Certificate tool can contact outbound | Credit @ion-
storm and @FVT [ https://twitter.com/FVT/status/834433734602530817 ] --> 
179    <Image condition="image">cmd.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Command prompt--> 
180    <Image condition="image">cscript.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:WindowsScriptingHost: | Credit @Cyb3rOps [ 
https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a4b4af9481e01e749409 ] --> 
181    <Image condition="image">java.exe</Image> <!--Java: 
Monitor usage of vulnerable application | Credit @ion-storm --> 
182    <Image condition="image">mshta.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: HTML application executes scripts without IE protections 
| Credit @ion-storm [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application ] --> 
183    <Image condition="image">msiexec.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Can install from http:// paths | Credit @vector-sec --> 
184    <Image condition="image">net.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: "net use"/"net view" used by attackers to surveil and 
connect with file shares from command line | Credit @ion-storm --> 
185    <Image condition="image">notepad.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: [ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2013/08/08/why-is-
notepad-exe-connecting-to-the-internet/ ] --> 
186    <Image condition="image">powershell.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: PowerShell interface--> 
187    <Image condition="image">qwinsta.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Remotely query login sessions on a server or workstation 
| Credit @ion-storm --> 
188    <Image condition="image">reg.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Remote Registry | Credit @ion-storm --> 
189    <Image condition="image">regsvr32.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: [ https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/04/bypass-
application-whitelisting-script.html ] --> 
190    <Image condition="image">rundll32.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: [ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2016/07/22/why-is-
rundll32-exe-connecting-to-the-internet/ ] --> 
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191    <Image condition="image">sc.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Remotely change Windows service settings from command 
line | Credit @ion-storm --> 
192    <Image condition="image">wmic.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:WindowsManagementInstrumentation: Credit @Cyb3rOps [ 
https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a4b4af9481e01e749409 ] --> 
193    <Image condition="image">wscript.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:WindowsScriptingHost: | Credit @arekfurt --> 
194    <!--Relevant 3rd Party Tools: Remote Access--> 
195    <Image condition="image">psexec.exe</Image> <!--
Sysinternals:PsExec client side | Credit @Cyb3rOps --> 
196    <Image condition="image">psexesvc.exe</Image> <!--
Sysinternals:PsExec server side | Credit @Cyb3rOps --> 
197    <Image condition="image">vnc.exe</Image> <!-- VNC client 
| Credit @Cyb3rOps --> 
198    <Image condition="image">vncviewer.exe</Image> <!-- VNC 
client | Credit @Cyb3rOps --> 
199    <Image condition="image">vncservice.exe</Image> <!-- VNC 
server | Credit @Cyb3rOps --> 
200    <Image condition="image">winexesvc.exe</Image> <!-- 
Winexe service executable | Credit @Cyb3rOps --> 
201    <Image condition="image">\AA_v</Image> <!-- Ammy Admin 
service executable (e.g. AA_v3.0.exe AA_v3.5.exe ) | Credit @Cyb3rOps --> 
202    <!-- Often exploited services -->  
203    <Image condition="image">omniinet.exe</Image> <!-- HP 
Data Protector https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-
10/product_id-20499/HP-Data-Protector.html | Credit @Cyb3rOps --> 
204    <Image condition="image">hpsmhd.exe</Image> <!-- HP 
System Management Homepage https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-
list/vendor_id-10/product_id-7244/HP-System-Management-Homepage.html | 
Credit @Cyb3rOps --> 
205    <!--Malware related--> 
206    <Image condition="image">tor.exe</Image> <!--Tor [ 
https://www.hybrid-
analysis.com/sample/800bf028a23440134fc834efc5c1e02cc70f05b2e800bbc285d7c92
a4b126b1c?environmentId=100 ] --> 
207    <!--Ports: Suspicious--> 
208    <DestinationPort condition="is">22</DestinationPort> <!--
SSH protocol--> 
209    <DestinationPort condition="is">23</DestinationPort> <!--
Telnet protocol--> 
210    <DestinationPort condition="is">25</DestinationPort> <!--
SMTP mail protocol--> 
211    <DestinationPort condition="is">3389</DestinationPort> 
<!--Microsoft:Windows:RDP--> 
212    <DestinationPort condition="is">5800</DestinationPort> 
<!--VNC protocol--> 
213    <DestinationPort condition="is">5900</DestinationPort> 
<!--VNC protocol--> 
214    <!--Ports: Proxy--> 
215    <DestinationPort condition="is">1080</DestinationPort> 
<!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm--> 
216    <DestinationPort condition="is">3128</DestinationPort> 
<!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm--> 
217    <DestinationPort condition="is">8080</DestinationPort> 
<!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm--> 
218    <!--Ports: Tor--> 
88 
219    <DestinationPort condition="is">1723</DestinationPort> 
<!--Tor protocol | Credit @ion-storm--> 
220    <DestinationPort condition="is">4500</DestinationPort> 
<!--Tor protocol | Credit @ion-storm--> 
221    <DestinationPort condition="is">9001</DestinationPort> 
<!--Tor protocol [ http://www.computerworlduk.com/tutorial/security/tor-
enterprise-2016-blocking-malware-darknet-use-rogue-nodes-3633907/ ] --> 
222    <DestinationPort condition="is">9030</DestinationPort> 
<!--Tor protocol [ http://www.computerworlduk.com/tutorial/security/tor-
enterprise-2016-blocking-malware-darknet-use-rogue-nodes-3633907/ ] --> 
223   </NetworkConnect> 
224   <NetworkConnect onmatch="exclude"> 
225    <Image condition="image">OneDrive.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:OneDrive--> 
226    <Image condition="image">Spotify.exe</Image> <!--Spotify-
-> 
227    <Image condition="end 
with">AppData\Roaming\Dropbox\bin\Dropbox.exe</Image> <!--Dropbox--> 
228    <!--SECTION: Microsoft--> 
229    <Image 
condition="image">OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:OneDrive--> 
230    <DestinationHostname condition="end 
with">microsoft.com</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery--> 
231    <DestinationHostname condition="end 
with">microsoft.com.akadns.net</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update 
delivery--> 
232    <DestinationHostname condition="end 
with">microsoft.com.nsatc.net</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update 
delivery--> 
233   </NetworkConnect> 
234  
235  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 4 : RESERVED FOR SYSMON STATUS MESSAGES, THIS 
LINE IS INCLUDED FOR DOCUMENTATION PURPOSES ONLY--> 
236   <!--DATA: UtcTime, State, Version, SchemaVersion--> 
237   <!--Cannot be filtered.--> 
238  
239  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 5 : PROCESS ENDED--> 
240   <!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image--> 
241   <ProcessTerminate onmatch="include"> 
242   <!--COMMENT: Useful data in building infection timelines.-
-> 
243    <Image condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--
Process terminations by user binaries--> 
244    <Image condition="end with">trigger.exe</Image>  <!--Look 
for Trigger --> 
245   </ProcessTerminate> 
246  
247  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 6 : DRIVER LOADED INTO KERNEL--> 
248   <!--DATA: UtcTime, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, Signature, 
SignatureStatus--> 
249   <DriverLoad onmatch="exclude"> 
250   <!--COMMENT: Because drivers with bugs can be used to 
escalate to kernel permissions, be extremely selective 
251     about what you exclude from monitoring. Low event 
volume, little incentive to exclude.--> 
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252    <Signature condition="contains">microsoft</Signature> <!-
-Exclude signed Microsoft drivers-->  
253    <Signature condition="contains">windows</Signature> <!--
Exclude signed Microsoft drivers-->  
254    <Signature condition="begin with">Intel </Signature> <!--
Exclude signed Intel drivers-->  
255   </DriverLoad> 
256  
257  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 7 : DLL (IMAGE) LOADED BY PROCESS--> 
258   <!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, ImageLoaded, 
Hashes, Signed, Signature, SignatureStatus--> 
259   <ImageLoad onmatch="include"> 
260   <!--COMMENT: Can cause high system load, disabled by 
default, important examples included below.--> 
261    <ImageLoaded condition="end 
with">trigger.dll</ImageLoaded>  <!--Look for Trigger --> 
262     
263    <!-- <ImageLoaded 
condition="contains">system.automation</ImageLoaded> --> 
264    <!-- <ImageLoaded 
condition="image">wshom.ocx</ImageLoaded> --> 
265    <!-- <ImageLoaded 
condition="image">vbscript.dll</ImageLoaded> --> 
266    <!-- <ImageLoaded 
condition="image">javascript.dll</ImageLoaded> --> 
267    <!-- <ImageLoaded 
condition="contains">msxml4</ImageLoaded> --> 
268    <!-- <ImageLoaded condition="image">hal.dll</ImageLoaded> 
--> 
269    <!-- <ImageLoaded 
condition="image">scrrun.dll</ImageLoaded> --> 
270    <!-- <ImageLoaded 
condition="contains">npjpi</ImageLoaded> --> 
271    <!-- <ImageLoaded 
condition="image">jp2iexp.dll</ImageLoaded> --> 
272    <!-- Mimikatz --> 
273     <!--NOTES: [ 
https://securityriskadvisors.com/blog/post/detecting-in-memory-mimikatz/ ] 
--> 
274    <!-- <ImageLoaded 
condition="image">wdigest.dll</ImageLoaded> --> 
275   </ImageLoad> 
276  
277  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 8 : REMOTE THREAD CREATED--> 
278   <!--DATA: UtcTime, SourceProcessGuid, SourceProcessId, 
SourceImage, TargetProcessId, TargetImage, NewThreadId, StartAddress, 
StartModule, StartFunction--> 
279   <CreateRemoteThread onmatch="exclude"> 
280   <!--COMMENT: Monitor for processes injecting code into 
other processes. Often used by malware to cloak their actions. 
281     Exclude mostly-safe sources and log anything else.-
-> 
282    <SourceImage 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe</SourceImage> 
283    <SourceImage 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe</SourceImage> 
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284    <SourceImage 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\wininit.exe</SourceImage> 
285    <SourceImage 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe</SourceImage> 
286    <SourceImage 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\services.exe</SourceImage> 
287    <SourceImage 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe</SourceImage> 
288    <SourceImage 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\audiodg.exe</SourceImage> 
289    <StartModule 
condition="is">C:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll</StartModule> 
290    <TargetImage condition="end 
with">Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe</TargetImage> 
291   </CreateRemoteThread> 
292  
293  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 9 : RAW DISK ACCESS--> 
294   <!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, Device--> 
295   <RawAccessRead onmatch="include"> 
296   <!--COMMENT: Monitor for raw sector-level access to the 
disk, often used to bypass access control lists or access locked files. 
297     Disabled by default since including even one entry 
here activates this component. Reward/performance/rule maintenance 
decision. 
298     Encourage you to experiment with this feature 
yourself.--> 
299   <!--COMMENT: You will likely want to set this to a full 
capture on domain controllers, where no process should be doing raw reads.-
-> 
300    <Image condition="end with">powershell.exe</Image> 
301    <Image condition="end with">wmic.exe</Image> 
302   </RawAccessRead> 
303  
304  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 10 : INTER-PROCESS ACCESS--> 
305   <!--DATA: UtcTime, SourceProcessGuid, SourceProcessId, 
SourceThreadId, SourceImage, TargetProcessGuid, TargetProcessId, 
TargetImage, GrantedAccess, CallTrace--> 
306   <ProcessAccess onmatch="include"> <!--TEST--> 
307   <!--COMMENT: Monitor for processes accessing other 
process' memory. This can be valuable, but can cause a huge number of 
events.--> 
308    <SourceImage condition="end 
with">trigger.exe</SourceImage>  <!--Look for Trigger --> 
309   </ProcessAccess> 
310  
311  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 11 : FILE CREATED--> 
312   <!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, 
TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime--> 
313   <FileCreate onmatch="include"> 
314    <TargetFilename condition="contains">\Start 
Menu</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Startup links and shortcut 
modification--> 
315    <TargetFilename 
condition="contains">\Startup</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office: 
Changes to user's autoloaded files under AppData--> 
91 
316    <TargetFilename 
condition="contains">\Content.Outlook\</TargetFilename> <!--
Microsoft:Outlook: attachments--> <!--PRIVACY WARNING--> 
317    <TargetFilename 
condition="contains">\Downloads\</TargetFilename> <!--Downloaded files. 
Does not include "Run" files in IE--> <!--PRIVACY WARNING--> 
318    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.application</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ClickOnce: [ 
https://blog.netspi.com/all-you-need-is-one-a-clickonce-love-story/ ] --> 
319    <TargetFilename condition="end with">.appref-
ms</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ClickOnce application | Credit @ion-storm 
--> 
320    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.bat</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting--> 
321    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.cmd</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting: Batch scripts can also use 
the .cmd extension | Credit: @mmazanec --> 
322    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.cmdline</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Executed by 
cvtres.exe--> 
323    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.docm</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro--> 
324    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.exe</TargetFilename> <!--Executable--> 
325    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.hta</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting--> 
326    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.pptm</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro--> 
327    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.ps1</TargetFilename> <!--PowerShell [ More information: 
http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/08/27/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-16/ ] -
-> 
328    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.sys</TargetFilename> <!--System driver files--> 
329    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.vbs</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting--> 
330    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.xlsm</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro--> 
331    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\Users\Default</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Changes to 
default user profile--> 
332    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\System32\Drivers</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft: Drivers 
dropped here--> 
333    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Drivers</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft: Drivers 
dropped here--> 
334    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\System32\GroupPolicy\Machine\Scripts</TargetFilename> <!--
Group policy [ More information: 
http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/01/07/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-52/ ] -
-> 
335    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\System32\GroupPolicy\User\Scripts</TargetFilename> <!--
Group policy [ More information: 
http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/01/07/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-52/ ] -
-> 
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336    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\System32\Tasks</TargetFilename> <!--
Microsoft:ScheduledTasks--> 
337    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\System32\Wbem</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:WMI: [ More 
information: 
http://2014.hackitoergosum.org/slides/day1_WMI_Shell_Andrei_Dumitrescu.pdf 
] --> 
338    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:WMI: [ More 
information: 
http://2014.hackitoergosum.org/slides/day1_WMI_Shell_Andrei_Dumitrescu.pdf 
] --> 
339    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell</TargetFilename> <!--
Microsoft:Powershell: Look for modifications for persistence [ 
https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets ] --> 
340    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell</TargetFilename> <!--
Microsoft:Powershell: Look for modifications for persistence [ 
https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets ] --> 
341    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\Tasks\</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ScheduledTasks--> 
342    <!-- TEST --> 
343    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.402</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
344    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.4035</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
345    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.4090</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
346    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.4091</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
347    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.452</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
348    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.707</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter -->  
349    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.725</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
350    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.726</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
351    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.911</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
352    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.f41o1</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
353    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.2cXpCihgsVxB3</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
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354    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.3ncrypt3d</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
355    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.au1crypt</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
356    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.BONUM</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
357    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.BRT92</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
358    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.BUSH</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
359    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.C8B089F</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
360    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.CHAK</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
361    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.clinTON</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
362    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.crypt</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
363    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.FIX</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
364    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.fuck</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
365    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.goro</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
366    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.gotham</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
367    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.granny</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
368    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.happ</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
369    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.lpcrestore</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
370    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.keepcalm</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
371    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.LIN</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
372    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.MAKB</TargetFilename> <!-- 
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373    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.medal</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
374    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.mtk118</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
375    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.needdecrypt</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
376    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.needkeys</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
377    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.NIGGA</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
378    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.nWcrypt</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
379    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.paycyka</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
380    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.pizdec</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
381    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.pscrypt</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
382    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.ReaGAN</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
383    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.rumblegoodboy</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
384    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.s1crypt</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
385    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.scorp</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
386    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.sea</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
387    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.skunk</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
388    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.Trump</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
389    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.UNLIS</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
390    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.vdul</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
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391    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.wallet</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
392    <TargetFilename 
condition="contains">.write_</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
393    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.YAYA</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
394    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.zuzya</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
395    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">..doc</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
396    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.xlsm</TargetFilename> <!-- 
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/ransome-globeimposter --> 
  
397    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.cerber3</TargetFilename> <!-- Reverse.it sample -->  
398    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.coded</TargetFilename> <!-- Reverse.it sample -->  
399    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.STN</TargetFilename> <!-- Reverse.it sample -->  
400    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.AK47</TargetFilename> <!-- Reverse.it sample -->   
401    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.asasin</TargetFilename> <!-- Reverse.it sample --> 
402    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">how_to_back_files.html</TargetFilename> <!-- Reverse.it sample --> 
403    <TargetFilename condition="contains">RECOVER-
FILES</TargetFilename> <!-- Reverse.it sample --> 
404    <TargetFilename 
condition="contains">DECRYPT</TargetFilename> <!-- Commonly seen in 
Ransomware -->    
405    <!-- TEST --> 
406   </FileCreate> 
407   <FileCreate onmatch="exclude"> 
408    <!--SECTION: Microsoft:Office:Click2Run--> 
409    <Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common 
Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe</Image> <!-- 
Microsoft:Office Click2Run--> 
410    <!--SECTION: Microsoft:Windows--> 
411    <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\smss.exe</Image> <!-- Microsoft:Windows: 
Session Manager SubSystem: Creates swapfile.sys,pagefile.sys,hiberfile.sys-
-> 
412    <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\CompatTelRunner.exe</Image> <!-- 
Microsoft:Windows: Windows 10 app, creates tons of cache files--> 
413    <Image 
condition="is">\\?\C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WMIADAP.EXE</Image> <!-- 
Microsoft:Windows: WMI Performance updates--> 
414    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\</TargetFilename> <!-- 
Microsoft:Windows: Temp files by DrvInst.exe--> 
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415    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\Windows\System32\wbem\Performance\</TargetFilename> <!-- 
Microsoft:Windows: Created in wbem by WMIADAP.exe--> 
416    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">WRITABLE.TST</TargetFilename> <!-- Microsoft:Windows: Created in wbem 
by svchost--> 
417    <!--SECTION: Microsoft:Windows:Updates--> 
418    <TargetFilename condition="begin 
with">C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\Sources\SafeOS\SafeOS.Mount\</TargetFilename> <!-- 
Microsoft:Windows: Feature updates containing lots of .exe and .sys--> 
419    <Image condition="begin 
with">C:\WINDOWS\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows</Image> <!-- 
Microsoft:Windows: Windows update--> 
420    <!--SECTION: Dell--> 
421    <Image condition="is">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Dell\CommandUpdate\InvColPC.exe</Image> 
422    <!--SECTION: Intel--> 
423    <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\igfxCUIService.exe</Image> <!--Intel: 
Drops bat and other files in \Windows in normal operation--> 
424   </FileCreate> 
425  
426  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 12 & 13 & 14 : REGISTRY MODIFICATION--> 
427   <!--NOTE: It may appear this section is missing important 
entries, but many of them match multiple areas, so look carefully to see if 
something is already covered.--> 
428   <!--NOTE: "contains" conditions below are formatted to reduce 
CPU load, so they may appear written inconsistently, but this is on purpose 
from tuning.--> 
429   <!--NOTE: "contains" works by finding the first letter, then 
matching the second, etc, so the first letters should be as low-occurance 
as possible.--> 
430   <!--NOTE: Windows writes hundreds or thousands of registry 
keys a minute, so just because you're not changing stuff, doesn't mean 
these rules aren't being run.--> 
431   <!--NOTE: You don't have to spend a lot of time worrying 
about this, CPUs are fast, but it's something to consider. Every rule and 
condition type has a cost.--> 
432   <!--DATA: EventType, UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, 
TargetObject, Details, NewName--> 
433   <!--TECHNICAL: Possible prefixes are HKLM, HKCR, and 
HKEY_USERS--> 
434   <!--CRITICAL: Schema version 3.30 and higher use HKLM and 
HKEY_USERS and HKCR and CurrentControlSet instead of REGISTRY\MACHINE\ and 
\REGISTRY\USER\ and ControlSet001--> 
435    
436   <RegistryEvent onmatch="include"> 
437    <!--Autorun or Startups--> 
438     <!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ 
http://www.ghacks.net/2016/06/04/windows-automatic-startup-locations/ ] --> 
439     <!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ 
https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https://arsenalrecon.com/
downloads/resources/Registry_Keys_Related_to_Autorun.ods ] --> 
440     <!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ 
http://www.silentrunners.org/launchpoints.html ] --> 
441     <!-- TEST --> 
442      
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443    <TargetObject condition="contains">Trigger</TargetObject>  
<!--Look for Trigger --> 
444    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\CurrentVersion\Run</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Run keys, incld RunOnce, RunOnceEx, RunServices, 
RunServicesOnce [Also covers terminal server] --> 
445    <TargetObject condition="contains">\Group 
Policy\Scripts</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Group policy scripts--
> 
446    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\Windows\System\Scripts</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Logon, Loggoff, Shutdown--> 
447    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\Policies\Explorer\Run</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows | Credit @ion-storm--> 
448    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\ServiceDll</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Points to a 
service's DLL [ https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-
1-introduction-attack-phases-and-windows-services ] --> 
449    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\ImagePath</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Points to a 
service's EXE [ 
https://github.com/crypsisgroup/Splunkmon/blob/master/sysmon.cfg ] --> 
450    <TargetObject condition="end with">\Start</TargetObject> 
<!--Microsoft:Windows: Services start mode changes (Disabled, 
Automatically, Manual)--> 
451    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: 
Autorun location [ https://www.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-
part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order ] --> 
452    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: 
Autorun location [ https://www.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-
part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order ] --> 
453    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Legacy 
driver loading | Credit @ion-storm --> 
454    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session 
Manager\BootExecute</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Autorun | Credit 
@ion-storm | [ https://www.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-
the-run-keys-and-search-order ] --> 
455    <!--CLSID launch commands and file association changes--> 
456    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\Explorer\FileExts\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Changes to file extension mapping--> 
457    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\shell\install\command\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Sensitive subkey under file associations and CLSID that 
map to launch command--> 
458    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\shell\open\command\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Sensitive subkey under file associations and CLSID that 
map to launch command--> 
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459    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\shell\open\ddeexec\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Sensitive subkey under file associations and CLSID that 
map to launch command--> 
460    <!--Windows COM--> 
461    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\InprocServer32\(Default)</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows:COM 
Object Hijacking [ https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-
hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence ] | Credit @ion-storm --> 
462    <!--Windows shell hijack--> 
463    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\Classes\*\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows:Explorer: [ 
http://www.silentrunners.org/launchpoints.html ] --> 
464    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\Classes\AllFilesystemObjects\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows:Explorer: [ 
http://www.silentrunners.org/launchpoints.html ] --> 
465    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\Classes\Directory\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows:Explorer: [ 
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1323663/windows-shell-context-menu-
option ] --> 
466    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\Classes\Drive\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows:Explorer: [ 
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1323663/windows-shell-context-menu-
option ] --> 
467    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\Classes\Folder\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows:Explorer: ContextMenuHandlers, DragDropHandlers, 
CopyHookHandlers, [ https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1323663/windows-
shell-context-menu-option ] --> 
468    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\ContextMenuHandlers\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: [ http://oalabs.openanalysis.net/2015/06/04/malware-
persistence-hkey_current_user-shell-extension-handlers/ ] --> 
469    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\CurrentVersion\Shell</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Shell Folders, ShellExecuteHooks, 
ShellIconOverloadIdentifers, ShellServiceObjects, 
ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad [ 
http://oalabs.openanalysis.net/2015/06/04/malware-persistence-
hkey_current_user-shell-extension-handlers/ ] --> 
470    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\ShellExecuteH
ooks</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: ShellExecuteHooks--> 
471    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\ShellServiceO
bjectDelayLoad</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: ShellExecuteHooks--> 
472    <!--AppPaths hijacking--> 
473    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App 
Paths\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Credit to @Hexacorn [ 
http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/ ] --
> 
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474    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session 
Manager\AppCertDlls\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Credit to 
@Hexacorn [ http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-
part-3/ ] --> 
475    <!--Terminal service boobytraps--> 
476    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal 
Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\InitialProgram</TargetObject> 
477    <!--Group Policy interity--> 
478    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\GPExtensions\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Group Policy internally uses a plugin architecture that 
nothing should be modifying--> 
479    <!--Winsock and Winsock2--> 
480    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinSock\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Wildcard, includes Winsock and Winsock2--> 
481    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\ProxyServer</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: System and user 
proxy server--> 
482    <!--Credential providers--> 
483    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\Credent
ial Provider</TargetObject> <!--Wildcard, includes Credental Providers and 
Credential Provider Filters--> 
484    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\</TargetObject> 
485    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SecurityProvi
ders</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Changes to WDigest-
UseLogonCredential for password scraping [ 
https://www.trustedsec.com/april-2015/dumping-wdigest-creds-with-
meterpreter-mimikatzkiwi-in-windows-8-1/ ] --> 
486    <!--Networking--> 
487    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order\</TargetO
bject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Order of network providers that are checked 
to connect to destination [ https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets 
] --> 
488    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\NetworkList\Profiles</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: | Credit @ion-storm --> 
489    <!--DLLs that get injected into every process launch--> 
490    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/windows/desktop/dd744762(v=vs.85).aspx ] --> 
491    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: [ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/windows/desktop/dn280412(v=vs.85).aspx ] --> 
492    <!--Office--> 
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493    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Office: Outlook add-ins--> 
494    <!--IE--> 
495    <TargetObject condition="contains">\Internet 
Explorer\Toolbar\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Machine 
and user--> 
496    <TargetObject condition="contains">\Internet 
Explorer\Extensions\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Machine 
and user--> 
497    <TargetObject condition="contains">\Browser Helper 
Objects\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Machine and user [ 
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb250436(v=vs.85).aspx ] --> 
498    <!--Magic registry keys--> 
499    <TargetObject condition="contains">{AB8902B4-09CA-4bb6-
B78D-A8F59079A8D5}\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Thumbnail cache 
autostart [ http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-
intelligence/poweliks-levels-up-with-new-autostart-mechanism/ ] --> 
500    <!--Infection artifacts--> 
501    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\UrlUpdateInfo</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:ClickOnce: [ 
https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/12/mimikatz-delivery-via-clickonce-
with.html ] --> 
502    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\InstallSource</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Source folder 
for certain program and componenent installations--> 
503    <!--Windows UAC tampering--> 
504    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Enable
LUA</TargetObject> <!--Detect: UAC Tampering | Credit @ion-storm --> 
505    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalA
ccountTokenFilterPolicy</TargetObject> <!--Detect: UAC Tampering | Credit 
@ion-storm --> 
506    <!--Microsoft Firewall modifications--> 
507    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\Firewa
llPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List</TargetObject> <!--
Windows Firewall authorized applications | Credit @ion-storm --> 
508    <!--Microsoft Security Center tampering | Credit @ion-
storm --> 
509    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security 
Center\AllAlertsDisabled</TargetObject> 
510    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security 
Center\AntiVirusDisableNotify</TargetObject> 
511    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security 
Center\DisableMonitoring</TargetObject> 
512    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security 
Center\FirewallDisableNotify</TargetObject> 
513    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security 
Center\FirewallOverride</TargetObject> 
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514    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security 
Center\UacDisableNotify</TargetObject> 
515    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security 
Center\UpdatesDisableNotify</TargetObject> 
516    <!--Windows Defender tampering | Credit @ion-storm --> 
517    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows 
Defender\DisableAntiSpyware</TargetObject> 
518    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows 
Defender\DisableAntiVirus</TargetObject> 
519    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time 
Protection\DisableBehaviorMonitoring</TargetObject> 
520    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time 
Protection\DisableOnAccessProtection</TargetObject> 
521    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time 
Protection\DisableScanOnRealtimeEnable</TargetObject> 
522    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows 
Defender\Spynet\SpyNetReporting</TargetObject> 
523    <!--Windows internals integrity monitoring--> 
524    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File 
Execution Options\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Malware likes 
changing IFEO--> 
525    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\</Targ
etObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows:UAC: Detect malware changes to UAC prompt 
level--> 
526    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\</TargetObject> 
<!--Microsoft:Windows: Event log system integrity and ACLs--> 
527    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\</TargetObject> <!-
-Microsoft:Defender: Detect changes to Defender administrative settings to 
monitor for disablement--> 
528    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Safeboot\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Services approved to load in safe mode--> 
529    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Winlogon\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Providers notified by WinLogon--> 
530    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\FriendlyName</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: New devices 
connected and remembered--> 
531    <TargetObject 
condition="is">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\InP
rogress\(Default)</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: See when 
WindowsInstaller is engaged--> 
532   </RegistryEvent> 
533   <RegistryEvent onmatch="exclude"> 
534   <!--COMMENT: Remove low-information noise--> 
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535    <!--SECTION: Microsoft binaries--> 
536    <Image condition="end 
with">Office\root\integration\integrator.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: 
C2R client--> 
537    <Image 
condition="image">C:\WINDOWS\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Changes association registry keys--> 
538    <Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common 
Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Office: C2R client--> 
539    <Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Windows 
Defender\MsMpEng.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Windows:Defender--> 
540    <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyew
y\SearchUI.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Cortana--> 
541    <!--Misc--> 
542    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">Toolbar\WebBrowser</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:IE: Extraneous 
activity--> 
543    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">Toolbar\WebBrowser\ITBar7Height</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:IE: 
Extraneous activity--> 
544    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">Toolbar\ShellBrowser\ITBar7Layout</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows:Explorer: Extraneous activity--> 
545    <TargetObject condition="end with">Internet 
Explorer\Toolbar\Locked</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows:Explorer: 
Extraneous activity--> 
546    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">ShellBrowser</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:InternetExplorer: Noise--> 
547    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\CurrentVersion\Run</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove 
noise from the "\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" wildcard--> 
548    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove 
noise from the "\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" wildcard--> 
549    <TargetObject condition="end with">\CurrentVersion\App 
Paths</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise from the 
"\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths" wildcard--> 
550    <TargetObject condition="end with">\CurrentVersion\Image 
File Execution Options</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise 
from the "\Windows\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options" wildcard--> 
551    <TargetObject condition="end with">\CurrentVersion\Shell 
Extensions\Cached</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise from 
the "\CurrentVersion\Shell Extensions\Cached" wildcard--> 
552    <TargetObject condition="end with">\CurrentVersion\Shell 
Extensions\Approved</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise from 
the "\CurrentVersion\Shell Extensions\Approved" wildcard--> 
553    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">}\PreviousPolicyAreas</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove 
noise from \Winlogon\GPExtensions by svchost.exe--> 
554    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\Control\WMI\Autologger\</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"--> 
555    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UsoSvc\Start</TargetObject> 
<!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"--> 
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556    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\Lsa\OfflineJoin\CurrentValue</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: 
Sensitive value during domain join--> 
557    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\Components\TrustedInstaller\Events</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise monitoring Winlogon--> 
558    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\Components\TrustedInstaller</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: 
Remove noise monitoring Winlogon--> 
559    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\Components\Wlansvc</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove 
noise monitoring Winlogon--> 
560    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\Components\Wlansvc\Events</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: 
Remove noise monitoring Winlogon--> 
561    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\UserData\S-
1-5-18\</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise monitoring 
installations run as system--> 
562    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\Directory\shellex</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise 
monitoring Classes--> 
563    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\Directory\shellex\DragDropHandlers</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise monitoring Classes--> 
564    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\Drive\shellex</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise 
monitoring Classes--> 
565    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\Drive\shellex\DragDropHandlers</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: 
Remove noise monitoring Classes--> 
566    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">_Classes\AppX</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: 
Remove noise monitoring "Shell\open\command"--> <!--Win8+--> 
567    <TargetObject condition="begin 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Publishers\</Ta
rgetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: SvcHost Noise--> 
568    <Image 
condition="is">C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.Windows.Cortana_cw5n1h2txyew
y\SearchUI.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise from Windows 10 
Cortana | Credit @ion-storm--> <!--Win10--> 
569    <!--Bootup Control noise--> 
570    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Audit</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise--> <!--Win8+--> 
571    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Audit\AuditPolicy</TargetOb
ject> <!--Microsoft:Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise--> <!--Win8+--> 
572    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Audit\PerUserAuditing\Syste
m</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise--> <!--Win8+--
> 
573    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SspiCache</TargetObject> 
<!--Microsoft:Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise--> <!--Win8+--> 
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574    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Kerberos\Domains</TargetObj
ect> <!--Microsoft:Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise--> <!--Win8+--> 
575    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit<
/TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows:lsass.exe: Boot noise--> <!--Win8+--> 
576    <!--Sevices autostart noise--> 
577    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\services\clr_optimization_v2.0.50727_32\Start</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 7--> 
578    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\services\clr_optimization_v2.0.50727_64\Start</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 7--> 
579    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\services\clr_optimization_v4.0.30319_32\Start</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 10--> 
580    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\services\clr_optimization_v4.0.30319_64\Start</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:dotNet: Windows 10--> 
581    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\services\DeviceAssociationService\Start</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"--> 
582    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\services\BITS\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove 
noise from monitoring "\Start"--> 
583    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\services\TrustedInstaller\Start</TargetObject> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise from monitoring "\Start"--> 
584    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\services\tunnel\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove 
noise from monitoring "\Start"--> 
585    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\services\UsoSvc\Start</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove 
noise from monitoring "\Start"--> 
586    <!--FileExts noise filtering--> 
587    <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\OpenWithProgids</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: 
Remove noise from monitoring "FileExts"--> 
588    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\OpenWithList</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise from 
monitoring "FileExts"--> 
589    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\UserChoice</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise from 
monitoring "FileExts"--> 
590    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\UserChoice\ProgId</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise 
from monitoring "FileExts"--> <!--Win8+--> 
591    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\UserChoice\Hash</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise 
from monitoring "FileExts"--> <!--Win8+--> 
592    <TargetObject condition="end 
with">\OpenWithList\MRUList</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove 
noise from monitoring "FileExts"--> 
593    <TargetObject condition="end with">} 
0xFFFF</TargetObject> <!--Microsoft:Windows: Remove noise from explorer.exe 
from monitoring ShellCached binary keys--> <!--Win8+--> 
594    <!--SECTION: 3rd party--> 
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595    <Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\WIDCOMM\Bluetooth 
Software\btwdins.exe</Image> <!--Constantly writes to HKLM--> 
596    <Image condition="is">C:\Program Files 
(x86)\Webroot\WRSA.exe</Image> <!--Webroot--> 
597   </RegistryEvent> 
598  
599  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 15 : ALTERNATE DATA STREAM CREATED--> 
600   <!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, 
TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime, Hash--> 
601   <FileCreateStreamHash onmatch="include"> 
602   <!--COMMENT: Any files created with an NTFS Alternate Data 
Stream which match these rules will be hashed and logged. 
603     [ 
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-
streams-in-ntfs/ ] 
604     ADS's are used by browsers and email clients to 
mark files as originating from the Internet or other foreign sources. 
605     [ https://textslashplain.com/2016/04/04/downloads-
and-the-mark-of-the-web/ ] --> 
606    <TargetFilename 
condition="contains">Content.Outlook</TargetFilename> <!--
Microsoft:Outlook: Attachments--> <!--PRIVACY WARNING--> 
607    <TargetFilename 
condition="contains">Downloads</TargetFilename> <!--Downloaded files. Does 
not include "Run" files in IE--> 
608    <TargetFilename 
condition="contains">Temp\7z</TargetFilename> <!--7zip extractions--> 
609    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.bat</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting--> 
610    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.cmd</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting | Credit @ion-storm --> 
611    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.hta</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting--> 
612    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.lnk</TargetFilename> <!--Shortcut file | Credit @ion-storm --> 
613    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.ps1</TargetFilename> <!--Powershell--> 
614    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.ps2</TargetFilename> <!--Powershell--> 
615    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.reg</TargetFilename> <!--Registry File--> 
616    <TargetFilename condition="end with">.vb</TargetFilename> 
<!--VisualBasicScripting files--> 
617    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.vbe</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting files--> 
618    <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">.vbs</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting files--> 
619   </FileCreateStreamHash> 
620  
621  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 16 : SYSMON CONFIGURATION CHANGE, THIS LINE IS 
INCLUDED FOR DOCUMENTATION PURPOSES ONLY--> 
622   <!--DATA: UtcTime, Configuration, ConfigurationFileHash--> 
623   <!--Cannot be filtered.--> 
624  
625  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 17 & 18 : PIPE CREATED / PIPE CONNECTED--> 
626   <!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, PipeName, Image--> 
627  
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628   <PipeEvent onmatch="include">  
629   <!-- TESTING --> 
630    <!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ 
https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-smb-beacon ] --> 
631    <!--ADDITIONAL REFERENCE: [ 
https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/10/07/named-pipe-pivoting/ ] --> 
632    <PipeName condition="end with">trigger</PipeName> <!-- 
Look for Trigger --> 
633   </PipeEvent> 
634    
635  <!-- TESTING -->  
636  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 19: WMI_FILTER--> 
637   <!--DATA: EventType, UtcTime, Operation, User, EventNamespace, 
Name, Query--> 
638  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 20: WMI_CONSUMER--> 
639   <!--DATA: EventType, UtcTime, Operation, User, Name, Type, 
Destination --> 
640  <!--SYSMON EVENT ID 21: WMI_BINDING--> 
641   <!--DATA: EventType, UtcTime, Operation, User, Consumer, Filter 
--> 
642   <WmiEvent onmatch="exclude"> 
643    <!-- Nothing is excluded, so trigger will fire --> 
644   </WmiEvent>  
645    
646  </EventFiltering> 
647 </Sysmon> 
648 
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APPENDIX C: TRIGGER TOOL PYTHON SCRIPT 
(TRIGGER.PY) 
The Python script for the trigger tool created in this research can be found online at 
https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. The Python script may be used to 
trigger all 21 Sysmon events listed in Appendix A. The script must be run using Python 
version 3 with Administrator privileges. The script is included below for convenience, with 
line numbers displayed for reference. 
 
1   import ctypes 
2   import inspect 
3   import os 
4   import os.path 
5   import shutil 
6   import struct 
7   import subprocess 
8   import sys 
9   import tempfile 
10  import threading 
11  import time 
12  import winreg 
13   
14  ## 
15  ## Function Name: 
16  ##   has_admin() 
17  ## 
18  ## Purpose: 
19  ##   Checks if user has admin privileges 
20  ## 
21  ## References: 
22  ##   https://stackoverflow.com/questions/2946746/python-checking-if-a-
user-has-administrator-privileges 
23  ## 
24  def has_admin(): 
25      if os.name == 'nt': 
26          try: 
27              # only windows users with admin privileges can read the 
C:\windows\temp 
28              temp = 
os.listdir(os.sep.join([os.environ.get('SystemRoot','C:\\windows'),'temp'])
) 
29          except: 
30              return (os.environ['USERNAME'],False) 
31          else: 
32              return (os.environ['USERNAME'],True) 
33      else: 
34          if 'SUDO_USER' in os.environ and os.geteuid() == 0: 
35              return (os.environ['SUDO_USER'],True) 
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36          else: 
37              return (os.environ['USERNAME'],False) 
38   
39  ## 
40  ## Function Name: 
41  ##   trigger1() 
42  ## 
43  ## Purpose: 
44  ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 1 
45  ## 
46  ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
47  ##   Event ID 1: Process creation 
48  ##     The process creation event provides extended information about a 
newly created process. 
49  ##     The full command line provides context on the process execution. 
50  ##     The ProcessGUID field is a unique value for this process across 
a domain to make event correlation easier. 
51  ##     The hash is a full hash of the file with the algorithms in the 
HashType field. 
52  ## 
53  ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
54  ##   <ProcessCreate onmatch="exclude"> 
55  ## <!--COMMENT: All process launched will be included, except 
for what matches a rule below... Make sure you don't have any rules that 
exclude cmd.exe --> 
56  ##   </ProcessCreate> 
57  ## 
58  ## References: 
59  ##   
https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html#subprocess.TimeoutExpired 
60  ##   https://stackoverflow.com/questions/847850/cross-platform-way-of-
getting-temp-directory-in-python 
61  ## 
62  def trigger1(): 
63      tempdir = tempfile.gettempdir() 
64      trigger = tempdir + "\\1trigger.exe" 
65      result = shutil.copyfile("C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe", trigger) 
66      time.sleep(1) 
67      cmd = [trigger] 
68      try: 
69          process = subprocess.run(cmd, timeout=5) 
70      except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: 
71          pass 
72      except: 
73          print("EventID 1: ERROR") 
74          return 
75      result = os.remove(trigger) 
76      print("EventID 1: Triggered") 
77      return 
78   
79  ## 
80  ## Function Name: 
81  ##   trigger2() 
82  ## 
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83  ## Purpose: 
84  ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 2 
85  ## 
86  ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
87  ##   Event ID 2: A process changed a file creation time 
88  ##     The change file creation time event is registered when a file 
creation time is explicitly modified by a process. 
89  ##     This event helps tracking the real creation time of a file. 
90  ##     Attackers may change the file creation time of a backdoor to 
make it look like it was installed with the operating system. 
91  ##     Note that many processes legitimately change the creation time 
of a file; it does not necessarily indicate malicious activity. 
92  ## 
93  ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
94  ##   <FileCreateTime onmatch="include"> 
95  ##     <TargetFilename condition="end 
with">trigger.txt</TargetFilename> <!--Look for Trigger file --> 
96  ##   </FileCreateTime> 
97  ## 
98  ## References: 
99  ##   https://technologytales.com/2014/10/29/changing-file-timestamps-
using-windows-powershell/ 
100 ##   https://stackoverflow.com/questions/847850/cross-platform-way-of-
getting-temp-directory-in-python 
101 ## 
102 def trigger2(): 
103     tempdir = tempfile.gettempdir() 
104     f = open(tempdir + "\\2trigger.txt","w+") 
105  
106     cmd1 = ["powershell.exe", "$(Get-Item " + f.name + 
").creationtime"] 
107     cmd2 = ["powershell.exe", "$(Get-Item " + f.name + 
").creationtime=$(Get-Date '1/1/1950')"] 
108     cmd3 = ["powershell.exe", "$(Get-Item " + f.name + 
").creationtime"] 
109     try: 
110         ret = subprocess.run(cmd1, timeout=20, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, 
stderr=subprocess.STDOUT) 
111         ret = subprocess.run(cmd2, timeout=20, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, 
stderr=subprocess.STDOUT) 
112         ret = subprocess.run(cmd3, timeout=20, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, 
stderr=subprocess.STDOUT) 
113     except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: 
114         print("EventID 2: TIMEOUT") 
115         return 
116     finally: 
117         f.close() 
118         result = os.remove(f.name) 
119  
120     print("EventID 2: Triggered")    
121     return 
122  
123 ## 
124 ## Function Name: 
110 
125 ##   trigger3() 
126 ## 
127 ## Purpose: 
128 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 3 
129 ## 
130 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
131 ##   Event ID 3: Network connection 
132 ##     The network connection event logs TCP/UDP connections on the 
machine. It is disabled by default. 
133 ##     Each connection is linked to a process through the ProcessId and 
ProcessGUID fields. 
134 ##     The event also contains the source and destination host names IP 
addresses, port numbers and IPv6 status. 
135 ## 
136 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
137 ##   <NetworkConnect onmatch="include"> 
138 ##     <Image condition="image">powershell.exe</Image> <!--
Microsoft:Windows: PowerShell interface--> 
139 ##   </NetworkConnect> 
140 ## 
141 ## References: 
142 ##   https://learn-powershell.net/2011/02/11/using-powershell-to-query-
web-site-information/ 
143 ## 
144 def trigger3(): 
145     cmd = ["powershell.exe", "$wc = New-Object system.Net.WebClient; 
$wc.Headers.Add('User-Agent','Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; Win64; x64) 
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/51.0.2704.103 
Safari/537.36'); $wp = $wc.downloadString('http://dsu.edu'); exit;"] 
146     try: 
147         ret = subprocess.run(cmd, timeout=120) 
148     except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: 
149         print("EventID 3: TIMEOUT") 
150         return 
151     print("EventID 3: Triggered") 
152     return 
153  
154 ## 
155 ## Function Name: 
156 ##   trigger4() 
157 ## 
158 ## Purpose: 
159 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 4 
160 ## 
161 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
162 ##   Event ID 4: Sysmon service state changed 
163 ##     The service state change event reports the state of the Sysmon 
service (started or stopped). 
164 ## 
165 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
166 ##   <!-- This event cannot be filtered. --> 
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167 ## 
168 ## References: 
169 ##   https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html 
170 ## 
171 def trigger4(): 
172     mycwd = os.getcwd() 
173     cmd1 = ["powershell.exe", "Restart-Service", "sysmon"] 
174     try: 
175         ret = subprocess.run(cmd1, timeout=60, cwd=mycwd, shell=False) 
176     except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: 
177         print("EventID 4: TIMEOUT") 
178         return 
179      
180     print("EventID 4: Triggered") 
181     return 
182  
183 ## 
184 ## Function Name: 
185 ##   trigger5() 
186 ## 
187 ## Purpose: 
188 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 5 
189 ## 
190 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
191 ##   Event ID 5: Process terminated 
192 ##     The process terminate event reports when a process terminates. 
It provides the UtcTime, ProcessGuid and ProcessId of the process. 
193 ## 
194 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
195 ##   <ProcessTerminate onmatch="include"> 
196 ##     <Image condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Process 
terminations by user binaries--> 
197 ## OR 
198 ##     <Image condition="end with">trigger.exe</Image> <!-- Look for 
Trigger --> 
199 ##   </ProcessTerminate> 
200 ## 
201 ## References: 
202 ##   https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html 
203 ##  https://stackoverflow.com/questions/847850/cross-platform-way-of-
getting-temp-directory-in-python 
204 ## 
205 def trigger5(): 
206     tempdir = tempfile.gettempdir() 
207     trigger = tempdir + "\\5trigger.exe" 
208     result = shutil.copyfile("C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe", 
trigger) 
209     time.sleep(2) 
210     cmd = [trigger] 
211     try: 
212         ret = subprocess.run(cmd, timeout=1) 
213     except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: 
214         pass 
215  
112 
216     result = os.remove(trigger) 
217     time.sleep(2) 
218     print("EventID 5: Triggered") 
219     return 
220  
221 ## 
222 ## Function Name: 
223 ##   trigger6() 
224 ## 
225 ## Purpose: 
226 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 6 
227 ## 
228 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
229 ##   Event ID 6: Driver loaded 
230 ##     The driver loaded events provides information about a driver 
being loaded on the system. 
231 ##     The configured hashes are provided as well as signature 
information. 
232 ##     The signature is created asynchronously for performance reasons 
and indicates if the file was removed after loading. 
233 ## 
234 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
235 ##   <DriverLoad onmatch="exclude"> 
236 ##     <!--COMMENT: Because drivers with bugs can be used to escalate 
to kernel permissions, be extremely selective 
237 ##   about what you exclude from monitoring. Low event 
volume, little incentive to exclude.--> 
238 ##     <Signature condition="contains">microsoft</Signature> <!--
Exclude signed Microsoft drivers-->  
239 ##     <Signature condition="contains">windows</Signature> <!--Exclude 
signed Microsoft drivers-->  
240 ##     <Signature condition="begin with">Intel </Signature> <!--Exclude 
signed Intel drivers-->  
241 ##   </DriverLoad> 
242 ## 
243 ## References: 
244 ##   https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procmon 
245 ##   https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html 
246 ## 
247 def trigger6(): 
248  
249     mycwd = os.getcwd() 
250     cmd1 = [mycwd + "\\ProcessMonitor\\Procmon.exe", "/AcceptEula", 
"/Minimized", "/Runtime", "3"] 
251     try: 
252         ret = subprocess.run(cmd1, timeout=30, cwd=mycwd, shell=False) 
253     except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: 
254         print("EventID 6: TIMEOUT") 
255         return 
256      
257     print("EventID 6: Triggered") 
258     return 
259  
260 ## 
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261 ## Function Name: 
262 ##   trigger7() 
263 ## 
264 ## Purpose: 
265 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 7 
266 ## 
267 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
268 ##   Event ID 7: Image loaded 
269 ##     The image loaded event logs when a module is loaded in a 
specific process. 
270 ##     This event is disabled by default and needs to be configured 
with the –l option. It indicates the process in which the module is loaded, 
hashes and signature information. 
271 ##     The signature is created asynchronously for performance reasons 
and indicates if the file was removed after loading. 
272 ##     This event should be configured carefully, as monitoring all 
image load events will generate a large number of events. 
273 ## 
274 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
275 ##   <ImageLoad onmatch="include"> 
276 ##     <ImageLoaded condition="end with">trigger.dll</ImageLoaded> <!-- 
Look for Trigger -->  
277 ##   </ImageLoad> 
278 ## 
279 ## References: 
280 ##   https://stackoverflow.com/questions/32732751/unload-dll-loaded-in-
python 
281 ##   https://stackoverflow.com/questions/847850/cross-platform-way-of-
getting-temp-directory-in-python 
282 ## 
283 def trigger7(): 
284     tempdir = tempfile.gettempdir()  
285     trigger = tempdir + "\\7trigger.dll" 
286     result = shutil.copyfile("C:\\Windows\\System32\\user32.dll", 
trigger) 
287     time.sleep(2) 
288     try: 
289         m = ctypes.cdll.LoadLibrary(trigger) 
290         _ctypes.FreeLibrary(trigger) 
291         time.sleep(5) 
292     except OSError as e: 
293         # Ignore dll initialization errors... we just want to trigger 
loading 
294         if e.winerror == 1114: 
295             pass 
296         else: 
297             print("EventID 7: ERROR", e) 
298             return 
299     except: 
300         print("EventID 7: ERROR", sys.exc_info()) 
301         return 
302  
303     result = os.remove(trigger) 
304     print("EventID 7: Triggered") 
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305     return 
306  
307 ## 
308 ## Function Name: 
309 ##   trigger8() 
310 ## 
311 ## Purpose: 
312 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 8 
313 ## 
314 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
315 ##   Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread 
316 ##     The CreateRemoteThread event detects when a process creates a 
thread in another process. 
317 ##     This technique is used by malware to inject code and hide in 
other processes. 
318 ##     The event indicates the source and target process. 
319 ##     It gives information on the code that will be run in the new 
thread: StartAddress, StartModule and StartFunction. 
320 ##     Note that StartModule and StartFunction fields are inferred, 
they might be empty if the starting address is outside loaded modules or 
known exported functions. 
321 ## 
322 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
323 ##   <CreateRemoteThread onmatch="exclude"> 
324 ##     <!--COMMENT: Monitor for processes injecting code into other 
processes. Often used by malware to cloak their actions. 
325 ##   Exclude mostly-safe sources and log anything else.-
-> 
326 ##   </CreateRemoteThread> 
327 ## 
328 ## References: 
329 ##   https://github.com/infodox/python-dll-
injection/blob/master/dll_inject.py 
330 ##   https://stackoverflow.com/questions/7989922/opening-a-process-
with-popen-and-getting-the-pid 
331 ##   https://www.christophertruncer.com/injecting-shellcode-into-a-
remote-process-with-python/ 
332 ##   https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html 
333 ##  https://stackoverflow.com/questions/847850/cross-platform-way-of-
getting-temp-directory-in-python 
334 ## 
335 def trigger8(): 
336     tempdir = tempfile.gettempdir()  
337     trigger = tempdir + "\\8trigger.exe" 
338     result = shutil.copyfile("C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe", 
trigger) 
339     time.sleep(3) 
340      
341     process = subprocess.Popen(trigger, shell=False) 
342  
343     page_rwx_value = 0x40 
344     process_all = 0x1F0FFF 
345     memcommit = 0x00001000 
346     kernel32_variable = ctypes.windll.kernel32 
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347     shellcode = "\x90\x90\x90\x90" 
348     process_id = process.pid 
349     shellcode_length = len(shellcode) 
350     process_handle = kernel32_variable.OpenProcess(process_all, False, 
process_id) 
351     result = memory_allocation_variable = 
kernel32_variable.VirtualAllocEx(process_handle, 0, shellcode_length, 
memcommit, page_rwx_value) 
352     result = kernel32_variable.WriteProcessMemory(process_handle, 
memory_allocation_variable, shellcode, shellcode_length, 0) 
353     result = kernel32_variable.CreateRemoteThread(process_handle, None, 
0, memory_allocation_variable, 0, 0, 0) 
354  
355     result = process.kill() 
356     time.sleep(4) 
357     result = os.remove(trigger) 
358     print("EventID 8: Triggered") 
359     return 
360  
361 ## 
362 ## Function Name: 
363 ##   trigger9() 
364 ## 
365 ## Purpose: 
366 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 9 
367 ## 
368 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
369 ##   Event ID 9: RawAccessRead 
370 ##     The RawAccessRead event detects when a process conducts reading 
operations from the drive using the \\.\ denotation. 
371 ##     This technique is often used by malware for data exfiltration of 
files that are locked for reading, as well as to avoid file access auditing 
tools. 
372 ##     The event indicates the source process and target device. 
373 ## 
374 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
375 ##   <RawAccessRead onmatch="include"> 
376 ##     <Image condition="end with">powershell.exe</Image> 
377 ##     <Image condition="end with">wmic.exe</Image> 
378 ##   </RawAccessRead> 
379 ## 
380 ## References: 
381 ##   https://ardamis.com/2012/08/21/getting-a-list-of-logical-and-
physical-drives-from-the-command-line/ 
382 ##   https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html 
383 ## 
384 def trigger9(): 
385     cmd = ["powershell.exe", "wmic.exe", "diskdrive", "list"]  
386     try: 
387         result = subprocess.run(cmd, timeout=60) 
388     except: 
389         print("EventID 9: ERROR", sys.exc_info()) 
390         return 
391     time.sleep(5) 
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392     print("EventID 9: Triggered") 
393     return 
394  
395 ## 
396 ## Function Name: 
397 ##   trigger10() 
398 ## 
399 ## Purpose: 
400 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 10 
401 ## 
402 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
403 ##   Event ID 10: ProcessAccess 
404 ##     The process accessed event reports when a process opens another 
process, an operation that’s often followed by information queries or 
reading and writing the address space of the target process. 
405 ##     This enables detection of hacking tools that read the memory 
contents of processes like Local Security Authority (Lsass.exe) in order to 
steal credentials for use in Pass-the-Hash attacks. 
406 ##     Enabling it can generate significant amounts of logging if there 
are diagnostic utilities active that repeatedly open processes to query 
their state, so it generally should only be done so with filters that 
remove expected accesses. 
407 ## 
408 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
409 ##   <ProcessAccess onmatch="include"> <!--TEST--> 
410 ##     <SourceImage condition="end with">trigger.exe</SourceImage> <!-- 
Look for trigger --> 
411 ##   </ProcessAccess> 
412 ## 
413 ## References: 
414 ##   https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html 
415 ## 
416 def trigger10(): 
417     mycwd = os.getcwd() 
418     tempdir = tempfile.gettempdir()  
419     trigger = tempdir + "\\10trigger.exe" 
420     result = shutil.copyfile("C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe", trigger) 
421     cmd = [trigger, "/c " + trigger + " /c echo trigger"] 
422     try: 
423         result = subprocess.run(cmd, timeout=60, cwd=mycwd, 
stdout=subprocess.PIPE, shell=False, check=True) 
424     except: 
425         print("EventID 10: ERROR", sys.exc_info()) 
426         return 
427     result = os.remove(trigger) 
428     print("EventID 10: Triggered") 
429     return 
430  
431 ## 
432 ## Function Name: 
433 ##   trigger11() 
434 ## 
435 ## Purpose: 
436 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 11 
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437 ## 
438 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
439 ##   Event ID 11: FileCreate 
440 ##     File create operations are logged when a file is created or 
overwritten. 
441 ##     This event is useful for monitoring autostart locations, like 
the Startup folder, as well as temporary and download directories, which 
are common places malware drops during initial infection. 
442 ## 
443 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
444 ##   <FileCreate onmatch="include"> 
445 ##     <TargetFilename condition="end with">.exe</TargetFilename> <!--
Executable--> 
446 ##   </FileCreate> 
447 ## 
448 ## References: 
449 ##  https://stackoverflow.com/questions/847850/cross-platform-way-of-
getting-temp-directory-in-python 
450 ## 
451 def trigger11(): 
452     tempdir = tempfile.gettempdir()  
453     trigger = tempdir + "\\11trigger.exe" 
454     result = shutil.copyfile("C:\\Windows\\System32\\CMD.EXE", trigger) 
455     result = os.remove(trigger) 
456     print("EventID 11: Triggered") 
457     return 
458  
459 ## 
460 ## Function Name: 
461 ##   trigger121314() 
462 ## 
463 ## Purpose: 
464 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 12, 13, and 14 
465 ## 
466 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
467 ##   Event ID 12: RegistryEvent (Object create and delete) 
468 ##     Registry key and value create and delete operations map to this 
event type, which can be useful for monitoring for changes to Registry 
autostart locations, or specific malware registry modifications. 
469 ## 
470 ##   Event ID 13: RegistryEvent (Value Set) 
471 ##     This Registry event type identifies Registry value 
modifications. The event records the value written for Registry values of 
type DWORD and QWORD. 
472 ## 
473 ##   Event ID 14: RegistryEvent (Key and Value Rename) 
474 ##     Registry key and value rename operations map to this event type, 
recording the new name of the key or value that was renamed. 
475 ## 
476 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
477 ##   <RegistryEvent onmatch="include"> 
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478 ##     <TargetObject 
condition="contains">\CurrentVersion\Run</TargetObject>  
479 ##   </RegistryEvent> 
480 ## 
481 ## References: 
482 ##   https://stackoverflow.com/questions/37357411/adding-an-exe-file-
to-registry-on-windows-run-at-startup-via-python 
483 ##   https://stackoverflow.com/questions/2632199/how-do-i-get-the-path-
of-the-current-executed-file-in-python 
484 ##   http://blogs.microsoft.co.il/pavely/2015/09/29/regrenamekey-
hidden-registry-api/ 
485 ##   https://www.blog.pythonlibrary.org/2010/03/20/pythons-_winreg-
editing-the-windows-registry/ 
486 ## 
487 def trigger121314(): 
488     keyVal = r'Software\CurrentVersion\Run' 
489     try: 
490         key = winreg.OpenKey(winreg.HKEY_CURRENT_USER, keyVal, 0, 
winreg.KEY_ALL_ACCESS) 
491     except: 
492         key = winreg.CreateKey(winreg.HKEY_CURRENT_USER, keyVal) 
493     winreg.SetValueEx(key, "Trigger", 0, winreg.REG_SZ, "trigger1213")    
494     winreg.DeleteValue(key, "Trigger") 
495  
496     keyVal = r'Software\CurrentVersion\Run\14Trigger' 
497     try: 
498         key2 = winreg.OpenKey(winreg.HKEY_CURRENT_USER, keyVal, 0, 
winreg.KEY_ALL_ACCESS) 
499     except: 
500         key2 = winreg.CreateKey(winreg.HKEY_CURRENT_USER, keyVal) 
501          
502     m = ctypes.cdll.LoadLibrary("c:\\windows\\system32\\advapi32") 
503     ret = m.RegRenameKey(key2.handle,0,r"New14Trigger") 
504  
505     winreg.DeleteKey(key, r"New14Trigger") 
506     winreg.CloseKey(key) 
507     winreg.CloseKey(key2) 
508      
509     print("EventID 12: Triggered") 
510     print("EventID 13: Triggered") 
511     print("EventID 14: Triggered") 
512     return 
513  
514 ## 
515 ## Function Name: 
516 ##   trigger15() 
517 ## 
518 ## Purpose: 
519 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 15 
520 ## 
521 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
522 ##   Event ID 15: FileCreateStreamHash 
523 ##     This event logs when a named file stream is created, and it 
generates events that log the hash of the contents of the file to which the 
stream is assigned (the unnamed stream), as well as the contents of the 
named stream. There are malware variants that drop their executables or 
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configuration settings via browser downloads, and this event is aimed at 
capturing that based on the browser attaching a Zone.Identifier “mark of 
the web” stream. 
524 ## 
525 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
526 ##   <FileCreateStreamHash onmatch="include"> 
527 ##     <TargetFilename condition="end with">.bat</TargetFilename> <!--
Batch scripting--> 
528 ##   </FileCreateStreamHash> 
529 ## 
530 ## References: 
531 ##   http://www.powertheshell.com/ntfsstreams/ 
532 ##   https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/altds 
533 ## 
534 def trigger15(): 
535     cmd1 = ["cmd.exe", "/c echo howdy > 15trigger.bat"] 
536     cmd2 = ["cmd.exe", "/c echo trigger>15trigger.bat:triggerADS.bat"] 
537     cmd3 = ["cmd.exe", "/c del 15trigger.bat"] 
538      
539     try: 
540         ret = subprocess.run(cmd1, timeout=20) 
541         ret = subprocess.run(cmd2, timeout=20) 
542         ret = subprocess.run(cmd3, timeout=20) 
543     except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: 
544         print("EventID 15: TIMEOUT") 
545         return 
546  
547     print("EventID 15: Triggered") 
548     return 
549  
550 ## 
551 ## Function Name: 
552 ##   trigger16() 
553 ## 
554 ## Purpose: 
555 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 16 
556 ## 
557 ## Input: 
558 ##   Path to Sysmon Executable 
559 ##   Path to Desired Sysmon Configuration File 
560 ## 
561 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
562 ##   Event ID 16: Sysmon Configuration File Changed 
563 ##     Sysmon configuration file changed 
564 ## 
565 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
566 ##   <!--Cannot be filtered.--> 
567 ## 
568 ## References: 
569 ##   https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html 
570 ## 
571 def trigger16(sysmon_path, config_path): 
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572    
573     mycwd = os.getcwd() 
574     cmd1 = [sysmon_path, "-c", config_path] 
575     try: 
576         ret = subprocess.run(cmd1, timeout=30, cwd=mycwd, shell=False) 
577     except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: 
578         print("EventID 16: TIMEOUT") 
579         return 
580      
581     print("EventID 16: Triggered") 
582     return 
583  
584 ## 
585 ## Function Name: 
586 ##   trigger1718(), pipeserver(), pipeclient() 
587 ## 
588 ## Purpose: 
589 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 17 and 18 
590 ## 
591 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
592 ##   Event ID 17: PipeEvent (Pipe Created) 
593 ##     This event generates when a named pipe is created. Malware often 
uses named pipes for interprocess communication. 
594 ## 
595 ##   Event ID 18: PipeEvent (Pipe Connected) 
596 ##     This event logs when a named pipe connection is made between a 
client and a server. 
597 ## 
598 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
599 ##   <PipeEvent onmatch="include">  
600 ##     <PipeName condition="end with">trigger</PipeName> <!-- Look for 
Trigger --> 
601 ##   </PipeEvent> 
602 ## 
603 ## References: 
604 ##   https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html 
605 ##   https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1430446/create-a-temporary-
fifo-named-pipe-in-python 
606 ##   https://stackoverflow.com/questions/13319679/createnamedpipe-in-
python 
607 ##   https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-
www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf 
608 ##   
http://www.bogotobogo.com/python/Multithread/python_multithreading_creating
_threads.php 
609 ## 
610 def pipeserver(): 
611  
612     cmd = ["cmd.exe", "/c powershell 
[reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('system.core'); $pipe = new-
object System.IO.Pipes.NamedPipeServerStream('\\\\.\\pipe\\18trigger'); 
$pipe.WaitForConnection(); $pipe.Dispose();"] 
613     try: 
614         ret = subprocess.run(cmd, timeout=30, shell=False) 
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615     except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: 
616         print("EventID 17: TIMEOUT") 
617         return 
618     print("EventID 17: Triggered") 
619     return 
620  
621 def pipeclient(): 
622  
623     cmd = ["cmd.exe", "/c powershell 
[reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('system.core'); $pipe=new-object 
System.IO.Pipes.NamedPipeClientStream('\\\\.\\pipe\\18trigger'); 
$pipe.Connect(); $pipe.Dispose();"] 
624     try: 
625         ret = subprocess.run(cmd, timeout=30, shell=False) 
626  
627     except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: 
628         print("EventID 18: TIMEOUT") 
629         return 
630     print("EventID 18: Triggered") 
631     return 
632  
633 def trigger1718(): 
634     c = threading.Thread(target=pipeclient) 
635     c.start() 
636     time.sleep(5) 
637     s = threading.Thread(target=pipeserver) 
638     s.start() 
639     time.sleep(5) 
640  
641     return 
642  
643 ## 
644 ## Function Name: 
645 ##   trigger192021() 
646 ## 
647 ## Purpose: 
648 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 19, 20, and 21 
649 ## 
650 ## Input: 
651 ##   Path to trigger.mof file  
652 ## 
653 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
654 ##   Event ID 19: WmiEvent (WmiEventFilter activity detected) 
655 ##     When a WMI event filter is registered, which is a method used by 
malware to execute, this event logs the WMI namespace, filter name and 
filter expression. 
656 ## 
657 ##   Event ID 20: WmiEvent (WmiEventConsumer activity detected) 
658 ##     This event logs the registration of WMI consumers, recording the 
consumer name, log, and destination. 
659 ## 
660 ##   Event ID 21: WmiEvent (WmiEventConsumerToFilter activity detected) 
661 ##      When a consumer binds to a filter, this event logs the consumer 
name and filter path. 
662 ## 
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663 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
664 ##   <WmiEvent onmatch="exclude"> 
665 ##     <!-- <Name condition="contains">Trigger</Name> Trigger event to 
verify functionality --> 
666 ##   </WmiEvent>  
667 ## 
668 ## References: 
669 ##   https://gist.github.com/mattifestation/aff0cb8bf66c7f6ef44a 
670 ##   https://soykablog.wordpress.com/2013/04/17/removing-permanent-wmi-
event-registrations-trevor-sullivans-tech-room/ 
671 ##   https://learn-powershell.net/2013/08/14/powershell-and-events-
permanent-wmi-event-subscriptions/ 
672 ## 
673 def trigger192021(mof_path): 
674  
675     ## CREATE WMI EVENTS 
676     cmd1 = ["cmd.exe", "/c", "mofcomp.exe", mof_path] 
677     try: 
678         ret = subprocess.run(cmd1, timeout=30, shell=False) 
679     except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: 
680         print("EventID 19: TIMEOUT") 
681         print("EventID 20: DID NOT RUN") 
682         print("EventID 21: DID NOT RUN") 
683         return 
684  
685     time.sleep(5) 
686  
687     ## REMOVE THE WMI EVENTS WE CREATED, TRIGGERS DELETE EVENTS 
688  
689     cmd = "powershell.exe"     
690     args="\"Get-WmiObject -Namespace 'root/subscription' -Class 
'__FilterToConsumerBinding' -Filter 
'Filter=\\\"__EventFilter.Name=\\\\\\\"TriggerFilter\\\\\\\"\\\"' | Remove-
WmiObject\" " 
691     ret = ctypes.windll.shell32.ShellExecuteW(None, u"runas", cmd, 
args, None, 0) 
692     time.sleep(5) 
693  
694     print("EventID 21: Triggered") 
695  
696     cmd = "powershell.exe" 
697     args = "\"Get-WmiObject -Namespace 'root/subscription' -Class 
'__EventFilter' -Filter 'Name=\\\"TriggerFilter\\\"' | Remove-WmiObject\" " 
698     ret = ctypes.windll.shell32.ShellExecuteW(None, u"runas", cmd, 
args, None, 0) 
699     time.sleep(5) 
700  
701     print("EventID 19: Triggered") 
702  
703     cmd = "powershell.exe" 
704     args= "\"Get-WmiObject -Namespace 'root/subscription' -Class 
'CommandLineEventConsumer' -Filter 'Name=\\\"TriggerConsumer\\\"' | Remove-
WmiObject\" " 
705     ret = ctypes.windll.shell32.ShellExecuteW(None, u"runas", cmd, 
args, None, 0) 
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706     time.sleep(5) 
707      
708     print("EventID 20: Triggered") 
709     return 
710  
711 ## 
712 ## Function Name: 
713 ##   trigger255() 
714 ## 
715 ## Purpose: 
716 ##   Triggers Sysmon Event ID 255 
717 ## 
718 ## Sysmon Event Details (from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon): 
719 ##   Event ID 255: Error 
720 ##      This event is generated when an error occurred within Sysmon. 
721 ##      They can happen if the system is under heavy load and certain 
tasked could not be performed or a bug exists in the Sysmon service. 
722 ##      You can report any bugs on the Sysinternals forum or over 
Twitter (@markrussinovich). 
723 ## 
724 ## Sysmon Configuration to Match Trigger 
(https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config/blob/master/sysmonconfig-
export.xml): 
725 ##   Not Implemented  
726 ## 
727 def trigger255(): 
728   print("EventID 255: Not Implemented") 
729   return 
730  
731 ## 
732 ## Function Name: 
733 ## 
734 ## Purpose: 
735 ##   Triggers all Sysmon events 
736 ## 
737 ## Input: 
738 ##   Modify "sysmon_path", "config_path", and "mof_path" to match your 
environment locations and names. 
739 ## 
740 def main(): 
741  
742     # CHECK FOR ADMIN RIGHTS (your mileage may vary) 
743     if not has_admin(): 
744         print("ADMIN RIGHTS REQUIRED!!!") 
745         return 
746      
747     # GET DETAILS ABOUT CURRENT FILE AND DIRECTORY 
748     filename = inspect.getframeinfo(inspect.currentframe()).filename 
749     dirname = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(filename)) 
750  
751      
752     # MODIFY THESE VALUES TO MATCH YOUR ENVIRONMENT LOCATIONS AND NAMES 
753     sysmon_path = "C:\\progra~1\\Sysmon-v6.20\\sysmon.exe" 
754     config_path = dirname + os.path.sep + "sysmonconfig-modified.xml" 
755     mof_path = dirname + os.path.sep + "trigger.mof" 
756      
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757     print("VERIFY YOUR FILE LOCATIONS MATCH TO ENSURE TRIGGERS WORK:") 
758     print("Sysmon Path: ", sysmon_path) 
759     print("Sysmon Config File: ", config_path) 
760     print("Manifest File: ", mof_path) 
761     print("") 
762  
763     # TRIGGER ALL EVENTS (numerically out of order to prevent timing 
issues) 
764     print("[ START ]") 
765     r = trigger9() 
766     r = trigger1() 
767     r = trigger2() 
768     r = trigger3() 
769     r = trigger4() 
770     r = trigger5() 
771     r = trigger6() 
772     r = trigger10() 
773     r = trigger11() 
774     r = trigger121314() 
775     r = trigger15() 
776     r = trigger16(sysmon_path, config_path) 
777     r = trigger1718() 
778     r = trigger192021(mof_path) 
779     r = trigger7() 
780     r = trigger8() 
781     print("[ DONE ]") 
782      
783     return 
784    
785 if __name__== "__main__": 
786     main() 
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APPENDIX D: TRIGGER MANIFEST FILE (TRIGGER.MOF) 
The Python script for the trigger tool uses a manifest file to trigger the Windows 
Management Instrumentation (WMI) events in Sysmon. The manifest file can be found online 
at https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. The file is included below, with 
line numbers displayed for reference. 
 
1  #pragma classflags ("updateonly", "forceupdate")  
2  #pragma namespace("\\\\.\\root\\subscription")  
3   
4  instance of __EventFilter as $MyEventFilter { 
5    EventNamespace = "Root\\Cimv2"; 
6    Name  = "TriggerFilter";  
7    Query = "Select * From __InstanceModificationEvent Where 
TargetInstance Isa 'Win32_LocalTime' And TargetInstance.Second=5";  
8    QueryLanguage = "WQL";  
9  }; 
10  
11 instance of CommandLineEventConsumer as $MyConsumer { 
12   Name = "TriggerConsumer"; 
13   CommandLineTemplate = "c:\\windows\\system32\\ping.exe 8.8.8.8"; 
14   RunInteractively = False; 
15   WorkingDirectory = "c:\\windows\\temp"; 
16 }; 
17  
18 instance of __FilterToConsumerBinding {  
19   Consumer = $MyConsumer;  
20   Filter   = $MyEventFilter;  
21 };  
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APPENDIX E: WINLOGBEAT CONFIGURATION 
(WINLOGBEAT.YML) 
The Winlogbeat configuration file used in this research can be found online at 
https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. Many common default options 
were used from the default YML configuration example provided when Winlogbeat is 
installed. The only changes made to the default configuration values are displayed below. 
 
#======================= Winlogbeat specific options 
========================== 
winlogbeat.event_logs: 
  - name: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational 
    ignore_older: 72h 
  
#================================ General 
===================================== 
  
# The name of the shipper that publishes the network data. It can be used 
to group 
# all the transactions sent by a single shipper in the web interface. 
name: "win7" 
 
# The tags of the shipper are included in their own field with each 
# transaction published. 
tags: ["windows", "testing"] 
  
# Optional fields that you can specify to add additional information to the 
# output. 
fields: 
  env: testing 
  
#----------------------------- Logstash output ----------------------------
---- 
output.logstash: 
  # The Logstash hosts 
  hosts: ["10.1.1.12:5044"] 
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APPENDIX F: LOGSTASH PIPELINE (BEATS.CONF) 
The configuration file for the Logstash pipeline created in this research can be found 
online at https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. The configuration is 
included below, with line numbers displayed for reference. 
 
1   input { 
2     beats { 
3       port => 5044 
4     } 
5   } 
6    
7   filter { 
8    
9     # MATCH FILE/IMAGE HASHES (MD5 and SHA256) 
10    if ( [event_id] == 1 or [event_id] == 6 or [event_id] == 7 ) { 
11      grok { 
12        match => [ "[event_data][Hashes]", "MD5=(?<MD5>[0-9A-
F]{32}),SHA256=(?<SHA256>[0-9A-F]{64})" ] 
13      } 
14    } 
15   
16    # MATCH SYSMON CONFIG FILE HASH (SHA1 ONLY) 
17    if ( [event_id] == 16 ) { 
18      grok { 
19        match => [ "[event_data][ConfigurationFileHash]", 
"SHA1=(?<sysmon_config_SHA1>[0-9A-F]{40})" ] 
20      } 
21    } 
22   
23    # GEOIP ON DESTINATION IP 
24    if ("" in [event_data][DestinationIp]) { 
25      if ( [event_data][DestinationIp] != "127.0.0.1" ) { 
26        geoip {  
27          source => "[event_data][DestinationIp]"  
28        } 
29      } 
30    } 
31   
32    # EXTRACT EXTENSION FROM TARGET FILENAME 
33    if ( [event_id] == 2 or [event_id] == 11 or [event_id] == 15 ) { 
34      grok { 
35        #match => [ "[event_data][TargetFilename]", 
"(\.(?<file_extension>[.]*[0-9A-Za-z]*)$)" ] 
36        match => [ "[event_data][TargetFilename]", 
"((?<file_extension>[.]+[0-9A-Za-z]*)$)" ] 
37      } 
38      translate { 
39          field => "file_extension" 
40          destination => "file_extension_ransomware" 
41          fallback => "false" 
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42          dictionary_path => '/etc/logstash/conf.d/dict/ransomware-
extensions.yaml' 
43        } 
44    } 
45   
46    # FIND MATCHING START DATA 
47    if ( [event_id] == 5 ) { 
48      elasticsearch { 
49        id => "process_duration" 
50        hosts => ["localhost:9200"] 
51        query => 'event_id:1 AND 
event_data.ProcessGuid:"%{[event_data][ProcessGuid]}"' 
52        fields => { "@timestamp" => "started" } 
53      } 
54      date { 
55        match => ["started", "ISO8601"] 
56        target => "[started]" 
57      } 
58      ruby { 
59        code => "event.set('duration_seconds', event.get('@timestamp') - 
event.get('started') ) " 
60      } 
61    } 
62   
63    # TRANSLATE SYSMON EVENT ID INTO EVENT NAME 
64    translate { 
65      field => "event_id" 
66      destination => "event_id_text" 
67      dictionary_path => 
'/etc/logstash/conf.d/dict/sysmon_event_ids.yaml' 
68    } 
69   
70    # IF WE WANT TO QUERY VT 
71    if ("" in [SHA256]) { 
72  #  if ([SHA256] == "asdf") { 
73   
74      # ONLY QUERY VT ON PROCESS CREATION EVENTS THAT AREN'T WHITELISTED 
75      if ( [event_id] == 1 or [event_id] == 6 or [event_id] == 7 ) { 
76        translate { 
77          field => "SHA256" 
78          destination => "whitelisted" 
79          fallback => "false" 
80          dictionary_path => '/etc/logstash/conf.d/dict/whitelist.yaml' 
81        } 
82   
83        if ([whitelisted] == "false") 
84        { 
85          rest { 
86            request => { 
87              url => "http://www.virustotal.com/vtapi/v2/file/report" 
88              method => "GET" 
89              headers => { 
90                "Accept-Encoding" => "gzip, deflate" 
91                "User-Agent" => "gzip" 
92              } 
93              params => { 
94                "apikey" => "INSERT_YOUR_API_KEY_HERE" 
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95                "resource" => "%{SHA256}" 
96              } 
97            } 
98            json => true 
99            target => "virustotal" 
100           fallback => {                        # hash describing a 
default in case of error 
101             "virustotal_error" => "true" 
102           } 
103         } 
104       }   
105     } 
106   } 
107 } 
108  
109 output { 
110   elasticsearch { 
111     hosts => localhost 
112     manage_template => false 
113     index => "%{[@metadata][beat]}-%{+YYYY.MM.dd}" 
114     document_type => "%{[@metadata][type]}" 
115   } 
116 } 
117 
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APPENDIX G: LOGSTASH DICTIONARY 
(SYSMON_EVENT_IDS.YAML) 
The dictionary file for the inclusion of Sysmon Event ID text used in the Logstash 
pipeline can be found online at https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. 
The file is included below, with line numbers displayed for reference. 
 
1   "1": "Process Creation" 
2   "2": "A Process Changed A File Creation Time" 
3   "3": "Network Connection" 
4   "4": "Sysmon Service State Changed" 
5   "5": "Process Terminated" 
6   "6": "Driver Loaded" 
7   "7": "Image Loaded" 
8   "8": "CreateRemoteThread" 
9   "9": "RawAccessRead" 
10  "10": "ProcessAccess" 
11  "11": "FileCreate" 
12  "12": "RegistryEvent (Object Create And Delete)" 
13  "13": "RegistryEvent (Value Set)" 
14  "14": "RegistryEvent (Key and Value Rename)" 
15  "15": "FileCreateStreamHash" 
16  "16": "Sysmon Configuration Change" 
17  "17": "PipeEvent (Pipe Created)" 
18  "18": "PipeEvent (Pipe Connected)" 
19  "19": "WmiEvent (WmiEventFilter Activity Detected)" 
20  "20": "WmiEvent (WmiEventConsumer Activity Detected)" 
21  "21": "WmiEvent (WmiEventConsumerToFilter Activity Detected)" 
22  "255": "Error" 
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APPENDIX H: LOGSTASH DICTIONARY 
(RANSOMWARE_EXTENSIONS.YAML) 
The dictionary file used in this research identify common ransomware file extensions 
during the Logstash pipeline can be found online at 
https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. The file is included below, with 
line numbers displayed for reference. 
 
1   ".726": "true" 
2   ".8899": "true" 
3   ".asasin": "true" 
4   ".cerber3": "true" 
5   ".coded": "true" 
6   ".crypt": "true" 
7   ".AK47": "true" 
8   ".STN": "true" 
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APPENDIX I: LOGSTASH DICTIONARY 
(WHITELIST.YAML) 
The dictionary file for the whitelist of SHA256 hashes used in the Logstash pipeline 
can be found online at https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. The file is 
included below, with line numbers displayed for reference. 
 
1  "36414C7E57AFA6136D77FD47F4C55102E35F2475FBCD719728DA7D14B1590E2A": 
"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\reg.exe" 
2  "DB24550C3183FC38F9440134322F124447DFE0A3564490180418305D7899D159": 
"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\attrib.exe" 
3  "17F746D82695FA9B35493B41859D39D786D32B23A9D2E00F4011DEC7A02402AE": 
"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\cmd.exe" 
4  "FECD6785984DBB61C6C0EA8A3D8DAF034346E47C88ECA90564F855C2548E40B2": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\mobsync.exe" 
5  "34DF739526C114BB89470B3B650946CBF7335CB4A2206489534FB05C1FC143A8": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\ipconfig.exe" 
6  "9DFD80610CBBC9188F6C6BC85C87016B0AE42254FC289C2B578E85282BDD9C23": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhost.exe" 
7  "93B2ED4004ED5F7F3039DD7ECBD22C7E4E24B6373B4D9EF8D6E45A179B13A5E8": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe" 
8  "66C371914C6F262906C875DC2B489C7F41CDFFD94EB3C7D9A2ED2CDC1192EC11": 
"C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore.exe" 
9  "E09BF4D27555EC7567A598BA89CCC33667252CEF1FB0B604315EA7562D18AD10": 
"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\vssadmin.exe" 
10 "AE255C2230F699D207323DFB289004C12B53D5CF6B12312DB11D845FD87315EC": 
"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore.exe" 
11 "47B801E623254CF0202B3591CB5C019CABFB52F123C7D47E29D19B32F1F2B915": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\VSSVC.exe" 
12 "14262982A64551FDE126339B22B993B6E4AED520E53DD882E67D887B6B66F942": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\PING.EXE" 
13 "74B3152A28D4F1A4FFF46B279ABF0EEF666DF0F8245EFAE1E71E6E375889FF70": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskkill.exe" 
14 "DA3AD32583644BD20116F0479C178F7C7C0B730728F4C02A438C0D19378C83D9": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WMIC.exe" 
15 "C6A91CBA00BF87CDB064C49ADAAC82255CBEC6FDD48FD21F9B3B96ABF019916B": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe" 
16 "D5BC504277172BE5C54B60AD5C13209DC1F729131DEF084DE3EC8C72E54C58EF": 
"C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe" 
17 "9DFD80610CBBC9188F6C6BC85C87016B0AE42254FC289C2B578E85282BDD9C23": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhost.exe" 
18 "F34F231D117CCDFEBB9CB35C8D6FDFA7051DA27FDC1204FCCFF361FC0B13A0FF": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe" 
19 "2FBBEC4CACB5161F68D7C2935852A5888945CA0F107CF8A1C01F4528CE407DE3": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\msdtc.exe" 
20 "F5C5758B5A1B09D44A0CDA1D4EAB5E35D4AC6A78AD39A69011F4A82CEAD958FF": 
"C:\\Program Files\\Winlogbeat\\winlogbeat.exe" 
21 "ED9FB40C3CB5BA0A9AC3ADE80B503F5D7128016C75852E612A6C838F04401EA3": 
"C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware Tools\\vmtoolsd.exe" 
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22 "2E2CE2F3FBB2A00AD374AF9419B41F8DD09244E299D5FB32326B0B775857ECF7": 
"C:\\Windows\\Sysmon.exe" 
23 "1398EF88CDE0195F9CBEA696591E6731209540320A622D4B777992AFC7DBFD1E": 
"C:\\Windows\\Sysmon.exe" 
24 "11C194D9ADCE90027272C627D7FBF3BA5025FF0F7B26A8333F764E11E1382CF9": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\userinit.exe" 
25 "415A23E6B3A446186FEBD84D86222C4FB654E9FD2BFDD8D877C6AB8C52D60C7B": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\EOSNotify.exe" 
26 "AF0A85066A7983878DC1C663811CE61C6CA1912DC956184F878B7B82DB93C651": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe" 
27 "F9B6DDF62B4175093DD38C00520C7F0D52FBAB0077A8ED1391DD5188E400F481": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" 
28 "CB1C6018FC5C15483AC5BB96E5C2E2E115BB0C0E1314837D77201BAB37E8C03A": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\csrss.exe" 
29 "405F03534BE8B45185695F68DEB47D4DAF04DCD6DF9D351CA6831D3721B1EFC4": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe" 
30 "C7FD161906C7226E86C7AE00506A1C7862D21ED4BB3FEF34A4B20C999A5A3E2A": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell_ise.exe" 
31 "CF50CE4474AA811D4AB00B44610A112244C2267018DF15BBF352A8FE4119C904": 
"C:\\Users\\user1\\AppData\\Local\\Programs\\Python\\Python36\\pythonw.exe" 
32 "3B2F41EFDA68C82D9D50AF329AC9B403C806CBE74F87917CDB350E542ADDA017": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\unsecapp.exe" 
33 "A8FDBA9DF15E41B6F5C69C79F66A26A9D48E174F9E7018A371600B866867DAB8": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe" 
34 "B212E59E4C7FE77F6F189138D9D8B151E50EB83A35D6EADFB1E4BB0B4262C484": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\mmc.exe" 
35 "7AA73B8E7D4D700C164D0410DCF84EA1CCCB0F7DD513E47A2EF0DAE5F16CAE45": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon.exe" 
36 "3E51D778DB271D53DA0B1F075B5F515D4A38F70F9C6F083B2646DAE8B9E0281A": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\smss.exe" 
37 "A0E2EB71358AD1BEA9C0ECBBF5B1AEAC3EAB769A73DD799320A98A42D0F1D2BE": 
"C:\\Program Files\\Sysmon\\Sysmon.exe" 
38 "DB06C3534964E3FC79D2763144BA53742D7FA250CA336F4A0FE724B75AAFF386": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe" 
39 "2F1A0D69B87CA32BB5DE2582CDD8B795823EB268A57B9D179609BBC5D046E865": 
"C:\\Program Files\\Winlogbeat\\winlogbeat.exe" 
40 "435603112D830DB82A3622F7A3387AE91BA828435A7A8DBA35F010C6F8B792E3": 
"C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware Tools\\VMware 
CAF\\pme\\bin\\ManagementAgentHost.exe" 
41 "9D67EFA96796E24CBEACE6190B29B8DD03271326B83D87582E4F8515D753A429": 
"C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware Tools\\VMware VGAuth\\VGAuthService.exe" 
42 "09AB0535A54C2E2962F0FD06988D99060F8CECA39B07AC00A63204C773B95893": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe" 
43 "D205B2C163E78AB42A5D67D7664EF6B75EA0374FF0924467D624F9DB0611F0AD": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsm.exe" 
44 "A86D6A6D1F5A0EFCD649792A06F3AE9B37158D48493D2ECA7F52DCC1CB9B6536": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe" 
45 "2B658D0A86220608C9F8FAC30494A0368778FD7DA5E6529257913B45A52C4A55": 
"C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware Tools\\vmacthlp.exe" 
46 "C4E98F07170CEC69CACDD5CEDB8927E48A2A299CB1B8CDA87526E768AF6174F0": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\wininit.exe" 
47 "7BC847CE6C2D29C334F0D1600BBBDE3933FF45F6BEE5186F442E6270A3F9EC4E": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\autochk.exe" 
48 "435603112D830DB82A3622F7A3387AE91BA828435A7A8DBA35F010C6F8B792E3": 
"C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware Tools\\VMware 
CAF\\pme\\bin\\ManagementAgentHost.exe" 
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49 "9D67EFA96796E24CBEACE6190B29B8DD03271326B83D87582E4F8515D753A429": 
"C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware Tools\\VMware VGAuth\\VGAuthService.exe" 
50 "A4567E548F8DA31C6EF694E79DA6019C7E24308A8D18081E423BED0D551EE393": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\mofcomp.exe" 
51 "2C7257C7D9D0064574296C5B96C6834B4FA2679E04097C2DD21B7AE3BB6940DD": 
"C:\\Users\\user1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Procmon64.exe" 
52 "978F95FC63699F1E769663E32BAE596148742B3038F743A51AF346CA4D2F56D0": 
"C:\\Users\\user1\\Desktop\\code\\ProcessMonitor\\Procmon.exe" 
53 "8481A8EC19CB656CE328C877D5817D317203BA34424A2E9D169DDCE5BF2CD2B0": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\DeviceDisplayObjectProvider.exe" 
54 "6DCE7D58EBB0D705FCB4179349C441B45E160C94E43934C5ED8FA1964E2CD031": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\schtasks.exe" 
55 "61BD24487C389FC2B939CE000721677CC173BDE0EDCAFCCFF81069BBD9987BFD": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\sdclt.exe" 
56 "7EE656884090AEDB0A615E0641ECC250D6204CB9570CA02216F2B7D5F381E021": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\wsqmcons.exe" 
57 "67E045FD25809E8CA486B1D17EB33667835FBC04974DD65DC07FCFC7E9A3D254": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\CompatTel\\diagtrackrunner.exe" 
58 "CB1822A981E9821D571AF16B7E37BEBA5FEB8E3DEDCDD0461119AF9AAC0358B3": 
"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\taskkill.exe" 
59 "F7AD4B09AFB301CE46DF695B22114331A57D52E6D4163FF74787BF68CCF44C78": 
"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\dllhost.exe" 
60 "4DE7FA20E3224382D8C4A81017E5BDD4673AFBEF9C0F017E203D7B78977FBF8C": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\vssadmin.exe" 
61 "CF45DC3EFB09309F4A2F7275A8D011A0D0CF65B3DD69A867A708A78A1076BBB7": 
"C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Notepad++\\notepad++.exe" 
62 "933E1778B2760B3A9194C2799D7B76052895959C3CAEDEFB4E9D764CBB6AD3B5": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\notepad.exe" 
63 "C9FF4DE365930BC063A082FF3DFEEC50247E9137F80DCA0B08C573326F659F58": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\vmmemctl.sys" 
64 "42AF63EA6C594D3610DC3A201E564E676891828CC29B16AF127CCB51A3E5B9BB": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\vmhgfs.sys" 
65 "2044B0B94C70368F43D5D31399BD3AB516482FFD5A3948D9271CF778FDA26A6E": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\vmusbmouse.sys" 
66 "4FB7B3A7F4CDE02A906D56386CBA474FB996717734F134C769B618A373F42A1F": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\vm3dmp.sys" 
67 "9D703AE54D05CEE7E8D61C3E1ECE1498905E5C41BD700AE8E560F99AEBFA87EA": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\vmmouse.sys" 
68 "D0528DDE112DD388F6B9279505485EED7D5CC706E2206F6374BF0E92AD1BEC7F": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\vmrawdsk.sys" 
69 "4CA10DBA7FF487FDB3F1362A3681D7D929F5AA1262CDFD31B04C30826983FB1D": 
"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\PING.EXE" 
70 "B56AFE7165AD341A749D2D3BD925D879728A1FE4A4DF206145C1A69AA233F68B": 
"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\notepad.exe" 
71 "949485BA939953642714AE6831D7DCB261691CAC7CBB8C1A9220333801F60820": 
"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\mshta.exe" 
72 "661F5D4CE4F0A6CB32669A43CE5DEEC6D5A9E19B2387F22C5012405E92169943": 
"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\netsh.exe" 
73 "62E449589E1F082E8DE3FA4D775871E1C66A272E3BD1FE5CC33EEEB40351CD13": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\Defrag.exe" 
74 "F583C6D572ABFDC9EFBA48480814ADD63FF3626A23C2880449E482D89AF24427": 
"C:\\Program Files\\7-Zip\\7zG.exe" 
75 "AAF48B577885D37A63604E01D5190C1F36705B5E26C4231ABEE42E86F11EDEB0": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\aitagent.exe" 
76 "CE29FAB2DE75FBB40A2DA29C9ED547CBEF758C58E0EBCE461CD56E42194EA6B0": 
"C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware Tools\\VMwareResolutionSet.exe" 
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77 "3B9AD8E2C1D03FF941A7C9192A605F31671B107DEF6FF503A71A0FB2C5BBD659": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\net.exe" 
78 "021D7CE4D95A1F8811AD5085ED091C2066C544152DEF2D370EFF464381B7D2ED": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\lpremove.exe" 
79 "0F084CCC40CBF7C3C7472DDAD609B5FD31AACAFA44E23F9EC7E9E2184713B986": 
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\net1.exe" 
80 "57E3E3EC6F548394C932BFCCAC03F02EA909B4DF332921E19454C71D7DBD362D": 
"C:\\Program Files\\Sysmon-v6.10\\Sysmon.exe" 
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APPENDIX J: LOGSTASH CONFIGURATION 
(LOGSTASH.YML) 
The Logstash configuration file used in this research can be found online at 
https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. The default Logstash 
configuration example file available when Logstash is first installed was used in this research. 
The only changes made from the file were the values path.data and 
xpack.monitoring.enabled, as indicated below. 
 
# ------------ Data path ------------------ 
# 
# Which directory should be used by logstash and its plugins 
# for any persistent needs. Defaults to LOGSTASH_HOME/data 
# 
path.data: /var/lib/logstash 
# 
 
# disable xpack settings 
xpack.monitoring.enabled: false 
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APPENDIX K: ELASTICSEARCH CONFIGURATION 
(ELASTICSEARCH.YML) 
The Elasticsearch configuration file used in this research can be found online at 
https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. The default Elasticsearch 
configuration example file available when Elasticsearch is first installed was used. The only 
changes made in the file were the values shown below. 
. 
# 
# Lock the memory on startup: 
# 
bootstrap.memory_lock: true 
 
# Set the bind address to a specific IP (IPv4 or IPv6): 
# 
network.host: 127.0.0.1 
 
# 
# disable x-pack security 
xpack.security.enabled: false 
 
xpack.watcher.enabled: true 
    
xpack.notification.email.account: 
      gmail_account: 
          profile: gmail 
          smtp: 
             auth: true 
             starttls.enable: true 
             host: smtp.gmail.com 
             port: 587 
             user: <insert_email_address> 
             password: <insert_password> 
  
#disable for now to get tables to show up. Change in production. 
xpack.notification.email.html.sanitization.enabled: false 
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APPENDIX L: KIBANA CONFIGURATION (KIBANA.YML) 
The Kibana configuration file used in this research can be found online at 
https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. All defaults were used from the 
Kibana configuration example file provided when Kibana is installed, except for the xpack 
setting shown below. 
 
 
# disable xpack security 
xpack.security.enabled: false 
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APPENDIX M: KIBANA INDEX FOR WINLOGBEAT LOGS 
The Kibana Winlogbeat index used in this research can be found online at 
https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. The index is included below, with 
line numbers displayed for reference. This index was automatically generated by 
Elasticsearch as Winlogbeat events were parsed and stored in Elasticsearch. 
 
1    { 
2      "winlogbeat-2018.01.23": { 
3        "aliases": {}, 
4        "mappings": { 
5          "_default_": { 
6            "properties": { 
7              "geoip": { 
8                "dynamic": "true", 
9                "properties": { 
10                 "ip": { 
11                   "type": "ip" 
12                 }, 
13                 "latitude": { 
14                   "type": "float" 
15                 }, 
16                 "location": { 
17                   "type": "geo_point" 
18                 }, 
19                 "longitude": { 
20                   "type": "float" 
21                 } 
22               } 
23             } 
24           } 
25         }, 
26         "wineventlog": { 
27           "properties": { 
28             "@timestamp": { 
29               "type": "date" 
30             }, 
31             "@version": { 
32               "type": "text", 
33               "fields": { 
34                 "keyword": { 
35                   "type": "keyword", 
36                   "ignore_above": 256 
37                 } 
38               } 
39             }, 
40             "MD5": { 
41               "type": "text", 
42               "fields": { 
43                 "keyword": { 
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44                   "type": "keyword", 
45                   "ignore_above": 256 
46                 } 
47               } 
48             }, 
49             "SHA256": { 
50               "type": "text", 
51               "fields": { 
52                 "keyword": { 
53                   "type": "keyword", 
54                   "ignore_above": 256 
55                 } 
56               } 
57             }, 
58             "beat": { 
59               "properties": { 
60                 "hostname": { 
61                   "type": "text", 
62                   "fields": { 
63                     "keyword": { 
64                       "type": "keyword", 
65                       "ignore_above": 256 
66                     } 
67                   } 
68                 }, 
69                 "name": { 
70                   "type": "text", 
71                   "fields": { 
72                     "keyword": { 
73                       "type": "keyword", 
74                       "ignore_above": 256 
75                     } 
76                   } 
77                 }, 
78                 "version": { 
79                   "type": "text", 
80                   "fields": { 
81                     "keyword": { 
82                       "type": "keyword", 
83                       "ignore_above": 256 
84                     } 
85                   } 
86                 } 
87               } 
88             }, 
89             "computer_name": { 
90               "type": "text", 
91               "fields": { 
92                 "keyword": { 
93                   "type": "keyword", 
94                   "ignore_above": 256 
95                 } 
96               } 
97             }, 
98             "duration_seconds": { 
99               "type": "float" 
100            }, 
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101            "event_data": { 
102              "properties": { 
103                "CommandLine": { 
104                  "type": "text", 
105                  "fields": { 
106                    "keyword": { 
107                      "type": "keyword", 
108                      "ignore_above": 256 
109                    } 
110                  } 
111                }, 
112                "CreationUtcTime": { 
113                  "type": "text", 
114                  "fields": { 
115                    "keyword": { 
116                      "type": "keyword", 
117                      "ignore_above": 256 
118                    } 
119                  } 
120                }, 
121                "CurrentDirectory": { 
122                  "type": "text", 
123                  "fields": { 
124                    "keyword": { 
125                      "type": "keyword", 
126                      "ignore_above": 256 
127                    } 
128                  } 
129                }, 
130                "DestinationHostname": { 
131                  "type": "text", 
132                  "fields": { 
133                    "keyword": { 
134                      "type": "keyword", 
135                      "ignore_above": 256 
136                    } 
137                  } 
138                }, 
139                "DestinationIp": { 
140                  "type": "text", 
141                  "fields": { 
142                    "keyword": { 
143                      "type": "keyword", 
144                      "ignore_above": 256 
145                    } 
146                  } 
147                }, 
148                "DestinationIsIpv6": { 
149                  "type": "text", 
150                  "fields": { 
151                    "keyword": { 
152                      "type": "keyword", 
153                      "ignore_above": 256 
154                    } 
155                  } 
156                }, 
157                "DestinationPort": { 
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158                  "type": "text", 
159                  "fields": { 
160                    "keyword": { 
161                      "type": "keyword", 
162                      "ignore_above": 256 
163                    } 
164                  } 
165                }, 
166                "DestinationPortName": { 
167                  "type": "text", 
168                  "fields": { 
169                    "keyword": { 
170                      "type": "keyword", 
171                      "ignore_above": 256 
172                    } 
173                  } 
174                }, 
175                "Details": { 
176                  "type": "text", 
177                  "fields": { 
178                    "keyword": { 
179                      "type": "keyword", 
180                      "ignore_above": 256 
181                    } 
182                  } 
183                }, 
184                "EventType": { 
185                  "type": "text", 
186                  "fields": { 
187                    "keyword": { 
188                      "type": "keyword", 
189                      "ignore_above": 256 
190                    } 
191                  } 
192                }, 
193                "Hashes": { 
194                  "type": "text", 
195                  "fields": { 
196                    "keyword": { 
197                      "type": "keyword", 
198                      "ignore_above": 256 
199                    } 
200                  } 
201                }, 
202                "Image": { 
203                  "type": "text", 
204                  "fields": { 
205                    "keyword": { 
206                      "type": "keyword", 
207                      "ignore_above": 256 
208                    } 
209                  } 
210                }, 
211                "ImageLoaded": { 
212                  "type": "text", 
213                  "fields": { 
214                    "keyword": { 
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215                      "type": "keyword", 
216                      "ignore_above": 256 
217                    } 
218                  } 
219                }, 
220                "Initiated": { 
221                  "type": "text", 
222                  "fields": { 
223                    "keyword": { 
224                      "type": "keyword", 
225                      "ignore_above": 256 
226                    } 
227                  } 
228                }, 
229                "IntegrityLevel": { 
230                  "type": "text", 
231                  "fields": { 
232                    "keyword": { 
233                      "type": "keyword", 
234                      "ignore_above": 256 
235                    } 
236                  } 
237                }, 
238                "LogonGuid": { 
239                  "type": "text", 
240                  "fields": { 
241                    "keyword": { 
242                      "type": "keyword", 
243                      "ignore_above": 256 
244                    } 
245                  } 
246                }, 
247                "LogonId": { 
248                  "type": "text", 
249                  "fields": { 
250                    "keyword": { 
251                      "type": "keyword", 
252                      "ignore_above": 256 
253                    } 
254                  } 
255                }, 
256                "NewThreadId": { 
257                  "type": "text", 
258                  "fields": { 
259                    "keyword": { 
260                      "type": "keyword", 
261                      "ignore_above": 256 
262                    } 
263                  } 
264                }, 
265                "ParentCommandLine": { 
266                  "type": "text", 
267                  "fields": { 
268                    "keyword": { 
269                      "type": "keyword", 
270                      "ignore_above": 256 
271                    } 
144 
272                  } 
273                }, 
274                "ParentImage": { 
275                  "type": "text", 
276                  "fields": { 
277                    "keyword": { 
278                      "type": "keyword", 
279                      "ignore_above": 256 
280                    } 
281                  } 
282                }, 
283                "ParentProcessGuid": { 
284                  "type": "text", 
285                  "fields": { 
286                    "keyword": { 
287                      "type": "keyword", 
288                      "ignore_above": 256 
289                    } 
290                  } 
291                }, 
292                "ParentProcessId": { 
293                  "type": "text", 
294                  "fields": { 
295                    "keyword": { 
296                      "type": "keyword", 
297                      "ignore_above": 256 
298                    } 
299                  } 
300                }, 
301                "PreviousCreationUtcTime": { 
302                  "type": "text", 
303                  "fields": { 
304                    "keyword": { 
305                      "type": "keyword", 
306                      "ignore_above": 256 
307                    } 
308                  } 
309                }, 
310                "ProcessGuid": { 
311                  "type": "text", 
312                  "fields": { 
313                    "keyword": { 
314                      "type": "keyword", 
315                      "ignore_above": 256 
316                    } 
317                  } 
318                }, 
319                "ProcessId": { 
320                  "type": "text", 
321                  "fields": { 
322                    "keyword": { 
323                      "type": "keyword", 
324                      "ignore_above": 256 
325                    } 
326                  } 
327                }, 
328                "Protocol": { 
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329                  "type": "text", 
330                  "fields": { 
331                    "keyword": { 
332                      "type": "keyword", 
333                      "ignore_above": 256 
334                    } 
335                  } 
336                }, 
337                "SchemaVersion": { 
338                  "type": "text", 
339                  "fields": { 
340                    "keyword": { 
341                      "type": "keyword", 
342                      "ignore_above": 256 
343                    } 
344                  } 
345                }, 
346                "Signature": { 
347                  "type": "text", 
348                  "fields": { 
349                    "keyword": { 
350                      "type": "keyword", 
351                      "ignore_above": 256 
352                    } 
353                  } 
354                }, 
355                "SignatureStatus": { 
356                  "type": "text", 
357                  "fields": { 
358                    "keyword": { 
359                      "type": "keyword", 
360                      "ignore_above": 256 
361                    } 
362                  } 
363                }, 
364                "Signed": { 
365                  "type": "text", 
366                  "fields": { 
367                    "keyword": { 
368                      "type": "keyword", 
369                      "ignore_above": 256 
370                    } 
371                  } 
372                }, 
373                "SourceHostname": { 
374                  "type": "text", 
375                  "fields": { 
376                    "keyword": { 
377                      "type": "keyword", 
378                      "ignore_above": 256 
379                    } 
380                  } 
381                }, 
382                "SourceImage": { 
383                  "type": "text", 
384                  "fields": { 
385                    "keyword": { 
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386                      "type": "keyword", 
387                      "ignore_above": 256 
388                    } 
389                  } 
390                }, 
391                "SourceIp": { 
392                  "type": "text", 
393                  "fields": { 
394                    "keyword": { 
395                      "type": "keyword", 
396                      "ignore_above": 256 
397                    } 
398                  } 
399                }, 
400                "SourceIsIpv6": { 
401                  "type": "text", 
402                  "fields": { 
403                    "keyword": { 
404                      "type": "keyword", 
405                      "ignore_above": 256 
406                    } 
407                  } 
408                }, 
409                "SourcePort": { 
410                  "type": "text", 
411                  "fields": { 
412                    "keyword": { 
413                      "type": "keyword", 
414                      "ignore_above": 256 
415                    } 
416                  } 
417                }, 
418                "SourceProcessGuid": { 
419                  "type": "text", 
420                  "fields": { 
421                    "keyword": { 
422                      "type": "keyword", 
423                      "ignore_above": 256 
424                    } 
425                  } 
426                }, 
427                "SourceProcessId": { 
428                  "type": "text", 
429                  "fields": { 
430                    "keyword": { 
431                      "type": "keyword", 
432                      "ignore_above": 256 
433                    } 
434                  } 
435                }, 
436                "StartAddress": { 
437                  "type": "text", 
438                  "fields": { 
439                    "keyword": { 
440                      "type": "keyword", 
441                      "ignore_above": 256 
442                    } 
147 
443                  } 
444                }, 
445                "StartFunction": { 
446                  "type": "text", 
447                  "fields": { 
448                    "keyword": { 
449                      "type": "keyword", 
450                      "ignore_above": 256 
451                    } 
452                  } 
453                }, 
454                "StartModule": { 
455                  "type": "text", 
456                  "fields": { 
457                    "keyword": { 
458                      "type": "keyword", 
459                      "ignore_above": 256 
460                    } 
461                  } 
462                }, 
463                "State": { 
464                  "type": "text", 
465                  "fields": { 
466                    "keyword": { 
467                      "type": "keyword", 
468                      "ignore_above": 256 
469                    } 
470                  } 
471                }, 
472                "TargetFilename": { 
473                  "type": "text", 
474                  "fields": { 
475                    "keyword": { 
476                      "type": "keyword", 
477                      "ignore_above": 256 
478                    } 
479                  } 
480                }, 
481                "TargetImage": { 
482                  "type": "text", 
483                  "fields": { 
484                    "keyword": { 
485                      "type": "keyword", 
486                      "ignore_above": 256 
487                    } 
488                  } 
489                }, 
490                "TargetObject": { 
491                  "type": "text", 
492                  "fields": { 
493                    "keyword": { 
494                      "type": "keyword", 
495                      "ignore_above": 256 
496                    } 
497                  } 
498                }, 
499                "TargetProcessGuid": { 
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500                  "type": "text", 
501                  "fields": { 
502                    "keyword": { 
503                      "type": "keyword", 
504                      "ignore_above": 256 
505                    } 
506                  } 
507                }, 
508                "TargetProcessId": { 
509                  "type": "text", 
510                  "fields": { 
511                    "keyword": { 
512                      "type": "keyword", 
513                      "ignore_above": 256 
514                    } 
515                  } 
516                }, 
517                "TerminalSessionId": { 
518                  "type": "text", 
519                  "fields": { 
520                    "keyword": { 
521                      "type": "keyword", 
522                      "ignore_above": 256 
523                    } 
524                  } 
525                }, 
526                "User": { 
527                  "type": "text", 
528                  "fields": { 
529                    "keyword": { 
530                      "type": "keyword", 
531                      "ignore_above": 256 
532                    } 
533                  } 
534                }, 
535                "UtcTime": { 
536                  "type": "text", 
537                  "fields": { 
538                    "keyword": { 
539                      "type": "keyword", 
540                      "ignore_above": 256 
541                    } 
542                  } 
543                }, 
544                "Version": { 
545                  "type": "text", 
546                  "fields": { 
547                    "keyword": { 
548                      "type": "keyword", 
549                      "ignore_above": 256 
550                    } 
551                  } 
552                } 
553              } 
554            }, 
555            "event_id": { 
556              "type": "long" 
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557            }, 
558            "event_id_text": { 
559              "type": "text", 
560              "fields": { 
561                "keyword": { 
562                  "type": "keyword", 
563                  "ignore_above": 256 
564                } 
565              } 
566            }, 
567            "fields": { 
568              "properties": { 
569                "env": { 
570                  "type": "text", 
571                  "fields": { 
572                    "keyword": { 
573                      "type": "keyword", 
574                      "ignore_above": 256 
575                    } 
576                  } 
577                } 
578              } 
579            }, 
580            "file_extension": { 
581              "type": "text", 
582              "fields": { 
583                "keyword": { 
584                  "type": "keyword", 
585                  "ignore_above": 256 
586                } 
587              } 
588            }, 
589            "file_extension_ransomware": { 
590              "type": "text", 
591              "fields": { 
592                "keyword": { 
593                  "type": "keyword", 
594                  "ignore_above": 256 
595                } 
596              } 
597            }, 
598            "geoip": { 
599              "dynamic": "true", 
600              "properties": { 
601                "city_name": { 
602                  "type": "text", 
603                  "fields": { 
604                    "keyword": { 
605                      "type": "keyword", 
606                      "ignore_above": 256 
607                    } 
608                  } 
609                }, 
610                "continent_code": { 
611                  "type": "text", 
612                  "fields": { 
613                    "keyword": { 
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614                      "type": "keyword", 
615                      "ignore_above": 256 
616                    } 
617                  } 
618                }, 
619                "country_code2": { 
620                  "type": "text", 
621                  "fields": { 
622                    "keyword": { 
623                      "type": "keyword", 
624                      "ignore_above": 256 
625                    } 
626                  } 
627                }, 
628                "country_code3": { 
629                  "type": "text", 
630                  "fields": { 
631                    "keyword": { 
632                      "type": "keyword", 
633                      "ignore_above": 256 
634                    } 
635                  } 
636                }, 
637                "country_name": { 
638                  "type": "text", 
639                  "fields": { 
640                    "keyword": { 
641                      "type": "keyword", 
642                      "ignore_above": 256 
643                    } 
644                  } 
645                }, 
646                "dma_code": { 
647                  "type": "long" 
648                }, 
649                "ip": { 
650                  "type": "ip" 
651                }, 
652                "latitude": { 
653                  "type": "float" 
654                }, 
655                "location": { 
656                  "type": "geo_point" 
657                }, 
658                "longitude": { 
659                  "type": "float" 
660                }, 
661                "postal_code": { 
662                  "type": "text", 
663                  "fields": { 
664                    "keyword": { 
665                      "type": "keyword", 
666                      "ignore_above": 256 
667                    } 
668                  } 
669                }, 
670                "region_code": { 
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671                  "type": "text", 
672                  "fields": { 
673                    "keyword": { 
674                      "type": "keyword", 
675                      "ignore_above": 256 
676                    } 
677                  } 
678                }, 
679                "region_name": { 
680                  "type": "text", 
681                  "fields": { 
682                    "keyword": { 
683                      "type": "keyword", 
684                      "ignore_above": 256 
685                    } 
686                  } 
687                }, 
688                "timezone": { 
689                  "type": "text", 
690                  "fields": { 
691                    "keyword": { 
692                      "type": "keyword", 
693                      "ignore_above": 256 
694                    } 
695                  } 
696                } 
697              } 
698            }, 
699            "host": { 
700              "type": "text", 
701              "fields": { 
702                "keyword": { 
703                  "type": "keyword", 
704                  "ignore_above": 256 
705                } 
706              } 
707            }, 
708            "level": { 
709              "type": "text", 
710              "fields": { 
711                "keyword": { 
712                  "type": "keyword", 
713                  "ignore_above": 256 
714                } 
715              } 
716            }, 
717            "log_name": { 
718              "type": "text", 
719              "fields": { 
720                "keyword": { 
721                  "type": "keyword", 
722                  "ignore_above": 256 
723                } 
724              } 
725            }, 
726            "message": { 
727              "type": "text", 
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728              "fields": { 
729                "keyword": { 
730                  "type": "keyword", 
731                  "ignore_above": 256 
732                } 
733              } 
734            }, 
735            "opcode": { 
736              "type": "text", 
737              "fields": { 
738                "keyword": { 
739                  "type": "keyword", 
740                  "ignore_above": 256 
741                } 
742              } 
743            }, 
744            "process_id": { 
745              "type": "long" 
746            }, 
747            "provider_guid": { 
748              "type": "text", 
749              "fields": { 
750                "keyword": { 
751                  "type": "keyword", 
752                  "ignore_above": 256 
753                } 
754              } 
755            }, 
756            "record_number": { 
757              "type": "text", 
758              "fields": { 
759                "keyword": { 
760                  "type": "keyword", 
761                  "ignore_above": 256 
762                } 
763              } 
764            }, 
765            "source_name": { 
766              "type": "text", 
767              "fields": { 
768                "keyword": { 
769                  "type": "keyword", 
770                  "ignore_above": 256 
771                } 
772              } 
773            }, 
774            "started": { 
775              "type": "date" 
776            }, 
777            "tags": { 
778              "type": "text", 
779              "fields": { 
780                "keyword": { 
781                  "type": "keyword", 
782                  "ignore_above": 256 
783                } 
784              } 
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785            }, 
786            "task": { 
787              "type": "text", 
788              "fields": { 
789                "keyword": { 
790                  "type": "keyword", 
791                  "ignore_above": 256 
792                } 
793              } 
794            }, 
795            "thread_id": { 
796              "type": "long" 
797            }, 
798            "type": { 
799              "type": "text", 
800              "fields": { 
801                "keyword": { 
802                  "type": "keyword", 
803                  "ignore_above": 256 
804                } 
805              } 
806            }, 
807            "user": { 
808              "properties": { 
809                "domain": { 
810                  "type": "text", 
811                  "fields": { 
812                    "keyword": { 
813                      "type": "keyword", 
814                      "ignore_above": 256 
815                    } 
816                  } 
817                }, 
818                "identifier": { 
819                  "type": "text", 
820                  "fields": { 
821                    "keyword": { 
822                      "type": "keyword", 
823                      "ignore_above": 256 
824                    } 
825                  } 
826                }, 
827                "name": { 
828                  "type": "text", 
829                  "fields": { 
830                    "keyword": { 
831                      "type": "keyword", 
832                      "ignore_above": 256 
833                    } 
834                  } 
835                }, 
836                "type": { 
837                  "type": "text", 
838                  "fields": { 
839                    "keyword": { 
840                      "type": "keyword", 
841                      "ignore_above": 256 
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842                    } 
843                  } 
844                } 
845              } 
846            }, 
847            "version": { 
848              "type": "long" 
849            }, 
850            "virustotal": { 
851              "properties": { 
852                "md5": { 
853                  "type": "text", 
854                  "fields": { 
855                    "keyword": { 
856                      "type": "keyword", 
857                      "ignore_above": 256 
858                    } 
859                  } 
860                }, 
861                "permalink": { 
862                  "type": "text", 
863                  "fields": { 
864                    "keyword": { 
865                      "type": "keyword", 
866                      "ignore_above": 256 
867                    } 
868                  } 
869                }, 
870                "positives": { 
871                  "type": "long" 
872                }, 
873                "resource": { 
874                  "type": "text", 
875                  "fields": { 
876                    "keyword": { 
877                      "type": "keyword", 
878                      "ignore_above": 256 
879                    } 
880                  } 
881                }, 
882                "response_code": { 
883                  "type": "long" 
884                }, 
885                "scan_date": { 
886                  "type": "text", 
887                  "fields": { 
888                    "keyword": { 
889                      "type": "keyword", 
890                      "ignore_above": 256 
891                    } 
892                  } 
893                }, 
894                "scan_id": { 
895                  "type": "text", 
896                  "fields": { 
897                    "keyword": { 
898                      "type": "keyword", 
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899                      "ignore_above": 256 
900                    } 
901                  } 
902                }, 
903                "scans": { 
904                  "properties": { 
905                    "ALYac": { 
906                      "properties": { 
907                        "detected": { 
908                          "type": "boolean" 
909                        }, 
910                        "result": { 
911                          "type": "text", 
912                          "fields": { 
913                            "keyword": { 
914                              "type": "keyword", 
915                              "ignore_above": 256 
916                            } 
917                          } 
918                        }, 
919                        "update": { 
920                          "type": "text", 
921                          "fields": { 
922                            "keyword": { 
923                              "type": "keyword", 
924                              "ignore_above": 256 
925                            } 
926                          } 
927                        }, 
928                        "version": { 
929                          "type": "text", 
930                          "fields": { 
931                            "keyword": { 
932                              "type": "keyword", 
933                              "ignore_above": 256 
934                            } 
935                          } 
936                        } 
937                      } 
938                    }, 
939                    "AVG": { 
940                      "properties": { 
941                        "detected": { 
942                          "type": "boolean" 
943                        }, 
944                        "result": { 
945                          "type": "text", 
946                          "fields": { 
947                            "keyword": { 
948                              "type": "keyword", 
949                              "ignore_above": 256 
950                            } 
951                          } 
952                        }, 
953                        "update": { 
954                          "type": "text", 
955                          "fields": { 
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956                            "keyword": { 
957                              "type": "keyword", 
958                              "ignore_above": 256 
959                            } 
960                          } 
961                        }, 
962                        "version": { 
963                          "type": "text", 
964                          "fields": { 
965                            "keyword": { 
966                              "type": "keyword", 
967                              "ignore_above": 256 
968                            } 
969                          } 
970                        } 
971                      } 
972                    }, 
973                    "AVware": { 
974                      "properties": { 
975                        "detected": { 
976                          "type": "boolean" 
977                        }, 
978                        "result": { 
979                          "type": "text", 
980                          "fields": { 
981                            "keyword": { 
982                              "type": "keyword", 
983                              "ignore_above": 256 
984                            } 
985                          } 
986                        }, 
987                        "update": { 
988                          "type": "text", 
989                          "fields": { 
990                            "keyword": { 
991                              "type": "keyword", 
992                              "ignore_above": 256 
993                            } 
994                          } 
995                        }, 
996                        "version": { 
997                          "type": "text", 
998                          "fields": { 
999                            "keyword": { 
1000                             "type": "keyword", 
1001                             "ignore_above": 256 
1002                           } 
1003                         } 
1004                       } 
1005                     } 
1006                   }, 
1007                   "Ad-Aware": { 
1008                     "properties": { 
1009                       "detected": { 
1010                         "type": "boolean" 
1011                       }, 
1012                       "result": { 
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1013                         "type": "text", 
1014                         "fields": { 
1015                           "keyword": { 
1016                             "type": "keyword", 
1017                             "ignore_above": 256 
1018                           } 
1019                         } 
1020                       }, 
1021                       "update": { 
1022                         "type": "text", 
1023                         "fields": { 
1024                           "keyword": { 
1025                             "type": "keyword", 
1026                             "ignore_above": 256 
1027                           } 
1028                         } 
1029                       }, 
1030                       "version": { 
1031                         "type": "text", 
1032                         "fields": { 
1033                           "keyword": { 
1034                             "type": "keyword", 
1035                             "ignore_above": 256 
1036                           } 
1037                         } 
1038                       } 
1039                     } 
1040                   }, 
1041                   "AegisLab": { 
1042                     "properties": { 
1043                       "detected": { 
1044                         "type": "boolean" 
1045                       }, 
1046                       "result": { 
1047                         "type": "text", 
1048                         "fields": { 
1049                           "keyword": { 
1050                             "type": "keyword", 
1051                             "ignore_above": 256 
1052                           } 
1053                         } 
1054                       }, 
1055                       "update": { 
1056                         "type": "text", 
1057                         "fields": { 
1058                           "keyword": { 
1059                             "type": "keyword", 
1060                             "ignore_above": 256 
1061                           } 
1062                         } 
1063                       }, 
1064                       "version": { 
1065                         "type": "text", 
1066                         "fields": { 
1067                           "keyword": { 
1068                             "type": "keyword", 
1069                             "ignore_above": 256 
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1070                           } 
1071                         } 
1072                       } 
1073                     } 
1074                   }, 
1075                   "AhnLab-V3": { 
1076                     "properties": { 
1077                       "detected": { 
1078                         "type": "boolean" 
1079                       }, 
1080                       "result": { 
1081                         "type": "text", 
1082                         "fields": { 
1083                           "keyword": { 
1084                             "type": "keyword", 
1085                             "ignore_above": 256 
1086                           } 
1087                         } 
1088                       }, 
1089                       "update": { 
1090                         "type": "text", 
1091                         "fields": { 
1092                           "keyword": { 
1093                             "type": "keyword", 
1094                             "ignore_above": 256 
1095                           } 
1096                         } 
1097                       }, 
1098                       "version": { 
1099                         "type": "text", 
1100                         "fields": { 
1101                           "keyword": { 
1102                             "type": "keyword", 
1103                             "ignore_above": 256 
1104                           } 
1105                         } 
1106                       } 
1107                     } 
1108                   }, 
1109                   "Antiy-AVL": { 
1110                     "properties": { 
1111                       "detected": { 
1112                         "type": "boolean" 
1113                       }, 
1114                       "result": { 
1115                         "type": "text", 
1116                         "fields": { 
1117                           "keyword": { 
1118                             "type": "keyword", 
1119                             "ignore_above": 256 
1120                           } 
1121                         } 
1122                       }, 
1123                       "update": { 
1124                         "type": "text", 
1125                         "fields": { 
1126                           "keyword": { 
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1127                             "type": "keyword", 
1128                             "ignore_above": 256 
1129                           } 
1130                         } 
1131                       }, 
1132                       "version": { 
1133                         "type": "text", 
1134                         "fields": { 
1135                           "keyword": { 
1136                             "type": "keyword", 
1137                             "ignore_above": 256 
1138                           } 
1139                         } 
1140                       } 
1141                     } 
1142                   }, 
1143                   "Arcabit": { 
1144                     "properties": { 
1145                       "detected": { 
1146                         "type": "boolean" 
1147                       }, 
1148                       "result": { 
1149                         "type": "text", 
1150                         "fields": { 
1151                           "keyword": { 
1152                             "type": "keyword", 
1153                             "ignore_above": 256 
1154                           } 
1155                         } 
1156                       }, 
1157                       "update": { 
1158                         "type": "text", 
1159                         "fields": { 
1160                           "keyword": { 
1161                             "type": "keyword", 
1162                             "ignore_above": 256 
1163                           } 
1164                         } 
1165                       }, 
1166                       "version": { 
1167                         "type": "text", 
1168                         "fields": { 
1169                           "keyword": { 
1170                             "type": "keyword", 
1171                             "ignore_above": 256 
1172                           } 
1173                         } 
1174                       } 
1175                     } 
1176                   }, 
1177                   "Avast": { 
1178                     "properties": { 
1179                       "detected": { 
1180                         "type": "boolean" 
1181                       }, 
1182                       "result": { 
1183                         "type": "text", 
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1184                         "fields": { 
1185                           "keyword": { 
1186                             "type": "keyword", 
1187                             "ignore_above": 256 
1188                           } 
1189                         } 
1190                       }, 
1191                       "update": { 
1192                         "type": "text", 
1193                         "fields": { 
1194                           "keyword": { 
1195                             "type": "keyword", 
1196                             "ignore_above": 256 
1197                           } 
1198                         } 
1199                       }, 
1200                       "version": { 
1201                         "type": "text", 
1202                         "fields": { 
1203                           "keyword": { 
1204                             "type": "keyword", 
1205                             "ignore_above": 256 
1206                           } 
1207                         } 
1208                       } 
1209                     } 
1210                   }, 
1211                   "Avast-Mobile": { 
1212                     "properties": { 
1213                       "detected": { 
1214                         "type": "boolean" 
1215                       }, 
1216                       "update": { 
1217                         "type": "text", 
1218                         "fields": { 
1219                           "keyword": { 
1220                             "type": "keyword", 
1221                             "ignore_above": 256 
1222                           } 
1223                         } 
1224                       }, 
1225                       "version": { 
1226                         "type": "text", 
1227                         "fields": { 
1228                           "keyword": { 
1229                             "type": "keyword", 
1230                             "ignore_above": 256 
1231                           } 
1232                         } 
1233                       } 
1234                     } 
1235                   }, 
1236                   "Avira": { 
1237                     "properties": { 
1238                       "detected": { 
1239                         "type": "boolean" 
1240                       }, 
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1241                       "result": { 
1242                         "type": "text", 
1243                         "fields": { 
1244                           "keyword": { 
1245                             "type": "keyword", 
1246                             "ignore_above": 256 
1247                           } 
1248                         } 
1249                       }, 
1250                       "update": { 
1251                         "type": "text", 
1252                         "fields": { 
1253                           "keyword": { 
1254                             "type": "keyword", 
1255                             "ignore_above": 256 
1256                           } 
1257                         } 
1258                       }, 
1259                       "version": { 
1260                         "type": "text", 
1261                         "fields": { 
1262                           "keyword": { 
1263                             "type": "keyword", 
1264                             "ignore_above": 256 
1265                           } 
1266                         } 
1267                       } 
1268                     } 
1269                   }, 
1270                   "Baidu": { 
1271                     "properties": { 
1272                       "detected": { 
1273                         "type": "boolean" 
1274                       }, 
1275                       "result": { 
1276                         "type": "text", 
1277                         "fields": { 
1278                           "keyword": { 
1279                             "type": "keyword", 
1280                             "ignore_above": 256 
1281                           } 
1282                         } 
1283                       }, 
1284                       "update": { 
1285                         "type": "text", 
1286                         "fields": { 
1287                           "keyword": { 
1288                             "type": "keyword", 
1289                             "ignore_above": 256 
1290                           } 
1291                         } 
1292                       }, 
1293                       "version": { 
1294                         "type": "text", 
1295                         "fields": { 
1296                           "keyword": { 
1297                             "type": "keyword", 
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1298                             "ignore_above": 256 
1299                           } 
1300                         } 
1301                       } 
1302                     } 
1303                   }, 
1304                   "BitDefender": { 
1305                     "properties": { 
1306                       "detected": { 
1307                         "type": "boolean" 
1308                       }, 
1309                       "result": { 
1310                         "type": "text", 
1311                         "fields": { 
1312                           "keyword": { 
1313                             "type": "keyword", 
1314                             "ignore_above": 256 
1315                           } 
1316                         } 
1317                       }, 
1318                       "update": { 
1319                         "type": "text", 
1320                         "fields": { 
1321                           "keyword": { 
1322                             "type": "keyword", 
1323                             "ignore_above": 256 
1324                           } 
1325                         } 
1326                       }, 
1327                       "version": { 
1328                         "type": "text", 
1329                         "fields": { 
1330                           "keyword": { 
1331                             "type": "keyword", 
1332                             "ignore_above": 256 
1333                           } 
1334                         } 
1335                       } 
1336                     } 
1337                   }, 
1338                   "Bkav": { 
1339                     "properties": { 
1340                       "detected": { 
1341                         "type": "boolean" 
1342                       }, 
1343                       "result": { 
1344                         "type": "text", 
1345                         "fields": { 
1346                           "keyword": { 
1347                             "type": "keyword", 
1348                             "ignore_above": 256 
1349                           } 
1350                         } 
1351                       }, 
1352                       "update": { 
1353                         "type": "text", 
1354                         "fields": { 
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1355                           "keyword": { 
1356                             "type": "keyword", 
1357                             "ignore_above": 256 
1358                           } 
1359                         } 
1360                       }, 
1361                       "version": { 
1362                         "type": "text", 
1363                         "fields": { 
1364                           "keyword": { 
1365                             "type": "keyword", 
1366                             "ignore_above": 256 
1367                           } 
1368                         } 
1369                       } 
1370                     } 
1371                   }, 
1372                   "CAT-QuickHeal": { 
1373                     "properties": { 
1374                       "detected": { 
1375                         "type": "boolean" 
1376                       }, 
1377                       "result": { 
1378                         "type": "text", 
1379                         "fields": { 
1380                           "keyword": { 
1381                             "type": "keyword", 
1382                             "ignore_above": 256 
1383                           } 
1384                         } 
1385                       }, 
1386                       "update": { 
1387                         "type": "text", 
1388                         "fields": { 
1389                           "keyword": { 
1390                             "type": "keyword", 
1391                             "ignore_above": 256 
1392                           } 
1393                         } 
1394                       }, 
1395                       "version": { 
1396                         "type": "text", 
1397                         "fields": { 
1398                           "keyword": { 
1399                             "type": "keyword", 
1400                             "ignore_above": 256 
1401                           } 
1402                         } 
1403                       } 
1404                     } 
1405                   }, 
1406                   "CMC": { 
1407                     "properties": { 
1408                       "detected": { 
1409                         "type": "boolean" 
1410                       }, 
1411                       "update": { 
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1412                         "type": "text", 
1413                         "fields": { 
1414                           "keyword": { 
1415                             "type": "keyword", 
1416                             "ignore_above": 256 
1417                           } 
1418                         } 
1419                       }, 
1420                       "version": { 
1421                         "type": "text", 
1422                         "fields": { 
1423                           "keyword": { 
1424                             "type": "keyword", 
1425                             "ignore_above": 256 
1426                           } 
1427                         } 
1428                       } 
1429                     } 
1430                   }, 
1431                   "ClamAV": { 
1432                     "properties": { 
1433                       "detected": { 
1434                         "type": "boolean" 
1435                       }, 
1436                       "result": { 
1437                         "type": "text", 
1438                         "fields": { 
1439                           "keyword": { 
1440                             "type": "keyword", 
1441                             "ignore_above": 256 
1442                           } 
1443                         } 
1444                       }, 
1445                       "update": { 
1446                         "type": "text", 
1447                         "fields": { 
1448                           "keyword": { 
1449                             "type": "keyword", 
1450                             "ignore_above": 256 
1451                           } 
1452                         } 
1453                       }, 
1454                       "version": { 
1455                         "type": "text", 
1456                         "fields": { 
1457                           "keyword": { 
1458                             "type": "keyword", 
1459                             "ignore_above": 256 
1460                           } 
1461                         } 
1462                       } 
1463                     } 
1464                   }, 
1465                   "Comodo": { 
1466                     "properties": { 
1467                       "detected": { 
1468                         "type": "boolean" 
165 
1469                       }, 
1470                       "result": { 
1471                         "type": "text", 
1472                         "fields": { 
1473                           "keyword": { 
1474                             "type": "keyword", 
1475                             "ignore_above": 256 
1476                           } 
1477                         } 
1478                       }, 
1479                       "update": { 
1480                         "type": "text", 
1481                         "fields": { 
1482                           "keyword": { 
1483                             "type": "keyword", 
1484                             "ignore_above": 256 
1485                           } 
1486                         } 
1487                       }, 
1488                       "version": { 
1489                         "type": "text", 
1490                         "fields": { 
1491                           "keyword": { 
1492                             "type": "keyword", 
1493                             "ignore_above": 256 
1494                           } 
1495                         } 
1496                       } 
1497                     } 
1498                   }, 
1499                   "CrowdStrike": { 
1500                     "properties": { 
1501                       "detected": { 
1502                         "type": "boolean" 
1503                       }, 
1504                       "result": { 
1505                         "type": "text", 
1506                         "fields": { 
1507                           "keyword": { 
1508                             "type": "keyword", 
1509                             "ignore_above": 256 
1510                           } 
1511                         } 
1512                       }, 
1513                       "update": { 
1514                         "type": "text", 
1515                         "fields": { 
1516                           "keyword": { 
1517                             "type": "keyword", 
1518                             "ignore_above": 256 
1519                           } 
1520                         } 
1521                       }, 
1522                       "version": { 
1523                         "type": "text", 
1524                         "fields": { 
1525                           "keyword": { 
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1526                             "type": "keyword", 
1527                             "ignore_above": 256 
1528                           } 
1529                         } 
1530                       } 
1531                     } 
1532                   }, 
1533                   "Cybereason": { 
1534                     "properties": { 
1535                       "detected": { 
1536                         "type": "boolean" 
1537                       }, 
1538                       "result": { 
1539                         "type": "text", 
1540                         "fields": { 
1541                           "keyword": { 
1542                             "type": "keyword", 
1543                             "ignore_above": 256 
1544                           } 
1545                         } 
1546                       }, 
1547                       "update": { 
1548                         "type": "text", 
1549                         "fields": { 
1550                           "keyword": { 
1551                             "type": "keyword", 
1552                             "ignore_above": 256 
1553                           } 
1554                         } 
1555                       }, 
1556                       "version": { 
1557                         "type": "text", 
1558                         "fields": { 
1559                           "keyword": { 
1560                             "type": "keyword", 
1561                             "ignore_above": 256 
1562                           } 
1563                         } 
1564                       } 
1565                     } 
1566                   }, 
1567                   "Cylance": { 
1568                     "properties": { 
1569                       "detected": { 
1570                         "type": "boolean" 
1571                       }, 
1572                       "result": { 
1573                         "type": "text", 
1574                         "fields": { 
1575                           "keyword": { 
1576                             "type": "keyword", 
1577                             "ignore_above": 256 
1578                           } 
1579                         } 
1580                       }, 
1581                       "update": { 
1582                         "type": "text", 
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1583                         "fields": { 
1584                           "keyword": { 
1585                             "type": "keyword", 
1586                             "ignore_above": 256 
1587                           } 
1588                         } 
1589                       }, 
1590                       "version": { 
1591                         "type": "text", 
1592                         "fields": { 
1593                           "keyword": { 
1594                             "type": "keyword", 
1595                             "ignore_above": 256 
1596                           } 
1597                         } 
1598                       } 
1599                     } 
1600                   }, 
1601                   "Cyren": { 
1602                     "properties": { 
1603                       "detected": { 
1604                         "type": "boolean" 
1605                       }, 
1606                       "result": { 
1607                         "type": "text", 
1608                         "fields": { 
1609                           "keyword": { 
1610                             "type": "keyword", 
1611                             "ignore_above": 256 
1612                           } 
1613                         } 
1614                       }, 
1615                       "update": { 
1616                         "type": "text", 
1617                         "fields": { 
1618                           "keyword": { 
1619                             "type": "keyword", 
1620                             "ignore_above": 256 
1621                           } 
1622                         } 
1623                       }, 
1624                       "version": { 
1625                         "type": "text", 
1626                         "fields": { 
1627                           "keyword": { 
1628                             "type": "keyword", 
1629                             "ignore_above": 256 
1630                           } 
1631                         } 
1632                       } 
1633                     } 
1634                   }, 
1635                   "DrWeb": { 
1636                     "properties": { 
1637                       "detected": { 
1638                         "type": "boolean" 
1639                       }, 
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1640                       "result": { 
1641                         "type": "text", 
1642                         "fields": { 
1643                           "keyword": { 
1644                             "type": "keyword", 
1645                             "ignore_above": 256 
1646                           } 
1647                         } 
1648                       }, 
1649                       "update": { 
1650                         "type": "text", 
1651                         "fields": { 
1652                           "keyword": { 
1653                             "type": "keyword", 
1654                             "ignore_above": 256 
1655                           } 
1656                         } 
1657                       }, 
1658                       "version": { 
1659                         "type": "text", 
1660                         "fields": { 
1661                           "keyword": { 
1662                             "type": "keyword", 
1663                             "ignore_above": 256 
1664                           } 
1665                         } 
1666                       } 
1667                     } 
1668                   }, 
1669                   "ESET-NOD32": { 
1670                     "properties": { 
1671                       "detected": { 
1672                         "type": "boolean" 
1673                       }, 
1674                       "result": { 
1675                         "type": "text", 
1676                         "fields": { 
1677                           "keyword": { 
1678                             "type": "keyword", 
1679                             "ignore_above": 256 
1680                           } 
1681                         } 
1682                       }, 
1683                       "update": { 
1684                         "type": "text", 
1685                         "fields": { 
1686                           "keyword": { 
1687                             "type": "keyword", 
1688                             "ignore_above": 256 
1689                           } 
1690                         } 
1691                       }, 
1692                       "version": { 
1693                         "type": "text", 
1694                         "fields": { 
1695                           "keyword": { 
1696                             "type": "keyword", 
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1697                             "ignore_above": 256 
1698                           } 
1699                         } 
1700                       } 
1701                     } 
1702                   }, 
1703                   "Emsisoft": { 
1704                     "properties": { 
1705                       "detected": { 
1706                         "type": "boolean" 
1707                       }, 
1708                       "result": { 
1709                         "type": "text", 
1710                         "fields": { 
1711                           "keyword": { 
1712                             "type": "keyword", 
1713                             "ignore_above": 256 
1714                           } 
1715                         } 
1716                       }, 
1717                       "update": { 
1718                         "type": "text", 
1719                         "fields": { 
1720                           "keyword": { 
1721                             "type": "keyword", 
1722                             "ignore_above": 256 
1723                           } 
1724                         } 
1725                       }, 
1726                       "version": { 
1727                         "type": "text", 
1728                         "fields": { 
1729                           "keyword": { 
1730                             "type": "keyword", 
1731                             "ignore_above": 256 
1732                           } 
1733                         } 
1734                       } 
1735                     } 
1736                   }, 
1737                   "Endgame": { 
1738                     "properties": { 
1739                       "detected": { 
1740                         "type": "boolean" 
1741                       }, 
1742                       "result": { 
1743                         "type": "text", 
1744                         "fields": { 
1745                           "keyword": { 
1746                             "type": "keyword", 
1747                             "ignore_above": 256 
1748                           } 
1749                         } 
1750                       }, 
1751                       "update": { 
1752                         "type": "text", 
1753                         "fields": { 
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1754                           "keyword": { 
1755                             "type": "keyword", 
1756                             "ignore_above": 256 
1757                           } 
1758                         } 
1759                       }, 
1760                       "version": { 
1761                         "type": "text", 
1762                         "fields": { 
1763                           "keyword": { 
1764                             "type": "keyword", 
1765                             "ignore_above": 256 
1766                           } 
1767                         } 
1768                       } 
1769                     } 
1770                   }, 
1771                   "F-Prot": { 
1772                     "properties": { 
1773                       "detected": { 
1774                         "type": "boolean" 
1775                       }, 
1776                       "result": { 
1777                         "type": "text", 
1778                         "fields": { 
1779                           "keyword": { 
1780                             "type": "keyword", 
1781                             "ignore_above": 256 
1782                           } 
1783                         } 
1784                       }, 
1785                       "update": { 
1786                         "type": "text", 
1787                         "fields": { 
1788                           "keyword": { 
1789                             "type": "keyword", 
1790                             "ignore_above": 256 
1791                           } 
1792                         } 
1793                       }, 
1794                       "version": { 
1795                         "type": "text", 
1796                         "fields": { 
1797                           "keyword": { 
1798                             "type": "keyword", 
1799                             "ignore_above": 256 
1800                           } 
1801                         } 
1802                       } 
1803                     } 
1804                   }, 
1805                   "F-Secure": { 
1806                     "properties": { 
1807                       "detected": { 
1808                         "type": "boolean" 
1809                       }, 
1810                       "result": { 
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1811                         "type": "text", 
1812                         "fields": { 
1813                           "keyword": { 
1814                             "type": "keyword", 
1815                             "ignore_above": 256 
1816                           } 
1817                         } 
1818                       }, 
1819                       "update": { 
1820                         "type": "text", 
1821                         "fields": { 
1822                           "keyword": { 
1823                             "type": "keyword", 
1824                             "ignore_above": 256 
1825                           } 
1826                         } 
1827                       }, 
1828                       "version": { 
1829                         "type": "text", 
1830                         "fields": { 
1831                           "keyword": { 
1832                             "type": "keyword", 
1833                             "ignore_above": 256 
1834                           } 
1835                         } 
1836                       } 
1837                     } 
1838                   }, 
1839                   "Fortinet": { 
1840                     "properties": { 
1841                       "detected": { 
1842                         "type": "boolean" 
1843                       }, 
1844                       "result": { 
1845                         "type": "text", 
1846                         "fields": { 
1847                           "keyword": { 
1848                             "type": "keyword", 
1849                             "ignore_above": 256 
1850                           } 
1851                         } 
1852                       }, 
1853                       "update": { 
1854                         "type": "text", 
1855                         "fields": { 
1856                           "keyword": { 
1857                             "type": "keyword", 
1858                             "ignore_above": 256 
1859                           } 
1860                         } 
1861                       }, 
1862                       "version": { 
1863                         "type": "text", 
1864                         "fields": { 
1865                           "keyword": { 
1866                             "type": "keyword", 
1867                             "ignore_above": 256 
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1868                           } 
1869                         } 
1870                       } 
1871                     } 
1872                   }, 
1873                   "GData": { 
1874                     "properties": { 
1875                       "detected": { 
1876                         "type": "boolean" 
1877                       }, 
1878                       "result": { 
1879                         "type": "text", 
1880                         "fields": { 
1881                           "keyword": { 
1882                             "type": "keyword", 
1883                             "ignore_above": 256 
1884                           } 
1885                         } 
1886                       }, 
1887                       "update": { 
1888                         "type": "text", 
1889                         "fields": { 
1890                           "keyword": { 
1891                             "type": "keyword", 
1892                             "ignore_above": 256 
1893                           } 
1894                         } 
1895                       }, 
1896                       "version": { 
1897                         "type": "text", 
1898                         "fields": { 
1899                           "keyword": { 
1900                             "type": "keyword", 
1901                             "ignore_above": 256 
1902                           } 
1903                         } 
1904                       } 
1905                     } 
1906                   }, 
1907                   "Ikarus": { 
1908                     "properties": { 
1909                       "detected": { 
1910                         "type": "boolean" 
1911                       }, 
1912                       "result": { 
1913                         "type": "text", 
1914                         "fields": { 
1915                           "keyword": { 
1916                             "type": "keyword", 
1917                             "ignore_above": 256 
1918                           } 
1919                         } 
1920                       }, 
1921                       "update": { 
1922                         "type": "text", 
1923                         "fields": { 
1924                           "keyword": { 
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1925                             "type": "keyword", 
1926                             "ignore_above": 256 
1927                           } 
1928                         } 
1929                       }, 
1930                       "version": { 
1931                         "type": "text", 
1932                         "fields": { 
1933                           "keyword": { 
1934                             "type": "keyword", 
1935                             "ignore_above": 256 
1936                           } 
1937                         } 
1938                       } 
1939                     } 
1940                   }, 
1941                   "Invincea": { 
1942                     "properties": { 
1943                       "detected": { 
1944                         "type": "boolean" 
1945                       }, 
1946                       "result": { 
1947                         "type": "text", 
1948                         "fields": { 
1949                           "keyword": { 
1950                             "type": "keyword", 
1951                             "ignore_above": 256 
1952                           } 
1953                         } 
1954                       }, 
1955                       "update": { 
1956                         "type": "text", 
1957                         "fields": { 
1958                           "keyword": { 
1959                             "type": "keyword", 
1960                             "ignore_above": 256 
1961                           } 
1962                         } 
1963                       }, 
1964                       "version": { 
1965                         "type": "text", 
1966                         "fields": { 
1967                           "keyword": { 
1968                             "type": "keyword", 
1969                             "ignore_above": 256 
1970                           } 
1971                         } 
1972                       } 
1973                     } 
1974                   }, 
1975                   "Jiangmin": { 
1976                     "properties": { 
1977                       "detected": { 
1978                         "type": "boolean" 
1979                       }, 
1980                       "result": { 
1981                         "type": "text", 
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1982                         "fields": { 
1983                           "keyword": { 
1984                             "type": "keyword", 
1985                             "ignore_above": 256 
1986                           } 
1987                         } 
1988                       }, 
1989                       "update": { 
1990                         "type": "text", 
1991                         "fields": { 
1992                           "keyword": { 
1993                             "type": "keyword", 
1994                             "ignore_above": 256 
1995                           } 
1996                         } 
1997                       }, 
1998                       "version": { 
1999                         "type": "text", 
2000                         "fields": { 
2001                           "keyword": { 
2002                             "type": "keyword", 
2003                             "ignore_above": 256 
2004                           } 
2005                         } 
2006                       } 
2007                     } 
2008                   }, 
2009                   "K7AntiVirus": { 
2010                     "properties": { 
2011                       "detected": { 
2012                         "type": "boolean" 
2013                       }, 
2014                       "result": { 
2015                         "type": "text", 
2016                         "fields": { 
2017                           "keyword": { 
2018                             "type": "keyword", 
2019                             "ignore_above": 256 
2020                           } 
2021                         } 
2022                       }, 
2023                       "update": { 
2024                         "type": "text", 
2025                         "fields": { 
2026                           "keyword": { 
2027                             "type": "keyword", 
2028                             "ignore_above": 256 
2029                           } 
2030                         } 
2031                       }, 
2032                       "version": { 
2033                         "type": "text", 
2034                         "fields": { 
2035                           "keyword": { 
2036                             "type": "keyword", 
2037                             "ignore_above": 256 
2038                           } 
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2039                         } 
2040                       } 
2041                     } 
2042                   }, 
2043                   "K7GW": { 
2044                     "properties": { 
2045                       "detected": { 
2046                         "type": "boolean" 
2047                       }, 
2048                       "result": { 
2049                         "type": "text", 
2050                         "fields": { 
2051                           "keyword": { 
2052                             "type": "keyword", 
2053                             "ignore_above": 256 
2054                           } 
2055                         } 
2056                       }, 
2057                       "update": { 
2058                         "type": "text", 
2059                         "fields": { 
2060                           "keyword": { 
2061                             "type": "keyword", 
2062                             "ignore_above": 256 
2063                           } 
2064                         } 
2065                       }, 
2066                       "version": { 
2067                         "type": "text", 
2068                         "fields": { 
2069                           "keyword": { 
2070                             "type": "keyword", 
2071                             "ignore_above": 256 
2072                           } 
2073                         } 
2074                       } 
2075                     } 
2076                   }, 
2077                   "Kaspersky": { 
2078                     "properties": { 
2079                       "detected": { 
2080                         "type": "boolean" 
2081                       }, 
2082                       "result": { 
2083                         "type": "text", 
2084                         "fields": { 
2085                           "keyword": { 
2086                             "type": "keyword", 
2087                             "ignore_above": 256 
2088                           } 
2089                         } 
2090                       }, 
2091                       "update": { 
2092                         "type": "text", 
2093                         "fields": { 
2094                           "keyword": { 
2095                             "type": "keyword", 
176 
2096                             "ignore_above": 256 
2097                           } 
2098                         } 
2099                       }, 
2100                       "version": { 
2101                         "type": "text", 
2102                         "fields": { 
2103                           "keyword": { 
2104                             "type": "keyword", 
2105                             "ignore_above": 256 
2106                           } 
2107                         } 
2108                       } 
2109                     } 
2110                   }, 
2111                   "Kingsoft": { 
2112                     "properties": { 
2113                       "detected": { 
2114                         "type": "boolean" 
2115                       }, 
2116                       "update": { 
2117                         "type": "text", 
2118                         "fields": { 
2119                           "keyword": { 
2120                             "type": "keyword", 
2121                             "ignore_above": 256 
2122                           } 
2123                         } 
2124                       }, 
2125                       "version": { 
2126                         "type": "text", 
2127                         "fields": { 
2128                           "keyword": { 
2129                             "type": "keyword", 
2130                             "ignore_above": 256 
2131                           } 
2132                         } 
2133                       } 
2134                     } 
2135                   }, 
2136                   "MAX": { 
2137                     "properties": { 
2138                       "detected": { 
2139                         "type": "boolean" 
2140                       }, 
2141                       "result": { 
2142                         "type": "text", 
2143                         "fields": { 
2144                           "keyword": { 
2145                             "type": "keyword", 
2146                             "ignore_above": 256 
2147                           } 
2148                         } 
2149                       }, 
2150                       "update": { 
2151                         "type": "text", 
2152                         "fields": { 
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2153                           "keyword": { 
2154                             "type": "keyword", 
2155                             "ignore_above": 256 
2156                           } 
2157                         } 
2158                       }, 
2159                       "version": { 
2160                         "type": "text", 
2161                         "fields": { 
2162                           "keyword": { 
2163                             "type": "keyword", 
2164                             "ignore_above": 256 
2165                           } 
2166                         } 
2167                       } 
2168                     } 
2169                   }, 
2170                   "Malwarebytes": { 
2171                     "properties": { 
2172                       "detected": { 
2173                         "type": "boolean" 
2174                       }, 
2175                       "result": { 
2176                         "type": "text", 
2177                         "fields": { 
2178                           "keyword": { 
2179                             "type": "keyword", 
2180                             "ignore_above": 256 
2181                           } 
2182                         } 
2183                       }, 
2184                       "update": { 
2185                         "type": "text", 
2186                         "fields": { 
2187                           "keyword": { 
2188                             "type": "keyword", 
2189                             "ignore_above": 256 
2190                           } 
2191                         } 
2192                       }, 
2193                       "version": { 
2194                         "type": "text", 
2195                         "fields": { 
2196                           "keyword": { 
2197                             "type": "keyword", 
2198                             "ignore_above": 256 
2199                           } 
2200                         } 
2201                       } 
2202                     } 
2203                   }, 
2204                   "McAfee": { 
2205                     "properties": { 
2206                       "detected": { 
2207                         "type": "boolean" 
2208                       }, 
2209                       "result": { 
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2210                         "type": "text", 
2211                         "fields": { 
2212                           "keyword": { 
2213                             "type": "keyword", 
2214                             "ignore_above": 256 
2215                           } 
2216                         } 
2217                       }, 
2218                       "update": { 
2219                         "type": "text", 
2220                         "fields": { 
2221                           "keyword": { 
2222                             "type": "keyword", 
2223                             "ignore_above": 256 
2224                           } 
2225                         } 
2226                       }, 
2227                       "version": { 
2228                         "type": "text", 
2229                         "fields": { 
2230                           "keyword": { 
2231                             "type": "keyword", 
2232                             "ignore_above": 256 
2233                           } 
2234                         } 
2235                       } 
2236                     } 
2237                   }, 
2238                   "McAfee-GW-Edition": { 
2239                     "properties": { 
2240                       "detected": { 
2241                         "type": "boolean" 
2242                       }, 
2243                       "result": { 
2244                         "type": "text", 
2245                         "fields": { 
2246                           "keyword": { 
2247                             "type": "keyword", 
2248                             "ignore_above": 256 
2249                           } 
2250                         } 
2251                       }, 
2252                       "update": { 
2253                         "type": "text", 
2254                         "fields": { 
2255                           "keyword": { 
2256                             "type": "keyword", 
2257                             "ignore_above": 256 
2258                           } 
2259                         } 
2260                       }, 
2261                       "version": { 
2262                         "type": "text", 
2263                         "fields": { 
2264                           "keyword": { 
2265                             "type": "keyword", 
2266                             "ignore_above": 256 
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2267                           } 
2268                         } 
2269                       } 
2270                     } 
2271                   }, 
2272                   "MicroWorld-eScan": { 
2273                     "properties": { 
2274                       "detected": { 
2275                         "type": "boolean" 
2276                       }, 
2277                       "result": { 
2278                         "type": "text", 
2279                         "fields": { 
2280                           "keyword": { 
2281                             "type": "keyword", 
2282                             "ignore_above": 256 
2283                           } 
2284                         } 
2285                       }, 
2286                       "update": { 
2287                         "type": "text", 
2288                         "fields": { 
2289                           "keyword": { 
2290                             "type": "keyword", 
2291                             "ignore_above": 256 
2292                           } 
2293                         } 
2294                       }, 
2295                       "version": { 
2296                         "type": "text", 
2297                         "fields": { 
2298                           "keyword": { 
2299                             "type": "keyword", 
2300                             "ignore_above": 256 
2301                           } 
2302                         } 
2303                       } 
2304                     } 
2305                   }, 
2306                   "Microsoft": { 
2307                     "properties": { 
2308                       "detected": { 
2309                         "type": "boolean" 
2310                       }, 
2311                       "result": { 
2312                         "type": "text", 
2313                         "fields": { 
2314                           "keyword": { 
2315                             "type": "keyword", 
2316                             "ignore_above": 256 
2317                           } 
2318                         } 
2319                       }, 
2320                       "update": { 
2321                         "type": "text", 
2322                         "fields": { 
2323                           "keyword": { 
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2324                             "type": "keyword", 
2325                             "ignore_above": 256 
2326                           } 
2327                         } 
2328                       }, 
2329                       "version": { 
2330                         "type": "text", 
2331                         "fields": { 
2332                           "keyword": { 
2333                             "type": "keyword", 
2334                             "ignore_above": 256 
2335                           } 
2336                         } 
2337                       } 
2338                     } 
2339                   }, 
2340                   "NANO-Antivirus": { 
2341                     "properties": { 
2342                       "detected": { 
2343                         "type": "boolean" 
2344                       }, 
2345                       "result": { 
2346                         "type": "text", 
2347                         "fields": { 
2348                           "keyword": { 
2349                             "type": "keyword", 
2350                             "ignore_above": 256 
2351                           } 
2352                         } 
2353                       }, 
2354                       "update": { 
2355                         "type": "text", 
2356                         "fields": { 
2357                           "keyword": { 
2358                             "type": "keyword", 
2359                             "ignore_above": 256 
2360                           } 
2361                         } 
2362                       }, 
2363                       "version": { 
2364                         "type": "text", 
2365                         "fields": { 
2366                           "keyword": { 
2367                             "type": "keyword", 
2368                             "ignore_above": 256 
2369                           } 
2370                         } 
2371                       } 
2372                     } 
2373                   }, 
2374                   "Paloalto": { 
2375                     "properties": { 
2376                       "detected": { 
2377                         "type": "boolean" 
2378                       }, 
2379                       "result": { 
2380                         "type": "text", 
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2381                         "fields": { 
2382                           "keyword": { 
2383                             "type": "keyword", 
2384                             "ignore_above": 256 
2385                           } 
2386                         } 
2387                       }, 
2388                       "update": { 
2389                         "type": "text", 
2390                         "fields": { 
2391                           "keyword": { 
2392                             "type": "keyword", 
2393                             "ignore_above": 256 
2394                           } 
2395                         } 
2396                       }, 
2397                       "version": { 
2398                         "type": "text", 
2399                         "fields": { 
2400                           "keyword": { 
2401                             "type": "keyword", 
2402                             "ignore_above": 256 
2403                           } 
2404                         } 
2405                       } 
2406                     } 
2407                   }, 
2408                   "Panda": { 
2409                     "properties": { 
2410                       "detected": { 
2411                         "type": "boolean" 
2412                       }, 
2413                       "result": { 
2414                         "type": "text", 
2415                         "fields": { 
2416                           "keyword": { 
2417                             "type": "keyword", 
2418                             "ignore_above": 256 
2419                           } 
2420                         } 
2421                       }, 
2422                       "update": { 
2423                         "type": "text", 
2424                         "fields": { 
2425                           "keyword": { 
2426                             "type": "keyword", 
2427                             "ignore_above": 256 
2428                           } 
2429                         } 
2430                       }, 
2431                       "version": { 
2432                         "type": "text", 
2433                         "fields": { 
2434                           "keyword": { 
2435                             "type": "keyword", 
2436                             "ignore_above": 256 
2437                           } 
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2438                         } 
2439                       } 
2440                     } 
2441                   }, 
2442                   "Qihoo-360": { 
2443                     "properties": { 
2444                       "detected": { 
2445                         "type": "boolean" 
2446                       }, 
2447                       "result": { 
2448                         "type": "text", 
2449                         "fields": { 
2450                           "keyword": { 
2451                             "type": "keyword", 
2452                             "ignore_above": 256 
2453                           } 
2454                         } 
2455                       }, 
2456                       "update": { 
2457                         "type": "text", 
2458                         "fields": { 
2459                           "keyword": { 
2460                             "type": "keyword", 
2461                             "ignore_above": 256 
2462                           } 
2463                         } 
2464                       }, 
2465                       "version": { 
2466                         "type": "text", 
2467                         "fields": { 
2468                           "keyword": { 
2469                             "type": "keyword", 
2470                             "ignore_above": 256 
2471                           } 
2472                         } 
2473                       } 
2474                     } 
2475                   }, 
2476                   "Rising": { 
2477                     "properties": { 
2478                       "detected": { 
2479                         "type": "boolean" 
2480                       }, 
2481                       "update": { 
2482                         "type": "text", 
2483                         "fields": { 
2484                           "keyword": { 
2485                             "type": "keyword", 
2486                             "ignore_above": 256 
2487                           } 
2488                         } 
2489                       }, 
2490                       "version": { 
2491                         "type": "text", 
2492                         "fields": { 
2493                           "keyword": { 
2494                             "type": "keyword", 
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2495                             "ignore_above": 256 
2496                           } 
2497                         } 
2498                       } 
2499                     } 
2500                   }, 
2501                   "SUPERAntiSpyware": { 
2502                     "properties": { 
2503                       "detected": { 
2504                         "type": "boolean" 
2505                       }, 
2506                       "result": { 
2507                         "type": "text", 
2508                         "fields": { 
2509                           "keyword": { 
2510                             "type": "keyword", 
2511                             "ignore_above": 256 
2512                           } 
2513                         } 
2514                       }, 
2515                       "update": { 
2516                         "type": "text", 
2517                         "fields": { 
2518                           "keyword": { 
2519                             "type": "keyword", 
2520                             "ignore_above": 256 
2521                           } 
2522                         } 
2523                       }, 
2524                       "version": { 
2525                         "type": "text", 
2526                         "fields": { 
2527                           "keyword": { 
2528                             "type": "keyword", 
2529                             "ignore_above": 256 
2530                           } 
2531                         } 
2532                       } 
2533                     } 
2534                   }, 
2535                   "SentinelOne": { 
2536                     "properties": { 
2537                       "detected": { 
2538                         "type": "boolean" 
2539                       }, 
2540                       "result": { 
2541                         "type": "text", 
2542                         "fields": { 
2543                           "keyword": { 
2544                             "type": "keyword", 
2545                             "ignore_above": 256 
2546                           } 
2547                         } 
2548                       }, 
2549                       "update": { 
2550                         "type": "text", 
2551                         "fields": { 
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2552                           "keyword": { 
2553                             "type": "keyword", 
2554                             "ignore_above": 256 
2555                           } 
2556                         } 
2557                       }, 
2558                       "version": { 
2559                         "type": "text", 
2560                         "fields": { 
2561                           "keyword": { 
2562                             "type": "keyword", 
2563                             "ignore_above": 256 
2564                           } 
2565                         } 
2566                       } 
2567                     } 
2568                   }, 
2569                   "Sophos": { 
2570                     "properties": { 
2571                       "detected": { 
2572                         "type": "boolean" 
2573                       }, 
2574                       "result": { 
2575                         "type": "text", 
2576                         "fields": { 
2577                           "keyword": { 
2578                             "type": "keyword", 
2579                             "ignore_above": 256 
2580                           } 
2581                         } 
2582                       }, 
2583                       "update": { 
2584                         "type": "text", 
2585                         "fields": { 
2586                           "keyword": { 
2587                             "type": "keyword", 
2588                             "ignore_above": 256 
2589                           } 
2590                         } 
2591                       }, 
2592                       "version": { 
2593                         "type": "text", 
2594                         "fields": { 
2595                           "keyword": { 
2596                             "type": "keyword", 
2597                             "ignore_above": 256 
2598                           } 
2599                         } 
2600                       } 
2601                     } 
2602                   }, 
2603                   "Symantec": { 
2604                     "properties": { 
2605                       "detected": { 
2606                         "type": "boolean" 
2607                       }, 
2608                       "result": { 
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2609                         "type": "text", 
2610                         "fields": { 
2611                           "keyword": { 
2612                             "type": "keyword", 
2613                             "ignore_above": 256 
2614                           } 
2615                         } 
2616                       }, 
2617                       "update": { 
2618                         "type": "text", 
2619                         "fields": { 
2620                           "keyword": { 
2621                             "type": "keyword", 
2622                             "ignore_above": 256 
2623                           } 
2624                         } 
2625                       }, 
2626                       "version": { 
2627                         "type": "text", 
2628                         "fields": { 
2629                           "keyword": { 
2630                             "type": "keyword", 
2631                             "ignore_above": 256 
2632                           } 
2633                         } 
2634                       } 
2635                     } 
2636                   }, 
2637                   "Tencent": { 
2638                     "properties": { 
2639                       "detected": { 
2640                         "type": "boolean" 
2641                       }, 
2642                       "result": { 
2643                         "type": "text", 
2644                         "fields": { 
2645                           "keyword": { 
2646                             "type": "keyword", 
2647                             "ignore_above": 256 
2648                           } 
2649                         } 
2650                       }, 
2651                       "update": { 
2652                         "type": "text", 
2653                         "fields": { 
2654                           "keyword": { 
2655                             "type": "keyword", 
2656                             "ignore_above": 256 
2657                           } 
2658                         } 
2659                       }, 
2660                       "version": { 
2661                         "type": "text", 
2662                         "fields": { 
2663                           "keyword": { 
2664                             "type": "keyword", 
2665                             "ignore_above": 256 
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2666                           } 
2667                         } 
2668                       } 
2669                     } 
2670                   }, 
2671                   "TheHacker": { 
2672                     "properties": { 
2673                       "detected": { 
2674                         "type": "boolean" 
2675                       }, 
2676                       "update": { 
2677                         "type": "text", 
2678                         "fields": { 
2679                           "keyword": { 
2680                             "type": "keyword", 
2681                             "ignore_above": 256 
2682                           } 
2683                         } 
2684                       }, 
2685                       "version": { 
2686                         "type": "text", 
2687                         "fields": { 
2688                           "keyword": { 
2689                             "type": "keyword", 
2690                             "ignore_above": 256 
2691                           } 
2692                         } 
2693                       } 
2694                     } 
2695                   }, 
2696                   "TotalDefense": { 
2697                     "properties": { 
2698                       "detected": { 
2699                         "type": "boolean" 
2700                       }, 
2701                       "update": { 
2702                         "type": "text", 
2703                         "fields": { 
2704                           "keyword": { 
2705                             "type": "keyword", 
2706                             "ignore_above": 256 
2707                           } 
2708                         } 
2709                       }, 
2710                       "version": { 
2711                         "type": "text", 
2712                         "fields": { 
2713                           "keyword": { 
2714                             "type": "keyword", 
2715                             "ignore_above": 256 
2716                           } 
2717                         } 
2718                       } 
2719                     } 
2720                   }, 
2721                   "TrendMicro": { 
2722                     "properties": { 
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2723                       "detected": { 
2724                         "type": "boolean" 
2725                       }, 
2726                       "result": { 
2727                         "type": "text", 
2728                         "fields": { 
2729                           "keyword": { 
2730                             "type": "keyword", 
2731                             "ignore_above": 256 
2732                           } 
2733                         } 
2734                       }, 
2735                       "update": { 
2736                         "type": "text", 
2737                         "fields": { 
2738                           "keyword": { 
2739                             "type": "keyword", 
2740                             "ignore_above": 256 
2741                           } 
2742                         } 
2743                       }, 
2744                       "version": { 
2745                         "type": "text", 
2746                         "fields": { 
2747                           "keyword": { 
2748                             "type": "keyword", 
2749                             "ignore_above": 256 
2750                           } 
2751                         } 
2752                       } 
2753                     } 
2754                   }, 
2755                   "TrendMicro-HouseCall": { 
2756                     "properties": { 
2757                       "detected": { 
2758                         "type": "boolean" 
2759                       }, 
2760                       "result": { 
2761                         "type": "text", 
2762                         "fields": { 
2763                           "keyword": { 
2764                             "type": "keyword", 
2765                             "ignore_above": 256 
2766                           } 
2767                         } 
2768                       }, 
2769                       "update": { 
2770                         "type": "text", 
2771                         "fields": { 
2772                           "keyword": { 
2773                             "type": "keyword", 
2774                             "ignore_above": 256 
2775                           } 
2776                         } 
2777                       }, 
2778                       "version": { 
2779                         "type": "text", 
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2780                         "fields": { 
2781                           "keyword": { 
2782                             "type": "keyword", 
2783                             "ignore_above": 256 
2784                           } 
2785                         } 
2786                       } 
2787                     } 
2788                   }, 
2789                   "VBA32": { 
2790                     "properties": { 
2791                       "detected": { 
2792                         "type": "boolean" 
2793                       }, 
2794                       "result": { 
2795                         "type": "text", 
2796                         "fields": { 
2797                           "keyword": { 
2798                             "type": "keyword", 
2799                             "ignore_above": 256 
2800                           } 
2801                         } 
2802                       }, 
2803                       "update": { 
2804                         "type": "text", 
2805                         "fields": { 
2806                           "keyword": { 
2807                             "type": "keyword", 
2808                             "ignore_above": 256 
2809                           } 
2810                         } 
2811                       }, 
2812                       "version": { 
2813                         "type": "text", 
2814                         "fields": { 
2815                           "keyword": { 
2816                             "type": "keyword", 
2817                             "ignore_above": 256 
2818                           } 
2819                         } 
2820                       } 
2821                     } 
2822                   }, 
2823                   "VIPRE": { 
2824                     "properties": { 
2825                       "detected": { 
2826                         "type": "boolean" 
2827                       }, 
2828                       "result": { 
2829                         "type": "text", 
2830                         "fields": { 
2831                           "keyword": { 
2832                             "type": "keyword", 
2833                             "ignore_above": 256 
2834                           } 
2835                         } 
2836                       }, 
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2837                       "update": { 
2838                         "type": "text", 
2839                         "fields": { 
2840                           "keyword": { 
2841                             "type": "keyword", 
2842                             "ignore_above": 256 
2843                           } 
2844                         } 
2845                       }, 
2846                       "version": { 
2847                         "type": "text", 
2848                         "fields": { 
2849                           "keyword": { 
2850                             "type": "keyword", 
2851                             "ignore_above": 256 
2852                           } 
2853                         } 
2854                       } 
2855                     } 
2856                   }, 
2857                   "ViRobot": { 
2858                     "properties": { 
2859                       "detected": { 
2860                         "type": "boolean" 
2861                       }, 
2862                       "result": { 
2863                         "type": "text", 
2864                         "fields": { 
2865                           "keyword": { 
2866                             "type": "keyword", 
2867                             "ignore_above": 256 
2868                           } 
2869                         } 
2870                       }, 
2871                       "update": { 
2872                         "type": "text", 
2873                         "fields": { 
2874                           "keyword": { 
2875                             "type": "keyword", 
2876                             "ignore_above": 256 
2877                           } 
2878                         } 
2879                       }, 
2880                       "version": { 
2881                         "type": "text", 
2882                         "fields": { 
2883                           "keyword": { 
2884                             "type": "keyword", 
2885                             "ignore_above": 256 
2886                           } 
2887                         } 
2888                       } 
2889                     } 
2890                   }, 
2891                   "Webroot": { 
2892                     "properties": { 
2893                       "detected": { 
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2894                         "type": "boolean" 
2895                       }, 
2896                       "result": { 
2897                         "type": "text", 
2898                         "fields": { 
2899                           "keyword": { 
2900                             "type": "keyword", 
2901                             "ignore_above": 256 
2902                           } 
2903                         } 
2904                       }, 
2905                       "update": { 
2906                         "type": "text", 
2907                         "fields": { 
2908                           "keyword": { 
2909                             "type": "keyword", 
2910                             "ignore_above": 256 
2911                           } 
2912                         } 
2913                       }, 
2914                       "version": { 
2915                         "type": "text", 
2916                         "fields": { 
2917                           "keyword": { 
2918                             "type": "keyword", 
2919                             "ignore_above": 256 
2920                           } 
2921                         } 
2922                       } 
2923                     } 
2924                   }, 
2925                   "WhiteArmor": { 
2926                     "properties": { 
2927                       "detected": { 
2928                         "type": "boolean" 
2929                       }, 
2930                       "result": { 
2931                         "type": "text", 
2932                         "fields": { 
2933                           "keyword": { 
2934                             "type": "keyword", 
2935                             "ignore_above": 256 
2936                           } 
2937                         } 
2938                       }, 
2939                       "update": { 
2940                         "type": "text", 
2941                         "fields": { 
2942                           "keyword": { 
2943                             "type": "keyword", 
2944                             "ignore_above": 256 
2945                           } 
2946                         } 
2947                       } 
2948                     } 
2949                   }, 
2950                   "Yandex": { 
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2951                     "properties": { 
2952                       "detected": { 
2953                         "type": "boolean" 
2954                       }, 
2955                       "result": { 
2956                         "type": "text", 
2957                         "fields": { 
2958                           "keyword": { 
2959                             "type": "keyword", 
2960                             "ignore_above": 256 
2961                           } 
2962                         } 
2963                       }, 
2964                       "update": { 
2965                         "type": "text", 
2966                         "fields": { 
2967                           "keyword": { 
2968                             "type": "keyword", 
2969                             "ignore_above": 256 
2970                           } 
2971                         } 
2972                       }, 
2973                       "version": { 
2974                         "type": "text", 
2975                         "fields": { 
2976                           "keyword": { 
2977                             "type": "keyword", 
2978                             "ignore_above": 256 
2979                           } 
2980                         } 
2981                       } 
2982                     } 
2983                   }, 
2984                   "Zillya": { 
2985                     "properties": { 
2986                       "detected": { 
2987                         "type": "boolean" 
2988                       }, 
2989                       "result": { 
2990                         "type": "text", 
2991                         "fields": { 
2992                           "keyword": { 
2993                             "type": "keyword", 
2994                             "ignore_above": 256 
2995                           } 
2996                         } 
2997                       }, 
2998                       "update": { 
2999                         "type": "text", 
3000                         "fields": { 
3001                           "keyword": { 
3002                             "type": "keyword", 
3003                             "ignore_above": 256 
3004                           } 
3005                         } 
3006                       }, 
3007                       "version": { 
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3008                         "type": "text", 
3009                         "fields": { 
3010                           "keyword": { 
3011                             "type": "keyword", 
3012                             "ignore_above": 256 
3013                           } 
3014                         } 
3015                       } 
3016                     } 
3017                   }, 
3018                   "ZoneAlarm": { 
3019                     "properties": { 
3020                       "detected": { 
3021                         "type": "boolean" 
3022                       }, 
3023                       "result": { 
3024                         "type": "text", 
3025                         "fields": { 
3026                           "keyword": { 
3027                             "type": "keyword", 
3028                             "ignore_above": 256 
3029                           } 
3030                         } 
3031                       }, 
3032                       "update": { 
3033                         "type": "text", 
3034                         "fields": { 
3035                           "keyword": { 
3036                             "type": "keyword", 
3037                             "ignore_above": 256 
3038                           } 
3039                         } 
3040                       }, 
3041                       "version": { 
3042                         "type": "text", 
3043                         "fields": { 
3044                           "keyword": { 
3045                             "type": "keyword", 
3046                             "ignore_above": 256 
3047                           } 
3048                         } 
3049                       } 
3050                     } 
3051                   }, 
3052                   "Zoner": { 
3053                     "properties": { 
3054                       "detected": { 
3055                         "type": "boolean" 
3056                       }, 
3057                       "result": { 
3058                         "type": "text", 
3059                         "fields": { 
3060                           "keyword": { 
3061                             "type": "keyword", 
3062                             "ignore_above": 256 
3063                           } 
3064                         } 
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3065                       }, 
3066                       "update": { 
3067                         "type": "text", 
3068                         "fields": { 
3069                           "keyword": { 
3070                             "type": "keyword", 
3071                             "ignore_above": 256 
3072                           } 
3073                         } 
3074                       }, 
3075                       "version": { 
3076                         "type": "text", 
3077                         "fields": { 
3078                           "keyword": { 
3079                             "type": "keyword", 
3080                             "ignore_above": 256 
3081                           } 
3082                         } 
3083                       } 
3084                     } 
3085                   }, 
3086                   "eGambit": { 
3087                     "properties": { 
3088                       "detected": { 
3089                         "type": "boolean" 
3090                       }, 
3091                       "result": { 
3092                         "type": "text", 
3093                         "fields": { 
3094                           "keyword": { 
3095                             "type": "keyword", 
3096                             "ignore_above": 256 
3097                           } 
3098                         } 
3099                       }, 
3100                       "update": { 
3101                         "type": "text", 
3102                         "fields": { 
3103                           "keyword": { 
3104                             "type": "keyword", 
3105                             "ignore_above": 256 
3106                           } 
3107                         } 
3108                       }, 
3109                       "version": { 
3110                         "type": "text", 
3111                         "fields": { 
3112                           "keyword": { 
3113                             "type": "keyword", 
3114                             "ignore_above": 256 
3115                           } 
3116                         } 
3117                       } 
3118                     } 
3119                   }, 
3120                   "nProtect": { 
3121                     "properties": { 
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3122                       "detected": { 
3123                         "type": "boolean" 
3124                       }, 
3125                       "result": { 
3126                         "type": "text", 
3127                         "fields": { 
3128                           "keyword": { 
3129                             "type": "keyword", 
3130                             "ignore_above": 256 
3131                           } 
3132                         } 
3133                       }, 
3134                       "update": { 
3135                         "type": "text", 
3136                         "fields": { 
3137                           "keyword": { 
3138                             "type": "keyword", 
3139                             "ignore_above": 256 
3140                           } 
3141                         } 
3142                       }, 
3143                       "version": { 
3144                         "type": "text", 
3145                         "fields": { 
3146                           "keyword": { 
3147                             "type": "keyword", 
3148                             "ignore_above": 256 
3149                           } 
3150                         } 
3151                       } 
3152                     } 
3153                   } 
3154                 } 
3155               }, 
3156               "sha1": { 
3157                 "type": "text", 
3158                 "fields": { 
3159                   "keyword": { 
3160                     "type": "keyword", 
3161                     "ignore_above": 256 
3162                   } 
3163                 } 
3164               }, 
3165               "sha256": { 
3166                 "type": "text", 
3167                 "fields": { 
3168                   "keyword": { 
3169                     "type": "keyword", 
3170                     "ignore_above": 256 
3171                   } 
3172                 } 
3173               }, 
3174               "total": { 
3175                 "type": "long" 
3176               }, 
3177               "verbose_msg": { 
3178                 "type": "text", 
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3179                 "fields": { 
3180                   "keyword": { 
3181                     "type": "keyword", 
3182                     "ignore_above": 256 
3183                   } 
3184                 } 
3185               } 
3186             } 
3187           }, 
3188           "whitelisted": { 
3189             "type": "text", 
3190             "fields": { 
3191               "keyword": { 
3192                 "type": "keyword", 
3193                 "ignore_above": 256 
3194               } 
3195             } 
3196           } 
3197         } 
3198       } 
3199     }, 
3200     "settings": { 
3201       "index": { 
3202         "creation_date": "1516665604694", 
3203         "number_of_shards": "5", 
3204         "number_of_replicas": "1", 
3205         "uuid": "54kZ3HndTgSds8Ve7ng0ew", 
3206         "version": { 
3207           "created": "5060599" 
3208         }, 
3209         "provided_name": "winlogbeat-2018.01.23" 
3210       } 
3211     } 
3212   } 
3213 }  
196 
APPENDIX N: WATCHER ALERT FOR VIRUSTOTAL HITS 
This research created a Watcher alert for reporting malicious processes according to 
VirusTotal results. The watcher code can be found online at 
https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. The code is included below for 
convenience, with line numbers displayed for reference. 
 
1  { 
2    "trigger": { 
3      "schedule": { 
4        "interval": "1m" 
5      } 
6    }, 
7    "input": { 
8      "search": { 
9        "request": { 
10         "search_type": "query_then_fetch", 
11         "indices": [ 
12           "<winlogbeat-{now-2m}>", 
13           "<winlogbeat-{now}>" 
14         ], 
15         "types": [], 
16         "body": { 
17           "query": { 
18             "bool": { 
19               "filter": { 
20                 "range": { 
21                   "@timestamp": { 
22                     "gt": "now-1m" 
23                   } 
24                 } 
25               }, 
26               "must": { 
27                 "range": { 
28                   "virustotal.positives": { 
29                     "gt": 0 
30                   } 
31                 } 
32               } 
33             } 
34           } 
35         } 
36       } 
37     } 
38   }, 
39   "condition": { 
40     "compare": { 
41       "ctx.payload.hits.total": { 
42         "gt": 0 
43       } 
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44     } 
45   }, 
46   "actions": { 
47     "send_email": { 
48       "email": { 
49         "profile": "gmail", 
50         "attachments": { 
51           "dashboard.pdf": { 
52             "reporting": { 
53               "url": 
"http://127.0.0.1:5601/api/reporting/generate/dashboard/AWDIhv9bq-
FH7NNrhWya" 
54             } 
55           }, 
56           "data.yml": { 
57             "data": { 
58               "format": "yaml" 
59             } 
60           } 
61         }, 
62         "to": [ 
63           "<insert_email_address>" 
64         ], 
65         "subject": "[WATCHER] Malicious Virustotal File Executed", 
66         "body": { 
67           "html": "<h1>{{ctx.payload.hits.total}} Malicious Process  
             Creation Events In Past 1 Minute</h1>  <h3>Hashes:</h3>  <ol>   
             {{#ctx.payload.hits.hits}}  
             <li>{{_source.virustotal.scans.Malwarebytes.result}} <a 
href='https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/{{_source.SHA256}}'> 
              {{_source.SHA256}}</a></li> {{/ctx.payload.hits.hits}}</ol>" 
68         } 
69       } 
70     } 
71   } 
72 }  
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APPENDIX O: WATCHER ALERT FOR SUSPICIOUS FILE 
EXTENSIONS 
This research created a Watcher alert for reporting malicious processes according to 
VirusTotal results. The watcher code can be found online at 
https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. The code is included below, with 
line numbers displayed for reference. 
 
1   { 
2     "trigger": { 
3       "schedule": { 
4         "interval": "1m" 
5       } 
6     }, 
7     "input": { 
8       "search": { 
9         "request": { 
10          "search_type": "query_then_fetch", 
11          "indices": [ 
12            "<winlogbeat-{now-2m}>", 
13            "<winlogbeat-{now}>" 
14          ], 
15          "types": [], 
16          "body": { 
17            "from": 0, 
18            "size": 10000, 
19            "query": { 
20              "bool": { 
21                "filter": { 
22                  "range": { 
23                    "@timestamp": { 
24                      "gte": "now-1m" 
25                    } 
26                  } 
27                }, 
28                "must": { 
29                  "terms": { 
30                    "file_extension.keyword": [ 
31                      ".402", 
32                      ".4035", 
33                      ".4090", 
34                      ".4091", 
35                      ".452", 
36                      ".707", 
37                      ".725", 
38                      ".726", 
39                      ".8899", 
40                      ".911", 
41                      ".f41o1", 
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42                      ".2cXpCihgsVxB3", 
43                      ".3ncrypt3d", 
44                      ".au1crypt", 
45                      ".BONUM", 
46                      ".BRT92", 
47                      ".BUSH", 
48                      ".C8B089F", 
49                      ".CHAK", 
50                      ".clinTON", 
51                      ".crypt", 
52                      ".FIX", 
53                      ".fuck", 
54                      ".goro", 
55                      ".gotham", 
56                      ".granny", 
57                      ".happ", 
58                      ".lpcrestore", 
59                      ".keepcalm", 
60                      ".LIN", 
61                      ".MAKB", 
62                      ".medal", 
63                      ".mtk118", 
64                      ".needdecrypt", 
65                      ".needkeys", 
66                      ".NIGGA", 
67                      ".nWcrypt", 
68                      ".paycyka", 
69                      ".pizdec", 
70                      ".pscrypte", 
71                      ".ReaGAN", 
72                      ".rubmblegoodboy", 
73                      ".s1crypt", 
74                      ".scorp", 
75                      ".sea", 
76                      ".skunk", 
77                      ".Trump", 
78                      ".UNLIS", 
79                      ".vdul", 
80                      ".wallet", 
81                      ".write_", 
82                      ".YAYA", 
83                      ".zuzya", 
84                      "..doc", 
85                      ".xlsm", 
86                      ".AK47", 
87                      ".STN", 
88                      ".coded", 
89                      ".cerber3", 
90                      ".asasin", 
91                      ".ykcol" 
92                    ] 
93                  } 
94                } 
95              } 
96            }, 
97            "sort": [ 
98              { 
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99                "event_data.UtcTime.keyword": "asc" 
100             } 
101           ] 
102         } 
103       } 
104     } 
105   }, 
106   "condition": { 
107     "compare": { 
108       "ctx.payload.hits.total": { 
109         "gt": 0 
110       } 
111     } 
112   }, 
113   "actions": { 
114     "send_email": { 
115       "email": { 
116         "profile": "gmail", 
117         "attachments": { 
118           "dashboard.pdf": { 
119             "reporting": { 
120               "url": 
"http://127.0.0.1:5601/api/reporting/generate/dashboard/AWDPFPvTvSdcMfsiRhD
e" 
121             } 
122           }, 
123           "data.yml": { 
124             "data": { 
125               "format": "yaml" 
126             } 
127           } 
128         }, 
129         "to": [ 
130           "<insert_email_address>" 
131         ], 
132         "subject": "[WATCHER] Potentially Malicious File Extension   
                       Found", 
133         "body": { 
134           "html": "<h1>{{ctx.payload.hits.total}} Potentially Malicious  
          File Extensions Seen In Past 1 Minute</h1>  <h3>File  
          Extensions (timestamp --- extension --- file):</h3>  <ol>  
          {{#ctx.payload.hits.hits}} <li>{{_source.event_data.UtcTime}} ---   
          {{_source.file_extension}}  ---  
          {{_source.event_data.TargetFilename}}</li>  
          {{/ctx.payload.hits.hits}}</ol> <h3>Elastic Discover Query:</h3> 
<a 
href='http://127.0.0.1:5601/app/kibana#/discover/AWDPG23_vSdcMfsiRhqc'>http
://127.0.0.1:5601/app/kibana#/discover/AWDPG23_vSdcMfsiRhqc</a>" 
135         } 
136       } 
137     } 
138   } 
139 }  
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APPENDIX P: WATCHER ALERT FOR CHANGES TO FILE 
CREATION TIMES 
This research created a Watcher alert for reporting when a file creation time was 
changed by a process. The watcher code can be found online at 
https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. The code is included below, with 
line numbers displayed for reference. 
 
1  { 
2    "trigger": { 
3      "schedule": { 
4        "interval": "1m" 
5      } 
6    }, 
7    "input": { 
8      "search": { 
9        "request": { 
10         "search_type": "query_then_fetch", 
11         "indices": [ 
12           "<winlogbeat-{now-2m}>", 
13           "<winlogbeat-{now}>" 
14         ], 
15         "types": [], 
16         "body": { 
17           "from": 0, 
18           "size": 10000, 
19           "query": { 
20             "bool": { 
21               "filter": [ 
22                 { 
23                   "range": { 
24                     "@timestamp": { 
25                       "gte": "now-1m" 
26                     } 
27                   } 
28                 }, 
29                 { 
30                   "term": { 
31                     "event_id": 2 
32                   } 
33                 } 
34               ] 
35             } 
36           }, 
37           "sort": [ 
38             { 
39               "event_data.UtcTime.keyword": "asc" 
40             } 
202 
41           ] 
42         } 
43       } 
44     } 
45   }, 
46   "condition": { 
47     "compare": { 
48       "ctx.payload.hits.total": { 
49         "gt": 0 
50       } 
51     } 
52   }, 
53   "actions": { 
54     "send_email": { 
55       "email": { 
56         "profile": "gmail", 
57         "attachments": { 
58           "dashboard.pdf": { 
59             "reporting": { 
60               "url": 
"http://127.0.0.1:5601/api/reporting/generate/dashboard/AWDIhWBRq-
FH7NNrhWqk" 
61             } 
62           }, 
63           "data.yml": { 
64             "data": { 
65               "format": "yaml" 
66             } 
67           } 
68         }, 
69         "to": [ 
70           "<insert_email_address>” 
71         ], 
72         "subject": "[WATCHER] Process Changed File Creation Time", 
73         "body": { 
74           "html": "<h1>{{ctx.payload.hits.total}} File Creation Times 
Changed In Past 1 Minute</h1>  <h3>File Creation Times Changed (timestamp -
-- file --- process):</h3>  <ol> {{#ctx.payload.hits.hits}} 
<li>{{_source.event_data.UtcTime}} --- 
{{_source.event_data.TargetFilename}} --- {{_source.event_data.Image}}</li> 
{{/ctx.payload.hits.hits}}</ol><h3>Elastic Discover Query:</h3><a 
href='http://127.0.0.1:5601/app/kibana#/discover/AWDImY92q-
FH7NNrhYSC'>http://127.0.0.1:5601/app/kibana#/discover/AWDImY92q-
FH7NNrhYSC</a>" 
75         } 
76       } 
77     } 
78   } 
79 }  
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APPENDIX Q: WATCHER ALERT FOR FILES CREATED 
WITHIN SHORT TIMEFRAME 
This research created a Watcher alert for reporting when more than 240 files are 
created on a system in less than 1 minute. The watcher code can be found online at 
https://github.com/dsugraduate/dsu2018/. The code is included below, with 
line numbers displayed for reference. 
 
1  { 
2    "trigger": { 
3      "schedule": { 
4        "interval": "1m" 
5      } 
6    }, 
7    "input": { 
8      "search": { 
9        "request": { 
10         "search_type": "query_then_fetch", 
11         "indices": [ 
12           "<winlogbeat-{now-2m}>", 
13           "<winlogbeat-{now}>" 
14         ], 
15         "types": [], 
16         "body": { 
17           "from": 0, 
18           "size": 10000, 
19           "query": { 
20             "bool": { 
21               "filter": [ 
22                 { 
23                   "range": { 
24                     "@timestamp": { 
25                       "gte": "now-1m" 
26                     } 
27                   } 
28                 }, 
29                 { 
30                   "term": { 
31                     "event_id": 11 
32                   } 
33                 } 
34               ] 
35             } 
36           }, 
37           "sort": [ 
38             { 
39               "event_data.UtcTime.keyword": "asc" 
40             } 
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41           ] 
42         } 
43       } 
44     } 
45   }, 
46   "condition": { 
47     "compare": { 
48       "ctx.payload.hits.total": { 
49         "gt": 240 
50       } 
51     } 
52   }, 
53   "actions": { 
54     "send_email": { 
55       "email": { 
56         "profile": "gmail", 
57         "attachments": { 
58           "dashboard.pdf": { 
59             "reporting": { 
60               "url": 
"http://127.0.0.1:5601/api/reporting/generate/dashboard/AWDIhv9bq-
FH7NNrhWya" 
61             } 
62           }, 
63           "data.yml": { 
64             "data": { 
65               "format": "yaml" 
66             } 
67           } 
68         }, 
69         "to": [ 
70           "<insert_email_address>" 
71         ], 
72         "subject": "[WATCHER] File Creation Threshold Exceeded", 
73         "body": { 
74           "html": "<h1>{{ctx.payload.hits.total}} Files Created In Past 
1 Minute</h1>  <h3>Files Created (timestamp --- file):</h3>  <ol> 
{{#ctx.payload.hits.hits}} <li>{{_source.event_data.UtcTime}} --- 
{{_source.event_data.TargetFilename}}</li> 
{{/ctx.payload.hits.hits}}</ol><h3>Elastic Discover Query:</h3><a 
href='http://127.0.0.1:5601/app/kibana#/discover/AWDPHZZyvSdcMfsiRh6s'>http
://127.0.0.1:5601/app/kibana#/discover/AWDPHZZyvSdcMfsiRh6s</a>" 
75         } 
76       } 
77     } 
78   } 
79 } 
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APPENDIX R. SCREENSHOTS OF RANSOMWARE 
NOTIFICATION MESSAGES 
This appendix contains screenshots of the ransomware notification messages observed 
after executing each ransomware sample. The screenshots are included below so that other 
researchers know the effects of each sample without having to execute the samples in their 
own environments. 
GlobeImposter sample G1 used file extension “.crypt” and created notification file 
“how_to_back_files.html”. A screenshot of the notification file is included in Figure 
20. 
 
Figure 20. Screenshot of Ransomware Sample G1 
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GlobeImposter sample G2 used file extension “.STN” and created notification file 
“0_HELP_DECYRPT_FILE.html”. A screenshot of the notification file is included in 
Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21. Screenshot of Ransomware Sample G2 
GlobeImposter sample G3 used file extension “.coded” and created notification file 
“how_to_back_files.html”. A screenshot of the notification file is included in Figure 
21. 
 
Figure 22. Screenshot of Ransomware Sample G3 
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Cerber sample C1 used file extension “.cerber3” and created notification file 
“@__README__@.txt” and “@__README__@.html”. A screenshot of the notification 
file is included in . 
 
Figure 23. Screenshot of Ransomware Sample C1 
Cerber sample C2 used file extension “.cerber3” and created notification file 
“@__README__@.txt” and “@__README__@.html”. A screenshot of the notification 
file is included in . 
 
Figure 24. Screenshot of Ransomware Sample C2 
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Cerber sample C3 used file extension “.8899” and created notification file 
“R_E_A_D__T_H_I_S_######.txt” and “R_E_A_D__T_H_I_S_######.hta”, 
where ###### is a random number. A screenshot of the notification file is included in Figure 
25. 
 
Figure 25. Screenshot of Ransomware Sample C3 
Locky sample L1 used file extension “.asasin” and created notification files 
“asasin.html” and “asasin.bmp”. A screenshot of the notification file is included in 
Figure 26. 
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Figure 26. Screenshot of Ransomware Sample L1 
Locky sample L2 used file extension “.asasin” and created notification files 
“asasin.html” and “asasin.bmp”. A screenshot of the notification file is included in 
Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27. Screenshot of Ransomware Sample L2 
Locky sample L3 used file extension “.asasin” and created notification files 
“asasin.html” and “asasin.bmp”. A screenshot of the notification file is included in 
Figure 28. 
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Figure 28. Screenshot of Ransomware Sample L3 
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APPENDIX S. HISTOGRAMS OF RANSOMWARE SAMPLES 
This appendix documents the histograms of the Sysmon events triggered by each 
ransomware sample used in this research study. A description of the ransomware dataset is 
found in the Chapter 4 on page 20. 
The GlobeImposter sample labeled G1 was identified by the SHA-256 hash 
7d49a2a9d788fc8dbaa6331c8b740f689e20600ff7e8d3692b1a9c6d37a37bd6 (Hybrid 
Analysis, 2017g). Sample G1 triggered 21 Sysmon events. The sample created two processes, 
terminated one process, created 17 files, and set one registry value. The histogram of the 
Sysmon events are found in Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29. Histogram of Sysmon Events for Sample G1 
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The GlobeImposter sample labeled G2 was identified by the SHA-256 hash 
edf67ba035e52cd903017a24271544caba57dace039be51b1e867fdfd5252744 (Hybrid 
Analysis, 2017b). Sample G2 triggered 407 Sysmon events. The sample created 10 processes, 
terminated one process, created 395 files, and set one registry value. The histogram of the 
Sysmon events generated by sample G2 is found in Figure 30. 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Histogram of Sysmon Events for Sample G2 
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The GlobeImposter sample labeled G3 was identified by the SHA-256 hash 
b2282de3df95c6a9d0151ad61d2ab4e99400ca3104ce9003a0b13290260a7a55 (Hybrid 
Analysis, 2017c). Sample G3 triggered 407 Sysmon events. The sample created 10 processes, 
terminated one process, created 395 files, and set one registry value. The histogram of the 
Sysmon events generated by sample G3 is found in Figure 31. 
 
 
Figure 31. Histogram of Sysmon Events for Sample G3 
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The Cerber sample labeled C1 was identified by the SHA-256 hash 
6563059c4e556e2bc1589b9711a328c4499baed3b0a14b533a467ce65ee37af6 (Hybrid 
Analysis, 2017i). Sample C1 triggered 565 Sysmon events. The sample created 11 processes, 
changed the creation time of 37 files, created 512 network connections, terminated one 
process, accessed one raw disk, and created three files. The histogram of the Sysmon events 
generated by sample C1 is found in Figure 32. 
 
 
 
Figure 32. Histogram of Sysmon Events for Sample C1 
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The Cerber sample labeled C2 was identified by the SHA-256 hash 
403577074344d4832649881daf8885fed4d9afc3e7a4b02247ceb9b51d858794 (Hybrid 
Analysis, 2017h). Sample C2 triggered 565 Sysmon events. The sample created 11 processes, 
changed the creation time of 37 files, created 512 network connections, terminated one 
process, accessed one raw disk, and created three files. The histogram of the Sysmon events 
generated by sample C2 is found in Figure 33. A keen observer will notice that this is the 
exact same profile as sample C1. 
 
 
Figure 33. Histogram of Sysmon Events for Sample C2 
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The Cerber sample labeled C3 was identified by the SHA-256 hash 
e67834d1e8b38ec5864cfa101b140aeaba8f1900a6e269e6a94c90fcbfe56678 (Hybrid Analysis, 
2017a). Sample C3 triggered 1203 Sysmon events. The sample created six processes, created 
1,193 network connections, terminated one process, and created three files. The histogram of 
the Sysmon events generated by sample C3 is found in Figure 34.  
 
 
Figure 34. Histogram of Sysmon Events for Sample C3 
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The Locky sample labeled L1 was identified by the SHA-256 hash 
c35f705df9e475305c0984b05991d444450809c35dd1d96106bb8e7128b9082f (Hybrid-
Analysis, 2017l). Sample L1 triggered 210 Sysmon events. The sample created five processes, 
changed the creation time on 150 files, terminated one process, and created 53 files, and set 
one registry value. The histogram of the Sysmon events generated by sample L1 is found in 
Figure 35.  
 
 
Figure 35. Histogram of Sysmon Events for Sample L1 
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The Locky sample labeled L2 was identified by the SHA-256 hash 
294f55a28930c8afed9b95d2af108a6916eeb2c79967e91f4dde48026bab15ce (Hybrid-
Analysis, 2017e). Sample L2 triggered 214 Sysmon events. The sample created six processes, 
changed the creation time on 154 files, terminated one process, and created 52 files, and set 
one registry value. The histogram of the Sysmon events generated by sample L2 is found in 
Figure 36.  
 
 
Figure 36. Histogram of Sysmon Events for Sample L2 
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The Locky sample labeled L3 was identified by the SHA-256 hash 
4c054127056fb400acbab7825aa2754942121e6c49b0f82ae20e65422abdee4f (Hybrid-
Analysis, 2017d). Sample L3 triggered 209 Sysmon events. The sample created 7 processes, 
changed the creation time on 150 files, terminated one process, and created 54 files, and set 
two registry values. The histogram of the Sysmon events generated by sample L3 is found in 
Figure 37.  
 
 
Figure 37. Histogram of Sysmon Events for Sample L3 
 
 
